J. Samuel Spruyt

It has been a long time ago since Professor De Rijk first drew our attention to an important Parisian manuscript containing two treatises on logic, both connected with the School of the 'Montani'. The school was established in the twelfth century on the Mont Sainte Genevieve (which is situated in what is nowadays known as the Quartier Latin). It was dominated by master Alberic (Albericus) of Paris. The 'Montani' were the heirs (faithful or not) of Pierre Abelard, Robert of Melun and this master Alberic. The present work aims to provide a first working edition of one of the treatises in the manuscript, the 'Introductiones Montane Maiores'. This introductory work on logic contains a wealth of information about the way in which logic was taught and practiced in the schools of Paris of the twelfth century. It also gives insight into the vicissitudes of the teachings of different Parisian masters. The edition is preceded by an extensive introduction, with information about the origins and contents of the text and discussions of some interesting doctrinal elements.

This paper deals with John Wyclif 's account of the fallacia accidentis. To a certain extent Wyclif 's explanations fit in with Aristotle's understanding of language. Aristotle recognises that we can talk about substances in many different ways; we can introduce them by using 'substantial' names, but also by using names derived from the substances' accidental features. The substances are the ultimate foundation of all these expressions. This idea in itself is not opposed to a conceptualist account of language. John Buridan uses Aristotle's principle of categorisation to show how language works, but for him the activity of categorising things is to be explained in terms of our mental activities only. Wyclif, on the other hand, reads much into the requirement that all our linguistic distinctions should have their basis in extramental reality: our conceptualisations not only pertain to individual substances, but also parallel their distinct ontic layers.

This contribution discusses the views of the medieval theologian Henry of Ghent on the role of the teacher in the acquisition of knowledge. According to Henry, teaching is basically aimed at assisting a pupil in his acquisition of truth. In teaching, the role of language as the vehicle of truth is crucial: in order to acquire knowledge one needs to think correctly, and the only way to learn how to think correctly is through a correct use of language. After presenting an analysis of Henry’s ideas on the essence of learning and teaching, the paper will deal with their implications for the practice of teaching. Next a review of contemporary views on education will be presented. The contribution will conclude with a few remarks on how Henry of Ghent’s views could still be relevant for assessing contemporary ideas on education.

Logica modernorum. A critical note on Habermas’s portrait of medieval philosophy In his monumental history of philosophy, the eminent scholar Jürgen Habermas has managed to provide us with a thorough and very nuanced overview of thousands of years of western thought. The famous philosopher paints an impressive picture of the vicissitudes of the modernisation processes featuring in the history of western philosophy. The Leitmotiv of Habermas’s narrative is the way in which throughout history philosophy dealt with the question concerning the relationship between faith and reason. When it comes to the Middle Ages, it is not surprising that Habermas should focus on the opposition between Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham. However, by confining himself to the concepts of fides and ratio, he completely overlooks thirteenth-century developments in the domain of logic. To take note of these developments is fundamental to understand the process of modernisation in philosophy. The aim of this paper is to fill in the gap, by concentrating on thirteenth-century discussions of necessity and (logical) consequences.

This paper aims to explain Henry of Ghent's views on what kind of language is appropriate in theology, and why. It concentrates on a number of questions of the Summa quaestionum ordinariarum , which are devoted to his take on how theologians should explain their discipline to students, and to the meaningfulness in general of theological language. The paper delves into the technical terms sensus and insinuare , and compares Henry's account with H.P. Grice's views on (speaker-)meaning and his notion of `conversational implicatures', thus showing that Henry emphasises the performative features of linguistic use

Gerald Odonis' logic is generous in its acceptance of ontological counterparts of linguistic expressions. He claims that universals have an objective status and are independent of our mental operations. This article takes a closer look at his views on the meaning of what he calls esse tertio adiacens, i.e., the type of being expressed in propositions of the form 'S is P'. To a certain extent Odonis' analysis resembles Peter of Spain's account of compositio. Unlike his predecessor, however, Odonis thinks that the 'being' used in any true statement, regardless of whether the subject exists or not, is univocal. It turns out that Odonis' account is more in line with John Duns Scotus' intensionalist theory of propositional composition.

