Jacqueline Broad

Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679?-1749) was one of the earliest defenders of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689). This paper examines her engagement with Stoic ideas in her moral writings: Remarks upon Some Writers in the Controversy concerning the Foundation of Moral Virtue (1743) and Remarks upon the Principles and Reasonings of Dr. Rutherforth’s Essay (1747). My analysis focuses on her principle of living in accordance with nature and her concept of virtue as conformity to the nature, relations, and fitness of things. I argue that a Stoic reading of Cockburn’s moral naturalism enables us to solve some puzzle and tensions in her thought and gain a richer understanding of Cockburn’s ideas concerning the foundations of morality.

This chapter examines three seventeenth-century feminist critiques of the misogynist pamphleteer John Sprint (fl. 1699–1700). It demonstrates that an ideal of freedom as rational self-governance—controlling one’s own will in conformity with the law of reason—plays a crucial role in the arguments of Sprint’s key critics, Eugenia, Mary Astell, and Mary Chudleigh. In their responses to Sprint, these Englishwomen highlight the moral dangers of the marital relationship, and especially the threat that such relationships pose to a woman’s capacity for rational self-governance. They argue that marriage thwarts this capacity if a wife is expected to ‘merge her will’ with that of her husband (as Sprint had suggested), such that she only ever thinks and desires what he himself thinks and desires. The chapter concludes by drawing parallels between these women’s views and those of recent feminist theorists of autonomy.

This volume is an edited collection of private letters and published epistles to and from English women philosophers of the early modern period (c. 1650–1700). It includes the letters and epistles of Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Damaris Cudworth Masham, and Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet. These women were the correspondents of some of the best-known intellectuals of the period, including Constantijn Huygens, Walter Charleton, Henry More, Joseph Glanvill, John Locke, Jean Le Clerc, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Their epistolary exchanges range over a wide variety of philosophical subjects, from religion, moral theology, and ethics to epistemology, metaphysics, and natural philosophy. The volume includes a main introduction by the editor, which explains the significance of the letters and epistles with respect to early modern scholarship and the study of women philosophers. It is argued that this selection of texts demonstrates the intensely collaborative and gender-inclusive nature of philosophical discussion in this period. To help situate each woman’s thought in its historical-intellectual context, the volume also includes original introductory essays for each principal figure, showing how her correspondences contributed to the formation of her own views as well as those of her better-known male contemporaries. The text also provides detailed scholarly annotations, explaining obscure philosophical ideas and archaic words and phrases in the letters and epistles. Among its critical apparatus, the volume also includes a note on the texts, a bibliography, and an index.

This volume is an edited collection of the philosophical correspondences of three English women of the eighteenth century: Mary Astell, Elizabeth Thomas, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn. The selected correspondence includes letters to and/or from John Norris, George Hickes, Mary Chudleigh, Richard Hemington, John Locke, Ann Hepburn Arbuthnot, and Edmund Law. Their epistolary exchanges range over a wide variety of philosophical subjects, from questions about the love of God and other people to the causes of sensation in the mind, the metaphysical foundations of moral obligation, and the importance of independence of judgement in one’s moral choices and actions. The volume includes a main introduction by the editor, which explains some of the key themes and developments in the eighteenth-century letters, including an increased awareness of other women’s writings and of the concerns of women as a sociopolitical group. It is argued that if we look beyond printed treatises to the content of these letters, it is possible to gain a fuller appreciation of women’s involvement in philosophical debates of the 1690s and early 1700s. To situate each woman’s thought in its historical-intellectual context, the volume includes original introductory essays for each principal figure, showing how her correspondence relates either to her contemporaries’ ideas or to her own published views. The text also provides detailed scholarly annotations, explaining obscure philosophical ideas and archaic words and phrases in the letters. Among its critical apparatus, the volume includes a note on the texts, a bibliography, and an index.

From the inception of women’s response to male philosophical misogyny, women have focused on issues connected with virtue and educability. Two factors lie behind this tendency. The first is that arguments for women’s subjection in marriage, and for their exclusion from positions of power, have traditionally emphasized women’s moral incapacity, duplicitousness, and lack of prudence. So women seeking to defend themselves from such charges have interrogated the concept of moral virtue and sought to show how women are capable of being virtuous agents. Second, as traditional educators of the young, women have historically recognized the importance of early education in providing good habits of mind and the right decision-making capacities for later in life. In this paper, we examine the convergence of these two topics—virtue and education—in women’s texts of the pre-enlightenment and enlightenment eras. We narrow our focus to those works by women and about women, while acknowledging that many similar ideas and arguments might be found in male writings of the period. We choose to highlight women’s ideas because we think that they provide an interesting pre-history to the development of women’s feminist arguments for political equality from the late eighteenth century onwards. This is a pre-history that emphasizes women’s moral equality, or the idea that women are morally on a par with men in so far as they possess all the necessary psychological traits to be considered moral agents, as well as the necessary psychology to be considered morally educable.

