Jacob Cléophas Defo Nzikou

This article aims to provide an account of Basile-Juléat Fouda's philosophical work, which is characterised as a Black African existential philosophy, pejoratively labelled as ethnophilosophy. Indeed, while Fouda sought to grasp culture from the ordinary life of Black Africans through a liberation of its interpretive possibility, his philosophical effort, whose essential material was African oral literature, met a singular fate in the African philosophical debate due to the exclusive adherence to Eurocentric critical thinking. However, the typical case of a comprehensive approach to his object, that of a hermeneutic of human and universal meaning, was doubly rejected: first, as reactionary - simply because it was developed in the wake of the affirmation of the existence of an original African philosophy; and secondly, because it was perceived as a revision of the very notion of philosophy, in the sense of an enlargement that would lead to a proper understanding of African modes of thought. Since it was a completely different orientation, it was considered a dilution of philosophy into culture for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of a Black African philosophy. However, the Black African philosophy thus denied only paid the price of methodological dissidence. For we see in it the preludes of a clash of approaches on African philosophical soil, concurrent with that of Gadamer and Habermas on European philosophical soil, between 'interpretive reason' and 'critical reason' known and recognized until then.

The aim of this article is to show that self-improvement is a modality of all dialectical ethics, which takes place in every hermeneutic situation where the subject confronts practical knowledge in order to decide on his or her action. From Aristotle to Basil-Juléat Fouda, ethical knowledge only makes sense in an intersubjective understanding of the world. From this unipolarity emerges the common ground of a philosophical foundation for ethics, namely from phrónèsis, which has the particularity of being practical knowledge, mobilising practical reason, and which is distinct from the theoretical knowledge of epistêmê. However, this disposition, which expresses itself in African knowledge-wisdom and guides its practical conduct, finds its consolidation in its relationship with transcendence. Thus, beyond the comparatism that establishes the identity between practical philosophy (Aristotle) and functional philosophy (Fouda), we realise that there is an African added value in terms of the foundations of ethical action.

This article aims to highlight the broad conception of interpretation that African hermeneutics proposes in its emancipation from the Western scriptural textual model. Indeed, since contemporary African hermeneutics establishes itself as a gnoseology of African philosophical singularity, rather than fully adopting the written paradigm of hermeneutics, it is essential to clarify how the thought of understanding and interpreting the being of African singularities follows a completely different hermeneutic approach. In fact, African philosophical hermeneutics is shaped by the uniqueness of African modes of transmission. Thus, the transition from oral tradition to written tradition, which is now established, cannot disregard what defines the specificity of African philosophical hermeneutics. Its theoretical appropriation has been a consequence of the challenges imposed by the imperialism of scriptural hermeneutic theories, which often exclude oral traditions. Furthermore, a non-restrictive conception of the notion of text or literature – one that extends beyond scripturality to encompass an oral tradition deeply embedded within cultural heritage – allows us to reconsider the limitations of contemporary hermeneutics. It also underscores the necessity of a more inclusive hermeneutic transformation. This suggests that hermeneutic theory should not be static but can evolve through encounters with new experiences and traditions.

This article explores how Jean Kinyongo Jeki contributes to the development of an intrinsic heuristic dimension within African philosophy, viewed through the lens of hermeneutic rationality. Faced with the challenge of articulating a rigorous and methodologically grounded African philosophical discourse, Kinyongo undertakes a hermeneutic detour that ultimately becomes an epistemological necessity. This turn leads him to identify "elements of philosophical discursivity"—core components of the intelligible form of African philosophical discourse—and to assert that their articulation requires a hermeneutic paradigm. Hermeneutic rationality thus emerges as a driving force for the authentic realization of African philosophy, anchored in a "philosophy of philosophical elements" pursued through a "discursive pathway." Through his effort to philosophically translate the concept of discursivity, framed within a hermeneutic epistemology, Kinyongo succeeds in rendering African philosophical thought heuristic—expressive of its internal dynamics of meaning.

The purpose of this article is to take account of the particularity and bias of Jacques Chatué's essentially comprehensive analysis of Basile-Juléat Fouda's contribution to Black African philosophy. Indeed, at a time when the quest for the authenticity of African philosophy is being played out through the epistemological means of a return to pheno-hermeneutics as the path best suited to catalysing its deployment, the apprehension already sketched out of the figurehead of this approach seems to us to be a possibility of strategic heuristic return. Thus, beyond the particularism expressed by this hermeneutist of Fouda through his stance vis-à-vis a proven misunderstanding of Fouda, which discredited the negro-African philosophy of existence ; beyond the partiality expressed by an 'a minima' grasp of his philosophical content, we insist on the added value offered by his philosophical paradigm, namely philosophical hermeneutics, to contribute further to his philosophical legitimisation and to the opening up of the possibility of an endogenous philosophy. Thus, Jacques Chatué's Basile-Juléat Fouda can be understood in two senses: firstly, as the philosophical offer of Fouda as grasped by Chatué, in the sense that this grasp would be different from that of Marcien Towa, for example; secondly, as a restitution specific to Chatué, in the sense that his horizon of understanding of Fouda remains limited within his field of vision and, as a result, authorises other possible horizons. If, for Gadamer, understanding consists in the process of merging horizons, this analysis proposes, finally, to identify the horizon of understanding in which Fouda's philosophy is situated.