Gerald Odonis' logic is generous in its acceptance of ontological counterparts of linguistic expressions. He claims that universals have an objective status and are independent of our mental operations. This article takes a closer look at his views on the meaning of what he calls esse tertio adiacens, i.e., the type of being expressed in propositions of the form 'S is P'. To a certain extent Odonis' analysis resembles Peter of Spain's account of compositio. Unlike his predecessor, however, Odonis thinks that the 'being' used in any true statement, regardless of whether the subject exists or not, is univocal. It turns out that Odonis' account is more in line with John Duns Scotus' intensionalist theory of propositional composition

The thirteenth-century treatises on syncategorematic words still form a gold mine for studying the development of logic after Aristotle and Boethius. Generally speaking, the class of words labelled syncategoremata included expressions that, more than their categorematic counterparts, require the context of an expression in order to be meaningful. Nouns and verbs, such as ‘man’ and ‘to run’, were considered as having a more determined meaning than expressions such as ‘every’ or ‘not’. In the early days of the syncategoremata literature, the criteria for distinguishing categorematic from syncategorematic words were not entirely clear; authors used both syntactic and semantic criteria to separate the two classes from each other. The different ways of describing the two classes of words sometimes led to alternative lists of syncategoremata. Eventually the list came to include: the verb ‘is’; the negation ‘not’; the modal adverbs ‘necessarily’ and ‘contingently’; the exclusives ‘only’ and ‘alone’; the exceptives ‘except’ and ‘unless’ ; the distributive signs ‘every’ , ‘whole’ (‘ totum

_ Source: _Volume 56, Issue 3-4, pp 320 - 339 Thirteenth-century views on consequences have not yet received much attention. Authors of this period deserve closer scrutiny, because of their profound interest in the nature of consequence. The fundamental feature of a consequence was captured in the claim that its antecedent is the cause of its consequent. At the same time authors systematically discussed consequences in terms of truth-preservation. This paper considers the requirements of syllogistic argument and consequences in general, including the role of ‘cause’ in the identification of syllogisms proper, looks at different descriptions of consequence, moves on to discussions of the syncategorema ‘_si_’ – in _syncategoremata_ treatises by Peter of Spain, Henry of Ghent, Nicholas of Paris and William of Sherwood, as well as some _sophismata_ tracts – and explores what thirteenth-century authors make of the truth-functional characterisation of consequence, showing how it clashes with the authors’ insistence on a causal connection between antecedent and consequent.

In a small tract by Master Gerardus Odonis, found in the MSS Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229, ff. 204ra-207vb and Madrid, Bibl. Univ. 65, ff. 113ra-117va, which has the provisional title De natura universalis, attention is paid to the definition, the origin and the ontological status of the universal. Odonis is totally against the moderns' view that universals have a mental existence only. Instead he holds a view similar to that of Henry of Ghent : universals have the being of an essence and are the basis of all intellectual operations

This volume contains the first critical edition of a Spanish textbook on logic, found in the libraries of Sevilla and Zaragoza. It has tentatively been given the title Logica Morelli, taken from the title found in the Zaragoza copy. The author of this work, who perhaps went by the name Morellus, is as yet unknown. It seems likely that the work originates from the second half of the fifteenth century. It is structured in accordance with academic practice in Spain of that period, and bears a close relationship to Pedro de Castrovol's Logica. The handbook is a compilation of the material used for introductory courses on logic, comprising the study on terms, propositions, argumentation, universals and categories, and obligations. The text neatly testifies to the way in which logic was taught and practiced at Spanish universities during the late Middle Ages, and shows us how material from diverse mediaeval authors and traditions managed to survive in the curricula of late mediaeval academic programmes. The volume contains a broad introduction, as well as extensive indexes of names, sources, subjects, and sophisma-sentences and examples.