Jacob McNulty

I argue that Sartre is an anti-intellectualist about intersubjectivity. For Sartre, our most basic relationship to others is not an intellectual one, not undergirded by reasons.This distinguishes Sartre from the German Idealists and from Hegel in particular. I argue that the divergence between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism explains another, namely, Sartre’s pessimism about human relationships as compared with Hegel’s optimism. What is more, Sartre’s views on intersubjectivity rest on one of his main anti-Hegelian commitments, the idea that being cannot be made fully transparent to thought. Some attention also to the problem of skepticism about other minds.

I here respond to Casati’s wonderful new book: Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being. I do so by attempting to reinforce the case for an alternative to his dialetheist interpretation of Heidegger: an interpretation based on what he calls “the showing solution” (borrowed from the literature on Wittgenstein). According to “the showing solution” the appropriate response to the contradiction of being is to accept its ineffability, not attempt to explain its contradictory nature. For the friends of ineffability, like myself, the problem with dialetheism is not that it is counter-intuitive but that it presses the demand for explanation too far. Along the way I suggest that reading Heidegger as I prefer has another advantage: preserving his conception of philosophy as what Bernard Williams calls “a humanistic discipline” (not to be confused with the humanism Heidegger and his French post-structuralist followers deplores in Sartre). I develop this line of counter-argument to Casati by invoking a critique of rationalist metaphysics and of the PSR that was made by a philosopher Heidegger himself greatly admired: Kant.

Among Sartre's best‐known theses in Being and Nothingness is his claim that the world of experience contains what he calls “négatités,” little pools or pockets of nothingness. The most famous example of a négatité is Pierre, the friend who is absent from the café. Sartre's conviction that there are négatités all around us has another side, often obscured from view: I mean his (apparent) conviction that we ourselves are a kind of non‐being or nothingness. In this paper I try to shed some light on this Sartrean thesis by connecting it to perennial problem in metaphysics concerning the status of holes, shadows or absences — in short, non‐beings. However I see more than mere analogy here. Sartre's view, as I understand it, is that we literally are a type of hole. We are holes in the sense that we are the kinds of nonbeings that require beings as our hosts. More accurately, it is being and not beings that host the holes that we are. Ordinary holes have some particular material thing as their hosts: cheese or fabric. Yet our “host” is not any particular being (cheese or fabric) but being itself: the in‐itself [en soi].

This essay defends a modified version of Nahum Browns “dialetheist” interpretation of bad faith. On this interpretation, bad faith, as a form of self-deception, constitutes a dialetheia or true contradiction. While in agreement with the dialetheist interpretation, I argue that bad faith is just as much a flight from true contradiction and towards what I call “sham consistency.” I also put forward a multi-step model of bad faith as cyclical, recursive and reflexive. And I respond to the objection that bad faith involves a truth value gap rather than a glut. I finally employ the dialetheist interpretation to explain Sartres contention that bad faith has its origins in the most primitive layer of human experience: the pre-reflective cogito.

Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) is known to many as a leading figure of 1960s counter-culture, and a 'Guru of the New Left'. However, the deeper philosophical background to Marcuse's thought is often forgotten, especially his significant engagement with German idealism, ancient philosophy, and a broad spectrum of problems and issues from the philosophical tradition. This much-needed book introduces and assesses Marcuse's philosophy and is ideal for those coming to his work for the first time. Jacob McNulty covers the following topics: Marcuse's life and the background to his thought, including his formative period as a student of Husserl and Heidegger and as a philosopher in Horkheimer's institute Marcuse's recasting of metaphysics in light of Marxian and Freudian thought Marcuse and German idealism, especially the role of Kant and Hegel Marcuse's philosophy of human nature, his use of the late Freud's ideas of Eros and Thanatos Marcuse as a critic of state and monopoly capitalism Meaning, propaganda, and ideology: the political implications of language and also the centrality of free speech Marcuse's aesthetics Marcuse's legacy and his relationship to contemporary analytical philosophy (especially "analytic critical theory"). An outstanding and engaging introduction to a central figure in twentieth-century radical thought, Marcuse is essential reading for those in philosophy and related disciplines including political theory, sociology and media and communication studies.

For Hegel, poverty is not simply a misfortune, but, rather, a kind of injury inflicted on one class by another. Though Hegel rejects Marx’s theory of class, he nevertheless anticipates Marx’s idea of the exploitation of one class by another. How, though, do we align this proto-marxist dichotomy between rich and poor with Hegel’s official theory of class; his tripartite theory of estates? I argue that Hegel’s wealthy are chiefly found in the ‘mercantile’ estate, and that they are those intellectual labourers who manage, oversee, and organize the production process.

