• Law and Mind: A Survey of Law and the Cognitive Sciences (edited book)
    with Bartosz Brożek and Nicole Vincent
    Cambridge University Press. 2021.
    Are the cognitive sciences relevant for law? How do they influence legal theory and practice? Should lawyers become part-time cognitive scientists? The recent advances in the cognitive sciences have reshaped our conceptions of human decision-making and behavior. Many claim, for instance, that we can no longer view ourselves as purely rational agents equipped with free will. This change is vitally important for lawyers, who are forced to rethink the foundations of their theories and the framework…Read more
  •  11
    Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation (edited book)
    with Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton, and Wojciech Załuski
    Springer Verlag. 2018.
  • Of Norms
    In Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation, Springer Verlag. pp. 103-138. 2018.
    This contribution elaborates the idea that norms are rules that lead to deontic consequences. Rules are one kind of constraints on possible worlds. They determine which facts necessarily go together or cannot go together. Three kinds of rules are distinguished: dynamic rules which attach consequences to the occurrence of events, fact-to-fact rules which attach one fact to the presence of some other fact, and counts-as rules, which make that some things also count as something else. Deontic facts…Read more
  •  1
    The Limited Function of Hermeneutics in Law
    In David Duarte, Pedro Moniz Lopes & Jorge Silva Sampaio (eds.), Legal Interpretation and Scientific Knowledge, Springer Verlag. pp. 1-11. 2019.
    My main claim in this article is that lawyers should make less use of the hermeneutical method than they do. The reasons that I will adduce to support this claim are the following: law is first and foremost an answer to the question of how to act and, more in particular, the question of which rules to enforce by collective means. As such, law does not coincide with positive law. Nevertheless, positive law determines the content of the law to a large extent. It does so for two reasons. The first …Read more
  •  6
    Book review (review)
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (4): 315-323. 1994.
  • What Is Legal Validity? Lessons from Soft Law
    In Anne Mackor, Stephan Kirste, Jaap Hage & Pauline Westerman (eds.), Legal Validity and Soft Law, Springer Verlag. 2018.
  •  20
    Legal Validity and Soft Law (edited book)
    with Anne Mackor, Stephan Kirste, and Pauline Westerman
    Springer Verlag. 2018.
  • Rechtsfilosofische annotaties: HR 26 januari 1990, NJ 1990, 794
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 197-203. 2004.
  • Jurisprudence or Legal Science? (review)
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 207-210. 2006.
  • Kunstige filosofie
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 64-67. 2007.
  • The Objectivity of Value Judgements
    Rechtstheorie 17 (4): 501-507. 1986.
  •  34
    An integrated view on rules and principles
    with Bart Verheij and H. Jaap Van Den Herik
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 6 (1): 3-26. 1998.
    In the law, it is generally acknowledged that there are intuitive differences between reasoning with rules and reasoning with principles. For instance, a rule seems to lead directly to its conclusion if its condition is satisfied, while a principle seems to lead merely to a reason for its conclusion. However, the implications of these intuitive differences for the logical status of rules and principles remain controversial.A radical opinion has been put forward by Dworkin (1978). The intuitive d…Read more
  •  147
    Hard cases: A procedural approach (review)
    with Ronald Leenes and Arno R. Lodder
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (2): 113-167. 1993.
    Much work on legal knowledge systems treats legal reasoning as arguments that lead from a description of the law and the facts of a case, to the legal conclusion for the case. The reasoning steps of the inference engine parallel the logical steps by means of which the legal conclusion is derived from the factual and legal premises. In short, the relation between the input and the output of a legal inference engine is a logical one. The truth of the conclusion only depends on the premises, and is…Read more
  •  17
    The logic of analogy in the law
    Argumentation 19 (4): 401-415. 2005.
    This paper deals with two issues in the field of reasoning by analogy in the law. The one issue is whether there exists such a thing as analogous rule application, or whether there is only the ‘normal’ application of a broadened rule. It is argued that if rules, as the entities made by a legislator, are distinguished from generalised solutions for cases, the idea of analogous application of rules makes sense. It is also shown how the so-called ‘reason-based model of rule application’, in contras…Read more
  •  5
    Recht als sociaal feit en recht als praktische rede
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 38 (1): 27-36. 2009.
    Brouwer argued against a vision of the law in which moral considerations partly determine the contents of the law. He did this for moral reasons, mainly because of the uncertainty such a vision would cause. This seems a strange view because it means that the nature of the law would depend on moral considerations concerning legal certainty. Most of the present paper is devoted to exploring two conceptions of the law, law as social fact and law as practical reason. It is argued that a view like Br…Read more
  •  39
    Theoretical foundations for the responsibility of autonomous agents
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3): 255-271. 2017.
    This article argues that it is possible to hold autonomous agents themselves, and not only their makers, users or owners, responsible for the acts of these agents. In this connection autonomous systems are computer programs that interact with the outside world without human interference. They include such systems as ‘intelligent’ weapons and self-driving cars. The argument is based on an analogy between human beings and autonomous agents and its main element asserts that if humans can be held re…Read more
  • Wetenschappelijke rechtsfilosofie?
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 1 7-12. 2007.
  •  39
    Rule consistency
    Law and Philosophy 19 (3): 369-390. 2000.
    This paper develops the theory that a set of rules is consistent if it is not possible that (1) the conditions of the rules in the set are all satisfied, (2) there is no exception to either one of the rules, and (3) the consequences of the rules are incompatible. To this purpose the notion of consistency is generalised to make it cover rules and is relativised to some background of constraints.This theory is formalised by means of Rule Logic, in which rules are treated as constraints on the poss…Read more
  • In memoriam: Popke Wieger Brouwer
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 3 213-214. 2006.
  •  46
  • Legal transactions and the legal ought
    In Jerzy Stelmach & Bartosz Brożek (eds.), The Normativity of Law, Copernicus Center Press. 2011.
  •  77
    Donald NUTE (ed.), Defeasible deontic logic
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 8 (1): 75-91. 2000.
  •  4
    Ter herinnering aan Bob Brouwer, een introductie
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 38 (1): 3-4. 2009.
    In an editorial article the editors supply a commentary on the topics covered in the journal
  •  1
    Rule Consistency
    Law and Philosophy 19 (3): 369-390. 2000.
    This paper develops the theory that a set of rules is consistent if it is not possible that the conditions of the rules in the set are all satisfied, there is no exception to either one of the rules, and the consequences of the rules are incompatible. To this purpose the notion of consistency is generalised to make it cover rules and is relativised to some background of constraints. This theory is formalised by means of Rule Logic, in which rules are treated as constraints on the possible worlds…Read more
  •  14
    Law and Coherence
    Ratio Juris 17 (1): 87-105. 2004.
  • De betekenis van juridische statuswoorden
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 37 (1): 13-28. 2008.