Jacob Ritz

Divergent readings of G. W. F. Hegel’s work have proliferated over recent decades, alternating between the two extremes of deflationary or metaphysical interpretations. This paper seeks to bridge the divide between these incompatible perspectives. On the one hand, deflationary views reduce Hegel’s system to an epistemological methodology that makes no metaphysical claims. On the other hand, metaphysical views claim that Hegel develops an ontology from Kant’s philosophy. Interestingly, an analogous divide exists among scholarship of Kant’s critical idealism which Lucy Allais’ moderate metaphysical interpretation addresses directly. As such, I aim to adapt Allais’ interpretation of Kant to help resolve the anarchy that permeates studies of Hegel. First, I outline the deflationary and metaphysical readings of Kant; the incompleteness of the former and the inconsistency of the latter; and present Allais’ moderate metaphysical interpretation as a synthesis of these views which combines their respective advantages. I then outline an analogous divide among Hegel interpretations to uncover an implicit reading of Kant that dominates Hegel scholarship, leading towards a new typology of Kant-Hegel scholarship. This analysis foregrounds my adaptation of Allais’ approach to Hegel’s case, allowing me to sketch a tentative, moderate metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy.