Jacopo Colelli

This article lays the groundwork for a patterned theory of inner speech by rethinking Vygotsky’s notion of internalization in light of 4E cognitive science and phenomenology. We begin by revisiting Vygotsky’s view of linguistic development as a dynamic and socially mediated process of transformation, central to the formation of subjectivity. Rather than treating internalization as a simple transfer of external norms, we focus on it as a developmental process that mediates the reorganization of the agent’s intra-psychic structures. This reorganization is understood as affecting the functional architecture of the mind, involving both cognitive and non-cognitive capacities—such as bodily, affective, and symbolic resources—integrated within intentional activity. Building on this reinterpretation, we critically engage with the 4E paradigm, highlighting how enactive and extended approaches often leave underexplored the internal structuring effects of linguistic practices. To address this, we propose that phenomenology offers the appropriate descriptive tools to trace the emergence of patterned forms of inner speech as they are lived and experienced. To address this, we propose that phenomenology offers the appropriate descriptive tools to trace the emergence of patterned forms of inner speech as they are lived and experienced. Inner speech, in this view, emerges within a newly constituted inner space of the mind—a structural feature of intentional experience that is shaped by embodied and social interactions, while also shaping how the agent interprets, evaluates, and acts in the world.

In this paper, I present a phenomenological examination of lived experiences within the context of psychedelic therapy, specifically focusing on the influence of “set” and “setting” in consciousness’ regular functioning. I scrutinize the limitations of psychological and sociological approaches in understanding how the manipulation of internal and external factors mediates therapeutic effects. Even when these approaches attempt to concentrate on the internal state of mind, they adopt a third-person perspective that fails to adequately explain the subjective experience. Consequently, I argue for the necessity of a phenomenological reflection employing Husserlian methodology to elucidate the intentional structure underlying modifications in the subjective experience that anticipate therapeutic outcomes. Utilizing epoché, I propose both a descriptive and a genetic analysis to capture the essential and universal properties that define those types of experiences. By comparing shamanic therapy in indigenous populations with the medicalized use of psychedelics in the West, I demonstrate how the efficacy of manipulating “set” and “setting” depends on an ongoing re-organization in consciousness’ intentional functioning concerning structures of embodiment, intercorporeality, intersubjectivity and culture.

_Riassunto_: Il dibattito contemporaneo sull’impatto causale degli stati mentali e delle decisioni consce sui fenomeni naturali e sociali fa largo uso di dati ricavati da test neurofisiologici e comportamentali, che esplorano il ruolo di processi cognitivi inconsci e interpretazioni post-hoc caratterizzate da intenzionalità dichiarativa. I dati neuroscientifici sono spesso utilizzati per sostenere una prospettiva fisicalista che privilegia il determinismo neurocognitivo rispetto alle discussioni sul libero arbitrio. Tuttavia, questa impostazione tende a ignorare, almeno parzialmente, il dibattito sui limiti epistemologici e tecnici nella generazione dei dati e i pregiudizi filosofici insiti nelle interpretazioni. Questo lavoro evidenzia tali limiti, proponendo un’analisi filosofica della relazione complessa tra razionalità, esercizio del libero arbitrio e costruzione dell’identità personale. Distinguendo il concetto di scelta autentica da quello di impulso o spinta ad agire, si sostiene una concezione enattiva e fenomenologica dell’azione umana libera, offrendo così un’interpretazione del libero arbitrio che respinge l’eliminativismo come inadeguato. Rifiutando un dualismo semplicistico, il libero arbitrio viene definito come la capacità di una soggettività incarnata, situata ed enattiva di interagire con un ambiente naturale e sociale attraverso compiti che implicano processi stratificati di valutazione e decisione. In conclusione, si argomenta che, sebbene le scienze fisiche e psicologiche possano indagare le basi dell’esecuzione dell’azione, non sono in grado di risolvere né di spiegare l’aspetto più complesso del processo decisionale stratificato ed esteso. Questo riguarda la relazione intenzionale tra la persona, considerata nella sua interezza, e un mondo ricco di valori, che conferisce senso e orientamento alle scelte individuali. Parole chiave: Libertà; Persona; Cervello; Inconscio; Determinismo/Eliminativismo; Thomas Fuchs _Embodied freedom. The role of person in decision-making_ _Abstract_: The contemporary debate on the causal impact of mental states and conscious decisions on natural and social phenomena extensively relies on data derived from neurophysiological and behavioral tests. These tests investigate the role of unconscious cognitive processes and post-hoc interpretations characterized by declarative intentionality. Neuroscientific data are often employed to support a physicalist perspective that prioritizes neurocognitive determinism over discussions of free will. However, this approach tends to partially overlook the epistemological and technical limitations inherent in data generation and the philosophical biases embedded in interpretations. This paper highlights these limitations by proposing a philosophical analysis of the complex relationship between rationality, the exercise of free will, and the construction of personal identity. By distinguishing the concept of genuine choice from that of impulse or urge to act, it advocates for an enactive and phenomenological conception of human free action, offering an interpretation of free will that rejects eliminativism as inadequate. Rejecting a simplistic dualism, free will is defined as the capacity of an embodied, situated, and enactive subjectivity to engage with a natural and social environment through tasks involving layered processes of evaluation and decision-making. In conclusion, it is argued that while physical and psychological sciences may explore the foundations of action execution, they cannot resolve nor explain the more complex aspect of the stratified and extended decision-making process. This aspect concerns the intentional relationship between the person, considered as a whole, and a world rich in values, which gives meaning and direction to individual choices. _Keywords_: Freedom; Person; Brain; Unconscious; Determinism/Eliminativism; Thomas Fuchs.

This commentary examines Cardeña et al.’s (2025) consensus taxonomy of altered states of consciousness by highlighting a tension internal to their phenomenological commitments. On the one hand, they adopt a “thin” phenomenology, using qualitative methods to collect experience-based data and thereby granting experience an epistemic role. On the other hand, the taxonomic labels under which these data are organized (e.g., identity, self, agency, delirium) draw much of their theoretical content from diagnostic, neuroscientific, and psychological practices that index categories via third-person behavioral and functional markers. I suggest that, while this partial lack of explicit phenomenological grounding is understandable given the article’s aims, making the experiential significance of these labels more transparent could improve the taxonomic project itself. To this end, I propose integrating a “thick,” theoretically articulated phenomenology that treats such labels as experiential kinds, and I use delirium as an illustrative case to show how phenomenological profiles and subprofiles might support richer and more fine-grained altered states of consciousness taxonomies

This paper introduces Phenomenological Cognitivism, a methodological framework grounding psychological explanations within pure experience to elucidate their intentional properties and their embeddness within the layered structure of first-person-experience. Unlike practical phenomenological approaches, which primarily employ phenomenology as a heuristic for data collection, concept formation, or experimental design, Phenomenological Cognitivism utilizes phenomenological functional analyses to directly align sensitivity to intentional properties with the explanatory objectives of cognitive neuroscience. Central to this framework are constitutive explanations, which identify minimal phenomenological structures necessary for cognitive capacities to operate correctly, and modalization, which describes why and how these capacities must adapt functionally within diverse functional architectures and representational dependencies when enacted within different experiential domains or classes of objects. Finally, the paper explains how Phenomenological Cognitivism uniquely supports epistemological model structuring—a methodological approach that can directly employ phenomenological descriptions to inform and constrain the development of computational models and the identification of underlying neurobiological mechanisms.