Jacob Zellmer

Realist interpreters argue that states are real individuals and not merely metaphorical or quasi-individuals for Spinoza. This paper argues that realism conflicts with Spinoza's conatus doctrine which is indispensable for his value theory. The conatus doctrine maintains that no individual, in itself, can be destroyed except by an external cause. Yet states can be destroyed by internal causes such as defective laws, citizens, or rulers. This is evidence that not all states are real individuals for Spinoza. After responding to objections, the paper then presents a positive view, qualified realism: some states are individuals, and some are not, on Spinoza's account. To be an individual, a state must meet the conditions for having a conatus: it must have a ratio, that is, an internal structuring by which, in itself, it produces unified effects that preserve its being.

This article examines how deduction preserves certainty and how much certainty it can preserve according to Descartes’s Rules for the Direction of the Mind. I argue that the certainty of a deduction is a matter of four conditions for Descartes. First, certainty depends on whether the conjunction of simple propositions is composed with necessity or contingency. Second, a deduction approaches the certainty of an intuition depending on how many “acts of conceiving” it requires and—third—the complexity or difficulty of the acts of thinking, which is determined by the content of the thoughts and on external factors. Fourth, certainty depends on the intellectual aptitude of the person using the deduction. A deduction lacks certainty when it relies on memory such that it is not apprehended with immediacy. However, the mental capacity and speed of a mind can be increased by training the special mental faculties of perspicacity and discernment. Increasing one’s intellectual aptitude allows for more steps of a deduction to be inferred in fewer acts of conceiving, thereby helping preserve the certainty of a deduction.

abstract: In 1655, La Peyrère was the first to substantially argue for and popularize polygenism—the view that God created multiple original human mating pairs in separate acts of creation with numerous pairs created before Adam. Positing or rejecting polygenism has been central to modern theorizing about human types and origins. Prominent recent interpreters have maintained that La Peyrère’s polygenism does not imply a hierarchy of human types. This paper reconstructs La Peyrère’s account and, in opposition to the dominant view, argues that his polygenism produces a human species hierarchy. The Adamite species is superior to the pre-Adamite species in virtue of its material composition, mode of creation, and form. The upshot is that La Peyrère’s theological system posits a protoracialist conception of human types.