Jaco Louw

In the following talk, I argue that the horizon, the specific here of the philosopher, is a constitutive site of dialogical encounters. To make this argument, I bring three philosophers into an unresolved conversation: Hans-Georg Gadamer’s understanding of the horizon as the ground for interpretation; Tsenay Serequeberhan’s effort to make the horizon political in the sense that the neo-colonial situation is when a living past has been rendered mute; and Jonathan Chimakonam’s relational horizon – where philosophical encounters happen between conversational partners thinking from their own philosophical places. By holding these three conceptions in productive tension, I argue that dialogical encounters require a mastery of vulnerability. This is demonstrated through philosophical counselling, where the horizon becomes aporia, the moment the practitioner’s conceptual repertoire fails. However, this failure becomes a hermeneutical opening, disclosing the distance between what the practitioner inherits and what the other (conversational partner) brings to the philosophical counselling session.

The interplay between listening and questioning, and its implications for philosophising, has been grappled with only in passing. Although listening and questioning are often cast as mutually exclusive, preserving the tension between them remains crucial for a philosophically attuned engagement with others. Conversational philosophy, I argue, provides fresh insights into maintaining and methodising this tension. When considering the encounter between conversational partners as constitutive to philosophising, the (re-)conceptualisation of both listening and the role of productive silences that emerge as (in-)between spaces in conversation becomes crucial. The conversational partners become integral collaborators in cultivating philosophy, creating novel concepts, and sustaining the conversation. But more fundamentally, it allows silence to bloom (echo, reverberate) and for conversational partners to listen attentively. This article argues that the productive tension between listening and questioning can be maintained by rooting the conversation in a novel framework of porous listening bodies. Philosophical counselling, a contemporary movement in practical philosophy, becomes an important conduit for concretising the principles of conversational philosophy, especially through the method of conversationalism. Crucially, this article thus introduces a praxis of listening-through-conversation(alism). Listening and productive silences are repositioned as dynamic, philosophically relevant, and fundamentally constitutive, particularly in collaborative efforts to cultivate philosophy and create new concepts.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological description of the authentic dialogue serves as an ideal framework for the embodied experience of listening, especially in philosophical counselling. Even though philosophical counsellors such as Gerd Achenbach and Anders Lindseth provide their own phenomenological accounts of listening in their practices, I argue that these descriptions lack corporeal grounding. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of reversibility, encroachment and the chiasm, I provide what I call the porous listening body, a framework that positions listening not as a skill to be mastered, but as a mastery of vulnerability – a continuous state of porosity. This embodied condition and ethical stance of radical receptivity allows both philosophical counsellor and the guest to be genuinely transformed by this encounter. Through three theoretical reframings, I translate Merleau-Ponty’s principles into a lived practice: encroachment becomes permeability, reversibility becomes a dynamic reception and the chiasm becomes the very structure of porosity itself. The porous listening body emerges as an active chiastic site where both participants dwell in the productive silences of the écart – the irreducible gap between the self and the other. By placing the framework of the porous listening body in dialogue with Achenbach’s and Lindseth’s work, I demonstrate how a Merleau-Pontian perspective not only deepens our understanding of philosophical counselling, but offers a concrete, embodied model for practitioners seeking to heed the call of truly listening.

Philosophical counselling is generally understood as a movement in practical philosophy that helps counselees, i.e. clients, resolve everyday problems with the help of philosophy. Moving outside of the scope of what philosophy can do, however, is a problem. More specifically, when the philosophical counsellor moves outside of the so-called realm of philosophy into the realm of psychotherapy, i.e. medical framework, problem resolution and ameliorative goals might be on the table. This plays into the hands of critics who state that philosophical counselling is encroaching on the terrain of the mental health professions without, inter alia, the proper evidence of its treatment efficacy. This paper is an attempt to keep the philosophical counsellor in the realm of philosophy, and by doing this to keep them busy with philosophising as such, i.e. philosophising as an end in itself. In particular, the article focuses on a novel interpretation of how to approach the counselee’s problem so that the philosophical counsellor does not fall prey to problem resolving and ameliorative endeavours. To substantiate this novel reinterpretation to the counselee’s problem, I turn to the notions of the Pyrrhonian aporia and the Derridean perhaps, in conjunction with a crucial position exclusively available to the counselee in philosophical counselling.

