Jacek Brzozowski

In this article I introduce a hybrid view of persistence whereby simple objects persist by enduring while composite objects persist by being stage‐related. I first show how, by sharing certain features and not others with the standard (non‐hybrid) views of persistence, this hybrid view navigates two metaphysical problems that have been raised against such standard (non‐hybrid) views. I then consider some implications of the view by addressing a couple of worries that may be raised against it. I conclude that this hybrid view provides an attractive theory, one that deserves further investigation in the debate on persistence.

In their response to Persson and Savulescu's argument that we urgently need to pursue the moral enhancement of humankind given the risk posed by a ‘morally corrupt minority's potential to abuse cognitive enhancement’, Gordon and Ragonese offer a ‘practical proposal’ for a targeted form of cognitive enhancement whereby ‘as more sophisticated forms of cognitive enhancement become accessible, they should be made available in a carefully regulated way to’ scientific researchers invested in the production of new and improved moral enhancements. In this article we raise some concerns with such a proposal, focusing specifically on the (potential) harms such an intervention may give rise to, for both the enhanced researchers and their unenhanced counterparts. We further suggest that recent changes in the nature of the academic environment – which already seem to be driving researchers to use cognitive enhancers – present a serious challenge to any proposal that encourages such use.

Recently I defended a hybrid view of persistence whereby simple objects endure while composite objects are stage related. I argued that it deserves further investigation given the explanatory work it does with regard to two problems raised in the literature on the metaphysics of the persistence of objects. In this paper I look at two further problems that have been raised—one from natural explanation, the other from time travel. I show how the hybrid view is able to deal with these problems. In doing so I further build the case that the hybrid view is a serious contender in the persistence debate based on the explanatory work it can do.

_Monism_is the view that there exists just one fundamental object—the whole world. Monism (and the opposing view, _Pluralism_) can be placed in a framework of metaphysical priority whereby parts or wholes are then derived from whatever is fundamental. A supposed advantage of monism over pluralism is that it is better suited to accommodate _gunk worlds_, where each object has further parts. But on closer inspection, appeal to gunk worlds does not give monism a clear cut advantage over pluralism. Either monism faces worries similar to those of pluralism, or else it cannot explain how properties of composite objects supervene on those of their parts. So an appeal to gunk worlds does not support monism over pluralism.

In this article I introduce a hybrid view of persistence whereby simple objects persist by enduring while composite objects persist by being stage-related. I first show how, by sharing certain features and not others with the standard views of persistence, this hybrid view navigates two metaphysical problems that have been raised against such standard views. I then consider some implications of the view by addressing a couple of worries that may be raised against it. I conclude that this hybrid view provides an attractive theory, one that deserves further investigation in the debate on persistence.