Kantian constitutivists, like Velleman and Korsgaard, argue that there are norms internal to individual agency. Yet as Gilbert and others have argued there may be norms internal to shared agency as well. Might political principles of justice be norms of this second kind? I turn to the history of philosophy for an answer, focusing on Rousseau’s classic work the Social Contract. Rousseau is much better known as a social contract theorist – but I argue that he is also a constitutivist about group agency. This means he is a thinker for whom success or failure in realizing the demands of justice is nothing other than success or failure in acting together. Unjust regimes, e.g. despotic ones, are ones whose members fail to genuinely act together. Interpretively, this approach has the advantage of explaining away the appearance of totalitarian tendencies in Rousseau’s thinking (‘the general will is always right’). Philosophically, it has the advantage of revealing in Rousseau’s writings what I believe is a unique type of social contract theory, resolutely non-hypothetical and normatively robust. In the closing sections, I revisit the oft-raised question of Rousseau’s relation to Rawls in light of the interpretation of the former proposed here.

This essay takes up a challenge recently posed by Graham Oppy: to clearly express, in premise-conclusion form, Hegel's version of the ontological argument. In addition to employing this format, it seeks to supplement existing treatments by locating a core component of Hegel's argument in a slightly different place than is common. Whereas some prominent recent treatments (Williams, Bubbio, Melechar) focus on Hegel's definition of the Absolute as the Concept, from the third part of his Science of Logic (the Doctrine of the Concept), mine focuses on earlier definitions from the first (the Doctrine of Being). As I hope to show, there are even more resources in Hegel's Logic for an ontological argument than those emphasized in recent treatments: the concept, the Idea, etc. Already in the first third of the Logic, we find a compelling response to a famous Kantian counter-argument to the ontological proof. The counter-argument is summed up in the phrase ‘existence [Sein] is not a real predicate’. Hence, Hegel's response as I interpret it will take the form of a competing analysis of Being, a Lehre vom Sein (Doctrine of Being). What do we learn when we put the ontology back into Hegel's ontological argument? That Being is neither predicate, nor subject, nor copula, but a monist (or ‘infinite’) category. The larger importance of this exercise to our understanding of Hegel's thought lies in the way it clarifies his profound debt to even non-idealist conceptions of God, such as the one espoused by Spinoza.

Kant said that logic had not had to take a single step forward since Aristotle, but German Idealists in the following generation made concerted efforts to re-think the logical foundations of philosophy. In this book, Jacob McNulty offers a new interpretation of Hegel's Logic, the key work of his philosophical system. McNulty shows that Hegel is responding to a perennial problem in the history and philosophy of logic: the logocentric predicament. In Hegel, we find an answer to a question so basic that it cannot be posed without risking incoherence: what is the justification for logic? How can one justify logic without already relying upon it? The answer takes the form of re-thinking the role of metaphysics in philosophy, so that logic assumes a new position as derivative rather than primary. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in Hegel studies and beyond.

My aim in this paper is to explore an affinity between early critical theory and analytical philosophy. The affinity is in a fairly unexpected area: philosophy of science. I argue that early critical theory embraces a view of science which is a natural if somewhat unfamiliar extension of the pragmatist one defended by Quine. In particular, I argue that Horkheimer has a version of the Quine-Duhem thesis (“underdetermination of theory choice by the evidence”). How do the Frankfurt and analytical versions of the underdetermination thesis differ? Quine and others have taken the thesis to motivate a form of pragmatism. What this means is that it is certain interests that ultimately determine the choice of theory: chief among them, an interest in simplicity of our theories. However, the Critical Theorists offer us a distinctly historical materialist version of the underdetermination thesis, in which it is the imperatives of the prevailing mode of production, for example, capitalism, which are decisive. The result is an unfamiliar Marxist version of an otherwise familiar thesis from the analytic tradition.

In the opening sections of his Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte argues that mutual recognition is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. However, the argument turns on the apparently unconvincing claim that, in the context of transcendental philosophy, conceptions of the subject as an isolated individual give rise to a vicious circle the resolution of which requires the introduction of a second rational being to ‘summon’ the first. In this essay, my aim is to present a revised account of the opening arguments on which they are more convincing. In particular, I argue that the problem of a circle is genuine and may be seen to result from a relation of mutual dependence between agency and cognition which ensures that for an exercise of either capacity to take place, an exercise of the other would have already had to have taken place with the result that neither can occur. Moreover, the solution is successful. The summons prevents us from being driven around the circle once more because it is a ‘synthesis’ that reconciles the constraint to which I am subject as a cognizer of independently given objects and my freedom as a self-determining subject.