“How might one live?” is one of the most important questions for philosophical counselling. The reason being that in this collaborative undertaking with the counselee, the philosophical counsellor will consider, experiment with, and create alternative ways of being becoming and thinking/living. However, this explicit Deleuzian question—“How might one live?”—even if crucial as I maintain, lacks important contextualising factors and situating questions. That is, explicit situating and contextual factors are not immediately interrogated, incorporated, and taken seriously. Contemporary African philosophers explicitly think from and through these situating questions—From where does one write?; In what language does one think/speak?. Turning to these African philosophers, I want to positively expand the Deleuzian question by adding two crucial situating elements, viz., here, today. The expanded question thus reads “How might one live, here, today?”. Asking the question in this manner and speaking/writing from a (South) African perspective necessitates serious consideration of these perspectives from African philosophy.

The role of translation in philosophical counselling has not yet been sufficiently acknowledged, despite the importance it might play in multilingual contexts such as South Africa. In these contexts, translation becomes fundamentally philosophical. Concepts and ideas are firstly formulated in one language and translated into another, situated within a philosophical framework. However, this presents a unique challenge: philosophical counsellors are not necessarily translators. To mitigate this potential problem, I argue that philosophical counselling is best conceptualised as incorporating the practice of transcreation – a process of co-creating and co-cultivating meaning through a radical re-interpretative engagement. I turn to two African philosophical traditions to illustrate but also ground this process of transcreation, namely, Tsenay Serequeberhan’s hermeneutic philosophy and Jonathan Chimakonam’s conversational philosophy. Serequeberhan’s notion of a sifting and sieving or a cultural filtration and fertilisation of a living past demonstrates that philosophical inheritance is not passive reception but active reinterpretation, listening, and responding to contemporary needs. Similarly, Chimakonam’s method of conversationalism emphasises how knowledge must be “forged” through dynamic and radically reciprocal conversations grounded in a conversational dialect. With the help of these perspectives, I argue that philosophical counselling embraces a similar process of transcreation, shifting its focus to a radical reciprocity and cross-pollination of co-creatively cultivating different ways of thinking.

The role of translation in philosophical counselling has not yet been sufficiently acknowledged, despite the importance it might play in multilingual contexts such as South Africa. In these contexts, translation becomes fundamentally philosophical. Concepts and ideas are firstly formulated in one language and translated into another, situated within a philosophical framework. However, this presents a unique challenge: philosophical counsellors are not necessarily translators. To mitigate this potential problem, I argue that philosophical counselling is best conceptualised as incorporating the practice of transcreation – a process of co-creating and co-cultivating meaning through a radical re-interpretative engagement. I turn to two African philosophical traditions to illustrate but also ground this process of transcreation, namely, Tsenay Serequeberhan’s hermeneutic philosophy and Jonathan Chimakonam’s conversational philosophy. Serequeberhan’s notion of a sifting and sieving or a cultural filtration and fertilisation of a living past demonstrates that philosophical inheritance is not passive reception but active reinterpretation, listening, and responding to contemporary needs. Similarly, Chimakonam’s method of conversationalism emphasises how knowledge must be “forged” through dynamic and radically reciprocal conversations grounded in a conversational dialect. With the help of these perspectives, I argue that philosophical counselling embraces a similar process of transcreation, shifting its focus to a radical reciprocity and cross-pollination of co-creatively cultivating different ways of thinking.