The aim of this article is to examine the philosophical legitimacy of the work of Basil-Juléat Fouda, a philosopher whose thought has marked and continues to mark philosophical discussion in Africa. So as not to embrace all the possibilities open to us in this undertaking at once, the following discussion will highlight the epistemological function of hermeneutics in this offer. B.-J. Fouda insists on the way in which African or Negro philosophy must be interpreted. For him, it is through hermeneutics that it must be understood. We intend to apply this insight to his own philosophical analysis in order to bring out this epistemological function of hermeneutics. To do this, we will focus on the relationship between B.-J. Fouda’s thoughts and the theory of philosophical hermeneutics as epistemology. The truth is that B.-J. Fouda’s Negro-African philosophy of existence can be understood in abstraction from the essentially critical demands of modern philosophy, but its epistemological contribution can be measured in terms of a global or totalising conception of philosophical wisdom, as reflected in hermeneutic philosophy. Furthermore, the outline and choice of a hermeneutic epistemology is, in our opinion, the most appropriate if we wish to understand the reason for the distance that separates Macien Towa and Basil-Juléat Fouda.

This article highlights the effectiveness of the hermeneutic approach within the framework of African philosophy in general, and in the work of Basil-Juléat Fouda in particular. Without claiming to provide an exhaustive development of African thought, we demonstrate that the link between hermeneutics and African philosophy, recognized by Paulin Hounrondji, is a theme that has been variously explored by philosophers such as Benoît Okolo Okonda, Henri Odera Oruka, Henri Maurier, Issiaka Prosper Laleye, Jeki Kinyongo, Kä Mana, Niamkey Koffi, Nkombe Oleko, Onaotsho Kawende, Phambu Ngoma Binda, Tshiamalenga Ntumba, etc. This theme is further reinforced in Fouda’s proactive offering of a traditional African philosophy, which is inscribed in the dialectical debate of the local and the global with a firm desire “to situate African philosophy within the general movement of philosophical thought, in order to better show its originality”. Moreover, it will be necessary to realise that the hermeneutic rationality, whose rational procedures are more or less held in contempt in Africa, cannot be considered as a supplementary methodological practice, especially since it is an alternative rationality imposed by reality on thought. This is all the more significant given the recognized role of ‘endogenous knowledge’ in the history of thought and life, due to the effects of the perception of knowledge on the evolution of human consciousness, and consequently, the consciousness of belonging to a community, which is accentuated when one seeks to grasp its philosophical relevance.

The aim of this book review is to show that Jacques Chatué's notion of territory is more essential mark of the nation than of the State. For this author, the legal conception of this notion, which links it more closely to the State, constitutes a weakening of the notion. He therefore believes that a philosophical approach that allows the notion of territory to be conceived in relation to the nation rather than simply to the law resolves the tension between the universal and particular approaches, since the philosopher, in his conception, assumes, at best, his dual loyalty by normatively densifying the nation's territorial reference and preference. For the author, this is a reference and a preference that is intended to be strategic because it fosters patriotic civic-mindedness. However, what emerges is an endogenous, historically tested conception of the notion of territory, which we see as a conceptual added value.

The aim of this reflection is to awaken the need for a revitalisation of symbolic civism through a hermeneutic of patriotic signifiers. In fact, the destruction of historical consciousness is what makes such a hermeneutic at the level of the self-impossible. That is to say, historical consciousness, the memory of a people, serves as a breeding ground for identity and should always be maintained. This being the case, any identity crisis would be the expression of a malaise: that of the loss of the feeling of belonging to the same historical consciousness. Indeed, there is a crisis of meaning when there is a conflict of interpretations. This conflict stems from the fact that the plurality of interpretations, far from contributing to creativity, generates uncivilisation. For people who once lived together, a hermeneutic of patriotic signifiers is needed as a solution that can contribute to the recovery of the feeling of continuity that is characteristic of all historical consciousness.

The hermeneutic reflexivity of the work of art is intended to be a conscious approach to the inherence of its meaning. We propose to emphasise this in Hans-Georg Gadamer, who promotes an internalist approach to grasping the truth of the work of art. In fact, by countering the subjectivism of modern aesthetics, he recognises the autonomy of the work of art, which art theory, handicapped by an ontological approach, alienates. So he conceives of the work of art as an ontological event. This conception is shared by Fabien Éboussi Boulaga, who agrees with Hans-Georg Gadamer that art only makes sense as an actualisation of being. So we can say that the experience of the truth of art (Gadamer) or of the original 'feeling' of it (Éboussi Boulaga) translates its philosophical meaning from an ontological grasp of the meaning of the work of art.

