Jacobus Erasmus

In this chapter I defend the second premise of the kalām cosmological argument, namely, that if the universe came into existence, then God brought it into existence. In defence of this premise, I appeal to a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) that states that every contingent concrete object that exists has a sufficient explanation in an external state of affairs why it exists. I argue, first, that we have a strong intuition for the PSR, second, that we have no evidence that the PSR is false and, third, that the denial of the PSR is inconsistent with atheism. I then argue that, even if the PSR is false, the incredible fine-tuning of the universe renders it highly unlikely that the universe lacks a sufficient explanation. Finally, by way of a conceptual analysis of what an explanation of the universe involves, I show that it must be God who brought the universe into being.

The cosmological argument is an argument type that attempts to infer the existence of a supernatural being (usually identified with God) from supposed facts about the universe, for example, that the universe exists, or that the universe is contingent because it could have not existed, or that the universe came into existence. Since the cosmological argument is an argument type, the phrase ‘the cosmological argument’ is usually used in the plural form to refer to the family of theistic arguments (a theistic argument is an argument in favour of theismtheism or God’s existence) that follow the pattern of inferring God’s existence from alleged facts about the universe. The cosmological argument is often classified into the following three types (Craig, The cosmological argument from Plato to Leibniz. Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene, 2001)

John PhiloponusPhiloponus, John was an influential sixth century Christian theologian, philosopher, and scientist. PhiloponusPhiloponus, John was the first Christian to make use of the concept of infinity to formulate philosophical arguments in favour of creatio ex nihilocreatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothingcreation out of nothing), the view that God created the universe out of nothing. In this chapter I examine Aristotle’s notion of infinity, which inspired PhiloponusPhiloponus, John’ infinity arguments. I then survey PhiloponusPhiloponus, John’ three infinity arguments, namely, the argument based on the impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite, the argument based on the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite, and the argument based on the impossibility of increasing an actual infinite.

The kalām cosmological argument is a philosophical argument in favour of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilocreatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothingcreation out of nothing), which states that God brought the universe into existence out of nothing or without the use of pre-existing materials. In this chapter I discuss the theological background of the kalām cosmological argument, first, by evaluating whether there is any biblical support for creatio ex nihilocreatio ex nihilo and, second, by examining several ancient influential Jewish and Christian thinkers who affirmed creatio ex nihilocreatio ex nihilo.

PhiloponusPhiloponus, John and Al-Ghazālı̄al-Ghazālı̄ could not have anticipated the rise of set theory and modern cosmologycosmology that occurred during the nineteenth century. These two independent fields have a direct bearing on the kalām cosmological argument. set theorySet theory challenges the mediaeval concept of infinity, while cosmology has much to say about the nature of time and the origin of the universe. Consequently, one cannot understand the modern versions of the kalām cosmological argument without a basic understanding of both set theory and cosmology, nor can one defend the argument today without interacting with these two fields. Therefore, this chapter offers a brief overview of set theory and cosmology.

William Lane Craig, the contemporary Christian philosopher of religion, is the foremost advocate of the kalām cosmological argument. Although Craig’s kalām cosmological argument is not totally unique, he advances the kalām cosmological argument in at least two distinct ways. First, he takes modern set theoryset theory into account in his defence of the impossibility of an actual infinite, ensuring that the kalām cosmological argument is in line with contemporary mathematics. Second, unlike his predecessors, Craig presents scientific arguments together with the philosophical arguments in support of a beginning of the universe. As a result, Craig has helped foster interaction between philosophers and physicists regarding the origin of the universe. This chapter offers an analysis of Craig’s formulation and defence of the argument.

Most physicists and cosmologists who believe that the universe is, or can be, eternal justify this belief by the fact that one may, conceivably, construct an eternal cosmological model, that is, a cosmological model that includes or entails an eternal universe. But is this correct? Can an eternal cosmological model, by itself, justify belief in the possibility of an eternal universe? In this chapter I argue that the answer to this question is negative. First, I argue that, if one does not engage with the philosophical arguments for a beginning of the universebeginning of the universe, and if one does not included in the pool of explanatory options the hypothesis of an absolute beginning when evaluating which hypothesis best explains the discoveries of modern cosmology, then one’s belief in the possibility of an eternal universe cannot be justified solely by the fact that there exist several eternal cosmological models. I then argue, second, that even if an eternal cosmological model can justify this belief, no such model is currently successful, and the hypothesis that the universe had a beginning is, at present, the best explanation of the discoveries of cosmology.

According to the Infinity Argument, an actually infinite regress of past events cannot exist because an actual infinite cannot exist. The Infinity Argument is one of the most common arguments for a beginning of the universe espoused by advocates of the kalām cosmological argument. However, in this chapter I argue that the Infinity Argument is inconclusive and not a good argument in support of theism because it depends on controversial metaphysical positions. I show that the Infinity Argument is, first, incompatible with Platonism, second, incompatible with the standard definition of omniscience and, third, relies on a controversial metaphysical intuition.