There has been a significant resurgence in the interest of practical philosophy and its contribution to the lives of the public, particularly with the growing popularity of the contemporary philosophical counselling/praxis movement. This renewed interest is partly driven by and stems from a growing recognition, both within and beyond academia, of the value and insight that philosophy can offer. [...] It is against this backdrop of growing interest that the first English translation of Gerd Achenbach’s seminal work, Philosophical Praxis: Origin, Relations, and Legacy, allows the often misunderstood author to finally “have his say on his own terms”, as the translator Michael Picard writes. [...] With this English translation, enriched by the author’s explanations and additional material, the English-speaking world might thus gain closer access to Achenbach’s original vision and ideas for philosophical counselling/praxis. The timing is particularly significant, coinciding with renewed momentum in both philosophical counselling/praxis and philosophy as a way of life, allowing new generations of philosophical counsellors/practitioners to shape their practices in unique ways alongside the help of Achenbach (and the myriad of other approaches).

Contributions of Pierre Hadot pertaining to the notion of philosophy as a way of life have had a profound and enduring influence upon philosophical counselling. Philosophical counsellors, such as Robert Walsh and Arto Tukiainen, embrace this imperative by living their philosophical counselling practices. A prevailing trend among these practitioners lies in their almost exclusive reliance upon either ancient Greek philosophical traditions as expounded by Hadot and Martha Nussbaum, or in their adaptation of Western philosophy. Regrettably, a conspicuous omission prevails regarding the incorporation of contemporary African philosophy, notably their philosophical praxes as a way of life/living, within the philosophical counselling discourse. The integration of African philosophy into philosophical counselling holds significant promise, particularly concerning the potential to impact ways of living within a southern African context. Within the wider landscape of contemporary African philosophy, certain authors have already conceptualised Ubuntu philosophy as a way of life/living. Notwithstanding, I undertake to introduce two additional African philosophical practices, namely hermeneutic African philosophy and conversational philosophy. I advance a novel interpretation of both by positioning them as relevant praxes for philosophical counselling. Emphasis is placed on interpretative actualisations in response to lived experiences, contextualised within a conversational framework. The implications for philosophical counselling are threefold: first, there is a disclosing of alternative ways of living/becoming along with the creation of new concepts; second, the relational dimension of philosophising is emphasised; and third, methodological constraints concerning the practice of philosophical counselling are transcended while embracing the transformative potential of reflective, creative and critical conversations.

In this talk, I focus on, and give a brief overview of, four key dispositions or modes of being that can be extracted from African philosophy, particularly hermeneutic, ubuntu, and conversational philosophy. These key dispositions are (i) the indigenisation and appropriation of philosophical ideas and concepts emerging from non-African lifeworlds – a significant problem in the literature of African philosophy; (ii) the archival-archaeological inventory process of sifting, sieving, filtrating, and fertilising indigenous knowledges by “returning to the source”; (iii) creative struggles that follow the encounter with the other in their radical otherness/alterity; and (iv) the arumarustic relationship (conversational dialectics) that emphasise reciprocity, and mutual constitutive acts of humanness (ubuntu).

At the heart of philosophical counselling, an emerging field of practical philosophy, is a modest claim, that the lay public can benefit from all that philosophy has to offer. If accepted, this claim suggests that different philosophical traditions should be incorporated into the philosophical counselling discourse. Even though various philosophical traditions have slowly been incorporated, there are sparse mentions of African philosophy in the philosophical counselling literature. However, Ubuntu philosophy has recently garnered some attention. Nonetheless, in this talk I address this dearth of African philosophical input through the introduction of two alternative notions of African philosophy, namely, African hermeneutics and conversational philosophy. These two schools of thought provide valuable and enriching insights to the philosophical counselling discourse. Through this introduction, I aim to transform two key mechanisms as found in the philosophical counselling literature. These mechanisms, that of a hermeneutical happening and collaborative philosophising, invaluable as they are to our understanding of philosophical counselling, lack a certain contextual nuance and situated sensitivity. Consequently, a problematic value-neutrality is continually reproduced; the philosophical counsellor then emerges as an “unprejudiced and value neutral educator”. With the help of African hermeneutics and conversational philosophy, I aim to positively transform these mechanisms. This transformation involves taking seriously the situated and contextual response, emerging from and responding to, in this case, an African lifeworld. Resultant is an interpretive actualisation through a collaborative undertaking rooted in the very conditions of the philosophical conversation.