The epistemological turn in hermeneutics, recognized today, offers a plural interpretation of the relationship between epistemology and hermeneutics as a discipline which each have a specific approach and a legitimate domain. Faced with a desire to substitute hermeneutics for epistemology or a dissolution of their legitimate domain, due to a hermeneutic added value within the framework of the theory of knowledge, under the pretext of calling into question exclusion of the subjective consciousness that scientific epistemology operates and that hermeneutics claims, one could not cherish either the dream, with an antagonistic gaze, or that of compatibility, between hermeneutics and epistemology, if not that of an inclusion which hardly signifies identity, in the theory of contemporary knowledge. Also, this article attempts to articulate the different perspectives of this report to identify what constitutes its value efficient.

The aim of this article is to show that Gadamer's relationship with Christian theology, although non-partisan, is reflexive in his hermeneutic theory, which nevertheless claims to be philosophical. In this sense, the article takes as its starting point a double relationship, that of his link with pietistic Protestantism and that of his proximity to the theories of theologians and philosophers recognised as having been developed according to a 'religious disposition'. The analysis presented here reflects this reflexivity on the part of the author, and at the same time highlights the fact that it is a reflexivity that unfolds performatively. For the author, there is no such thing as research devoid of epistemological innocence. However, such a stance, which is antithetical to positivism, is polemical in that it reintroduces subjectivity into research, even though it may offer an entirely different route to truth.

The gadamerian project to set up an autonomous philosophical hermeneutics is a revolutionary idea in hermeneutics, which is part of the will of the author of “L’herméneutique en rétrospective”, to differentiate philosophical hermeneutics' approach from other hermeneutics (philological/literary, theological, legal, scientific, etc.) that already exist. Dogmatic and scientific approaches dominate hermeneutical activities from its predecessors who are, for the most part, theologians and/or laudators of positive methods of exact sciences. The schleiermacherian conception could have satisfied it, but its tendency to generalise hermeneutics in a philosophical framework, hardly let show the autonomy of this one compared to the existence of the other. It was then necessary, beyond considerable efforts that, from his predecessor Schleiermacher, that Gadamer established the field of “philosophical hermeneutics” independent of current hermeneutics, and in particular theological hermeneutics. To Gadamer, it was a question of going beyond theological hermeneutics to ensure autonomy of philosophical hermeneutics, despite a pietist tradition which still weighs on his shoulders like a burden. Some had seen in this overtaking a rigorous and programmed partitioning (discontinuity) between the two forms of hermeneutics ; others, on the other hand, saw it as a continuity, by affirming impossibility of this philosophical hermeneutic to completely rid itself of the theological heritage of its author. However, a careful rereading of the gadamerian project as it appears in filigree in "Truth and Method", rereading backed by a historical-comprehensive method, which allows to reconcile the two paradoxical points of view without encroaching autonomy of one and other disciplines. Such a reconciliation, as long as it is intelligently made, has the merit of revealing new epistemological, anthropological and ethical issues, reflecting the skilfully combined contributions of theology and philosophy in the new hermeneutical activity assumed by Gadamer.

One might have expected a radical division between theology and philosophy in Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics, theological understanding of revealed knowledge being a priori dogmatic and different from a philosophical grasp underpinned by a rational and critical approach. Far from it! Gadamerian hermeneutics reserves the right to dismiss the two disciplines once and for all, since it operates a discontinuity within continuity. The concern to exclude and include the theological and the philosophical in a hermeneutical investigation requires, however, a conceptual revision of the theological notions of understanding and application, so as to fully involve the subject in their respective implementations. This involvement aims to restore to the hermeneutic subject its autonomy and its right to freely critique constituted truths, according to its present and future historical situation, in a new world. Gadamer thus safeguards his theological experience in his philosophical investigations by rationally dissolving the highly dogmatic character of the truths contained in the biblical texts, in order to relativise and contextualise them in space and time. Gadamer counters the proponents of the systematic divorce between theology and philosophy, faith and reason, God and man, by showing that a hermeneutics based exclusively on reason would be limited and incapable of being reflectively enriched by divine truths. Gadamer's hermeneutic is therefore the vehicle for a new epistemological approach to the relationship between theology and philosophy, on the one hand, and for a new anthropology that sees human happiness in a prudent reconciliation with God, on the other.

Translation studies on this dilemma have become even more relevant at a time when the term “creativity” has been introduced to express a better understanding of what was once perceived as “betrayal”. The resurgence in recent years of the debate on faithfulness versus the creativity alternative, shows that we have not been dissuaded from breaking with the absolute vow of faithfulness which has kept translation in a dilemmatic status. From the point of view of hermeneutic expertise, this article attempts to argue that creativity is not a simple alternative, but a necessity which is essential when translating. To support this point, the analysis of the hermeneutic reflexivity of creativity in translation is based on the interpretative character of translating which brings into play the phenomenon of understanding. Starting from highlighting the fertility of the act, we demonstrate that it amply justifies the fact that a translation is equivalent. It is basically a question of demonstrating that translation is the construction of an equivalence of meaning and value. The article concludes that, in a manner consistent with the fact that creativity is not an alternative, the vow of faithfulness participates in the dialectic of the emergence of meaning and supports the idea that translation is a creative project.