John Schellenberg argues that divine hiddenness is evidence against God’s existence. More precisely, according to Schellenberg’s well-known Hiddenness Argument, God’s existence entails that there would never be any nonresistant non-believers; however, there are some non-resistant non-believers; therefore, God does not exist. In this paper, we offer a Molinist response or solution to the Hiddenness Argument. First, we briefly explain Molinism, we then describe Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument, and, finally, we argue that Molinism undercuts the view that God would necessarily ensure there will never be any nonresistant non-believers.

In a recent article, William C. Roach offers a presuppositional critique, which is inspired by Carl F. H. Henry, of Michael R. Licona’s so-called New Historiographical Approach to defending the resurrection. More precisely, Roach attempts to defend six key theses, namely, that the NHA is an evidentialist approach, the NHA is a deductive argument, the NHA is an insufficient approach, believers and unbelievers share no common ground, the NHA does not embrace a correspondence theory of truth, and the presupposition of divine revelation is necessary for apologetics. We respond to each of Roach’s arguments, respectively.

A common argument in support of a beginning of the universe used by advocates of the kalām cosmological argument (KCA) is the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite, or the “Infinity Argument”. However, it turns out that the Infinity Argument loses some of its force when compared with the achievements of set theory and it brings into question the view that God predetermined an endless future. We therefore defend a new formal argument, based on the nature of time (just as geometrical reasoning is based on the nature of space), which addresses more directly the question of beginningless time.

Divine determinism, though affirmed by many Calvinists, implicates God in the decisions people make that ultimately damn them to the terrible destiny of hell. In this paper, the authors argue that this scenario is a problem for divine determinism. The article contends that determinism is inconsistent with God’s love and the Scriptures that explicitly state that God does not ‘desire’ anyone to go to hell. Even human love for others strongly suggests that God, who is ‘love’, will not determine anyone to hell. On the other extreme, those who argue for universalism, though appealing to Scripture, often do so with questionable exegesis.

In a recent article, Andrew Ter Ern Loke raises several objections to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef’s exposition and response to the so-called ‘Infinite God Objection’ to the kalām cosmological argument. According to this objection, the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite brings into question the view that God’s knowledge is infinite. Erasmus and Verhoef’s solution to this objection, which Loke criticises, depends on an unusual account of omniscience. In this article, I respond to Loke and show that his objections are unsuccessful.

This book offers a discussion of the kalām cosmological argument, and presents a defence of a version of that argument after critically evaluating three of the most important versions of the argument. It argues that, since the versions of the kalām cosmological argument defended by Philoponus (c. 490–c. 570), al-Ghazālī (1058– 1111), and the contemporary philosopher, William Lane Craig, all deny the possibility of the existence of an actual infinite, these arguments are incompatible with Platonism and the view that God foreknows an endless future. This conclusion, however, is not a problem for the proponents of the kalām cosmological argument, for the book shows how the argument can be defended without denying the possibility of the actual infinite. In order to offer a comprehensive analysis of Philoponus and al-Ghazālī’s cosmological arguments, the book draws on recent English translations of some of their works. Next, the book advances a detailed argument against the popular argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite. Finally, the book offers a unique defence of the kalām cosmological argument by defending philosophical arguments for a beginning of time that do not deny the actual infinite, evaluating which hypothesis best explains the discoveries of modern cosmology, and offering an argument in support of the premise that, if the universe came into existence, then God brought it into existence.

In a recent paper, John J. Park argues (1) that an abstract object can bring a universe into existence, and (2) that, according to the Big Bang Theory, the initial singularity is an abstract object that brought the universe into existence. According to Park, if (1) and (2) are true, then the kalam cosmological argument fails to show that the cause of the universe must be divine. I argue, however, that both (1) and (2) are false. In my argument I analyse the abstract/concrete distinction and conclude that, by its nature, an abstract object is causally inefficacious in the sense that it cannot bring something into existence.

In this article, we evaluate various responses to a noteworthy objection, namely, the infinite God objection to the kalām cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the proponents of the kalām argument face a dilemma—either an actual infinite cannot exist or God cannot be infinite. More precisely, this objection claims that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinite with God knowing an actually infinite number of future events or abstract objects, such as mathematical truths. We argue, however, that the infinite God objection is based on two questionable assumptions, namely, that it is possible for an omniscient being to know an actually infinite number of things and that there exist an actually infinite number of abstract objects for God to know

Yishai Cohen raises three related objections to the kalam cosmological argument. Firstly, Cohen argues that, if the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite, which is used to support the kalam cosmological argument, is sound, then a predetermined endless future must also be impossible. Secondly, Cohen argues that the possibility of a predetermined endless future entails the possibility of an actual infinite. Finally, Cohen maintains that Robert C. Koons’ Grim Reaper paradox shows that a predetermined endless future is impossible. I intend to show that Cohen’s three arguments are not sound and that the possibility of an endless future is not a thorn in the kalam cosmological argument.