Philosophical counselling is typically conceptualised as a praxis going beyond academic and theoretical philosophy. However, two problems soon follow, namely the lack of agreed-upon methods and a substantial neglect of different philosophical traditions informing its practice. In this article, I propose reconceptualising philosophical counselling as a distinct method through which academic philosophy can be practised. This allows me to introduce an understanding of African philosophy, inspired by African philosophers Chimakonam and Serequeberhan, that might encourage the philosophical counsellor to render academic philosophy more applicable to the counselee. Moreover, it allows for embodied voices talking from an embedded African lifeworld to create new and more relevant concepts that emerge from that lifeworld.

Philosophical counselling, a contemporary movement in practical philosophy, continually expands its discourse by introducing novel philosophical ideas and different traditions. Nevertheless, a conspicuous silence persists regarding the introduction of African philosophies in its discourse. This issue becomes apparent when the question “How might one live?”—a fundamental question that the philosophical counsellor deals with—is adequately investigated. However, its current formulation suffers greatly from a much-needed nuance concerning temporal and contextual awareness. To address and transcend this shortcoming, I turn to two distinct African philosophies, namely, the hermeneutic philosophy of Tsenay Serequeberhan and the conversational method of philosophising advocated by Jonathan O. Chimakonam. By incorporating these philosophies, my aim is twofold: first, to promote an interpretative actualisation situated within a conversational framework that might lead to the creation of new concepts and/or the disclosing of different ways of being/becoming, and second, to draw attention to an underlying assumption that might maintain the neglect of philosophical traditions beyond Western philosophy.

Contributions of Pierre Hadot pertaining to the notion of philosophy as a way of life have had a profound and enduring influence upon philosophical counselling theory and practice. Various philosophical counsellors, such as Robert Walsh and Arto Tukiainen, have embraced this imperative by living their philosophical counselling practice. Nonetheless, a prevailing trend among these practitioners lies in their exclusive reliance upon either the ancient Greek philosophical tradition as expounded by Hadot, or in their adaptation of contemporary Western philosophies. Regrettably, a conspicuous omission prevails with respect to the incorporation of contemporary African philosophies, notably their philosophical praxes as a way of life/living, within the discourse of contemporary philosophical counselling. The integration of African philosophies into the discourse of philosophical counselling literature holds significant promise, particularly concerning the potential to impact ways of living within a Southern African context. Within the wider landscape of contemporary African philosophy, certain authors have already conceptualised ubuntu philosophy as a way of life/living. This talk, notwithstanding, undertakes to introduce two different African philosophies, namely, hermeneutic African philosophy and conversational philosophy. A novel interpretation of these philosophies will be advanced, positioning them as praxes for philosophical counselling. Emphasis is placed on an interpretative actualisation in response to lived experiences, contextualised within a conversational framework. The implications for philosophical counselling are threefold: firstly, the disclosing of alternative ways of life/living and being/becoming, along with the creation of new concepts; secondly, a profound accentuation of the relational dimension in philosophical counselling, underscored by the notion of collaborative philosophising that emerges from the dynamic interaction between the philosophical counsellor and the counselee; thirdly, a reworked understanding of philosophical counselling that moves beyond methodological constraints while embracing the transformative potential of reflective, creative, and critical conversations.

