Jacoby Carter

Philosophizing the Americas establishes the field of inter-American philosophy. Bringing together contributors who work in Africana Philosophy, Afro-Caribbean philosophy, Latin American philosophy, Afro-Latin philosophy, decolonial theory, and African American philosophy, the volume examines the full range of traditions that have, separately and in conversation with each other, worked through how philosophy in both establishes itself in the Americas and engages with the world from which it emerges. The book traces a range of questions, from the history of philosophy in the Americas to philosophical questions of race, feminism, racial eliminativism, creolization, epistemology, coloniality, aesthetics, and literature. The essays place an impressive range of philosophical traditions and figures into dialogue with one another: some familiar, such as José Martí, Sylvia Wynter, Martin R. Delany, José Vasconcelos, Alain Locke, as well as such less familiar thinkers as Arturo Alfonso Schomburg, Hilda Hilst, and George Lamming. In each chapter, the contributors find fascinating and productive matrices of tension or convergence in works throughout the Americas. The result is an original and important contribution to knowledge that introduces readers from various disciplines to unfamiliar yet compelling ideas and considers familiar texts from novel and prescient perspectives. Philosophizing the Americas stands alone as a representation of current scholarly debates in the field of inter-American philosophy. Contributors: Stephanie Rivera Berruz, Jacoby Adeshei Carter, Nadia Celis, Tommy J. Curry, Hernando A. Estévez, Daniel Fryer, James B. Haile III, Chike Jeffers, Lee A. McBride III, Michael Monahan, Adriana Novoa, Susana Nuccetelli, Andrea J. Pitts, Dwayne A. Tunstall, and Alejandro A. Vallega.

'Insurrectionist Ethics' is the name given to denote the myriad forms of justification for radical social transformation in the interest of freedom for oppressed people. It is a set of advocacy systems that usually aim at liberation for specified populations under siege in a given society. While the identities of these beleaguered groups is always intersectional, one salient criterion of group membership is often chosen to be the rallying point for solidarity. Whether the movement is “Black Lives Matter, “Gay Pride”, or “Poor People’s Campaign,” at the nucleus of each is a cry for emancipation. The contributions in this volume put forward bold, forcefully argued, provocative claims that challenge in a fundamental and radical way the presuppositions, values, and beliefs that underwrite the systems and structures that insurrectionist ethics calls into question. The volume begins with a section defining and theorizing what insurrectionist ethics is, and then moves to a section studying insurrectionist ethics across the Americas. Additional sections focus on applications of and correctives to insurrectionist ethics, pragmatism and naturalism, and the past, present, and future of insurrectionist ethics.

In Preludes to Pragmatism: Toward A Reconstruction of Philosophy, Phillip Kitcher argues in Chapter 6, “Does ‘Race’ Have a Future” that developments in evolutionary biology may support a separation of our species into subcategories that could be regarded as races. The human species, he argues, could possibly be divided, using a similar methodology to that employed by evolutionary biologists, into relatively stable and isolated breeding populations that bear distinctive and salient clusters of significant genotypic and phenotypic traits. Hence, the eliminativist claim that there is nothing in the world that corresponds to our use of the term ‘race’ is mistaken. There is, in short, a scientifically legitimate..

This chapter is intended to provide a new definition of insurrectionist ethics that cuts in many ways against the grain of positions already engraved in the literature. That is done by considering the various elements of a novel definition of insurrectionist ethics. One that treats fundamental, structural, and systemic oppression as the conditions that give warrant to an insurrectionist response. A notion of necro-depictions is articulated as an essential conceptual tool to understanding the duty to insurrect or resist oppression. It is here argued that insurrectionists ethics is an anti-ethical position that operates from an understanding of the severe ethical constraints under which oppressed people are forced to deliberate about the appropriate ends to seek through voluntary action. Insurrectionist ethics requires the transvaluation of existing values, and radical reformulation of conceptions of personhood, humanity, and liberation, among others, to render comprehensible its radical aims of social transformation, and abolition of present conditions of oppression.

An important feature of so-called rational decision making, at least in times of crisis, is arational: that is, our ability to decide manifests features of our characters or the values we hold rather than our reasoning abilities.1 Such a position stands in obvious opposition to the Western philosophical tradition. Consider, by comparison, the view of Immanuel Kant, who held that reason could, and perhaps sometimes ought to, operate independently of (and in opposition to) our sentiments. Contrary to Kant, William James argues in "The Sentiment of Rationality" that arational mental states and phenomena—such as feelings, emotions, values, and attitudes—are indispensable to practical rationality (317). The attempt to ..

This article begins with a consideration of the standard argument for the moral equality of soldiers; namely, that soldiers are morally equal because they pose similar dangers to one another. Next, arguments for the equal application of the rules of war to both sides are considered and ultimately rejected. In the end, it is argued that if the justice of the cause for war is attributable to the warriors on either side, then modifying or unequally applying the rules of war is in some cases the morally appropriate thing to do.

This paper considers the increasingly common suggestion that a new form of warfare has emerged. It clarifies the notion of new wars and responds to an argument for the claim that in order to achieve military parity non-state actors must violate just war principles. I reject the claim that violation of just war principles is necessary and argue that we can make reasonable normative judgments about new wars in terms of just war theory. From there, I consider the possibility that military parity can be achieved in a way that does not violate these principles and argue that it is permissible for relatively weak non-state actors to fight with fewer restrictions than conventional states.

This paper begins with a presentation of some important aspects of the science behind global warming. Following that, I argue that attempts to address global warming and climate change as problems facing humanity ought not to center around economic understandings of the problem or it solutions. Moreover, I argue that pragmatism is especially vulnerable to this sort of misappropriation in seeking solutions to climate change, and that environmental pragmatists ought to make a conscious effort to avoid potential mischaracterizations of pragmatism by providing a clearer sense of the boundaries that delimit its approach to climate change, or any other environmental crisis

This paper considers the increasingly common suggestion that a new form of warfare has emerged. It clarifies the notion of new wars and responds to an argument for the claim that in order to achieve military parity non-state actors must violate just war principles. I reject the claim that violation of just war principles is necessary and argue that we can make reasonable normative judgments about new wars in terms of just war theory. From there, I consider the possibility that military parity can be achieved in a way that does not violate these principles and argue that it is permissible for relatively weak non-state actors to fight with fewer restrictions than conventional states.