Philosophical counselling, a relatively new field in practical philosophy, offers to potentially edify the layperson’s everyday life with the help of philosophy. This lofty ideal is upheld by philosophical practitioners introducing various contemporary philosophies to its growing literature. However, many philosophical traditions beyond contemporary philosophy still somewhat suffer from an unwarranted neglect. Presently, African philosophy faces an almost complete absence in the philosophical counselling literature. It is thus a given that a prevalent lack of inquiry exists regarding its use in philosophical counselling. Despite this silence, fertile grounds exist for innovative contributions to further advance the development of African philosophy in philosophical counselling. In this talk, I will introduce a novel reading of African philosophy to the literature of philosophical counselling. This understanding of African philosophy is greatly inspired and influenced by the work of Tsenay Serequeberhan and Jonathan Chimakonam. More specifically, the notion of African philosophy gathered from these philosophers seek to advance the critical interpretation/hermeneutic actualised from a specific philosophical place or lifeworld through the method of conversationalism. Furthermore, the very rootedness of this notion of philosophy, stemming from a concrete lifeworld, actively problematises philosophies that reproduce a supposed and untenable value neutrality. Developing this understanding of African philosophy in a philosophical counselling context, I offer an initial critique of uncritical applications of philosophies originating from distinct philosophical places under the guise of a value neutrality. In maintaining this unwarranted silence on different philosophical traditions, philosophical counsellors might promote the use of philosophies as if universally applicable. And secondly, I propose that following from this understanding of African philosophy, philosophical counselling as such can begin to foster an environment in which new concepts can be co-created. Consequently, and in conjunction with conversationalism, radically new ways of being/becoming can be explored which might hold greater contextual significance.

Method in philosophical counselling is still a contentious topic. That is, there is no consensus on whether the philosophical counsellor should have a method in her practice to help the counsellee resolve philosophical problems. Some philosophical counsellors claim that there should not be any rigid adherence to method(s) as this will render philosophy too dogmatic. Philosophical counselling, in light of this view, promotes a kind of mutual philosophising sans definite goal with the counsellee. What I call "dissentient philosophical counselling" takes this claim even further: the philosophical counsellor lives/practices her philosophical counselling, that is, she embodies and practices philosophy as a way of life. This view is posed as a response to contemporary conceptualisations of philosophical counselling where the philosophical counsellor might stand in a disembodied relationship with her method(s) and tries to have a conversation "from nowhere". Dissentient philosophical counselling, even though more focused on living philosophically , still suffers from certain shortcomings. In this paper, I firstly showcase how even the seemingly innocuous but important question "How might one live?" suffers from a lack of much needed nuance. And secondly, I introduce, via a fictional narrative, a provisional way of practicing this reworked dissentient philosophical counselling. I do this by, firstly, introducing African conversational philosophy, via its method of conversationalism, and secondly, I introduce a peculiar version of Pyrrhonian scepticism especially regarding the notion of bios adoxastōs (life without dogma).

Philosophical counselling is generally understood as the discussion or resolution of everyday problems with the help of philosophy. However, few agree on this definition. This leads to a crisis of definition for philosophical counselling which in turn causes practical problems regarding, inter alia, the teaching of future philosophical counsellors, the question of method, and the potential scope of philosophical counselling. I identify in this study a prevalent therapeutic thesis on the nature of philosophical counselling which ties together some of the more popular conceptions of philosophical counselling. This thesis predominates when philosophical counsellors focus on the counselling part and neglect the philosophical part of philosophical counselling. This stance keeps philosophical counselling firmly contained within a medico-therapeutic framework. In opposition to this predominant view, I propose a reconceptualisation of philosophical counselling which does not subscribe to the therapeutic thesis and by implication works outside of a medical framework. More specifically, in fleshing out my non-therapeutic understanding of philosophical counselling, I propose twelve context-dependent conditions of philosophical counselling by drawing on a Pyrrhonian disposition and also on examples of philosophical counsellors who begin to work outside of the medico-therapeutic framework. I argue that these conditions should be met for philosophical counselling to stay firmly within the realm of philosophy as an aim in itself, thereby remaining true to its origin and basic orientation, and drawing on its innate strengths. With this fundamental reconceptualisation and the accompanying twelve context-dependent conditions, I propose a novel account of philosophical counselling which (i) does not subscribe to the therapeutic thesis, (ii) gives a novel answer to the problem of educating future philosophical counsellors, and (iii) has a clear scope of potential counselees.