Some scholars have identified a puzzle in the writings of Mary Astell (1666–1731), a deeply religious feminist thinker of the early modern period. On the one hand, Astell strongly urges her fellow women to preserve their independence of judgement from men; yet, on the other, she insists upon those same women maintaining a submissive deference to the Anglican church. These two positions appear to be incompatible. In this paper, I propose a historical-contextualist solution to the puzzle: I argue that the seeming inconsistency can be dispelled through a close examination of (i) the concepts of selfhood and self-government in Anglican women’s devotional texts of the period, and of (ii) the role that these concepts play in Astell’s feminist arguments.

In this article, I critically examine a number of recent editions of philosophical works by early modern women. I argue that the proliferation of such texts is likely to have positive implications for the study of early modern philosophy. By taking a historical-contextualist approach to women’s writings, these editions contribute to the goal of a thorough, unbiased, and impartial account of early modern thought. Their accessibility and teachability also draw attention to historical-philosophical ideas, methods, and genres that could have worth and relevance today. Above all, these texts are valuable for helping to correct a one-sided, male-biased understanding of the philosophical past.

In this chapter, the author interprets Mary Astell's critique of these principles as engagements with the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Scholars have examined Astell's writings in relation to the Hobbesian concept of the state of nature and Hobbes's theory of the social contract. While Astell explicitly vilifies Hobbes as a proponent of just cause theory, in the political pamphlets of 1704, she implicitly adopts salient aspects of his views concerning the maintenance of peace. Her writings are valuable for demonstrating how Hobbesian ideas concerning war and peace were embraced by a feminist pioneer of the early modern era. Astell's named references to Hobbes are reflective of a popular if somewhat distorted conception of Hobbesian politics in her time. Astell builds on Hobbes's views by suggesting that recognition of women's moral and intellectual competence can play a positive role in the maintenance of peace.

This paper provides an overview of women's engagement with Stoic ethics in early modern England (c. 1600–1700). It builds on recent literature in the field by demonstrating that there is a positive gender‐inclusive narrative to be told about Stoic philosophy in this time—one that incorporates women's specific concerns and responds to women's lived experiences. To support this claim, we take an interdisciplinary approach and examine several different genres of women's writing in the period, including letters, poems, plays, educational texts, and moral essays. In these writings, we argue, a distinctive conception of Stoic therapy emerges. Women embrace well‐known aspects of the Stoic philosophy—such as living in agreement with nature, the importance of self‐government, and the ideal of freedom from the passions—but they also allow room for the cultivation of eupatheiai or life‐affirmative feelings, such as feelings of respect, affection, and good will toward other people.

Several recent studies devote themselves to Mary Astell's feminist theory of virtue—her ‘serious proposal to the ladies’ to help women obtain wisdom, equality, and happiness, despite the prejudices of seventeenth-century custom. But there has been little scholarship on Astell's conception of heroic virtues, those exceptional character traits that raise their bearers above the ordinary course of nature. Astell's appropriation of heroic virtue poses a number of philosophical difficulties for her feminist ethics—heroic virtues are characteristically masculine, exceptional, and individualistic, ill-suited to a community-oriented feminism aimed at ordinary women. In this paper, we seek to investigate—and then dispel—these key difficulties. Our intention is to generate a new understanding of Astell's theory of virtue as a unique and sophisticated theory that equalizes and naturalizes heroic virtue for women.

This article examines two early modern feminist works, Woman Not Inferior to Man and Woman's Superior Excellence Over Man, written by “Sophia, A Person of Quality.” Scholars once dismissed these texts as plagiarisms or semi-translations of François Poulain de la Barre's De l’égalité des deux sexes. More recently, however, Guyonne Leduc has drawn attention to the original aspects of these treatises by highlighting Sophia's significant variations on Poulain's vocabulary. In this article, I take Leduc's analysis a step further by demonstrating that Sophia's variations amount to unique and distinctive arguments for the restoration of women's rights, based on both the natural equality and the moral superiority of women compared to men. I argue that Sophia goes beyond Poulain's Cartesian insights to mount a critique of male tyranny characterized as a lack of generosity toward women. My contention is that Sophia's texts represent a culmination in a line of reasoning that extends from the querelle des femmes of the Renaissance to Poulain's Cartesian feminism of the seventeenth century, through to arguments for women's rights in the eighteenth century. Her works thus warrant greater recognition as significant turning points in the history of feminist thought.

In her Remarks Upon Some Writers (1743), Catharine Trotter Cockburn takes a seemingly radical stance by asserting that it is possible for atheists to be virtuous. In this paper, I examine whether or not Cockburn’s views concerning atheism commit her to a naturalistic ethics and a so-called radical enlightenment position on the independence of morality and religion. First, I examine her response to William Warburton’s critique of Pierre Bayle’s arguments concerning the possibility of a society of virtuous atheists. I argue that this response shows Cockburn vacillating between a moral naturalism, on the one hand, and a theistic morality, on the other. Second, I draw on Cockburn’s letters to her niece Ann Arbuthnot, and her opinions concerning mystical ideas about “the will of God” in north-east Scotland in the mid-eighteenth century. I maintain that these letters give us a fuller appreciation of Cockburn’s naturalistic position. My conclusion is that Cockburn’s ideas concerning atheism prompt us to consider the close interplay between secular and religious principles in so-called radical ideas of the period.

In his correspondence, John Locke described his close friend Damaris Masham as ‘a determined foe to ecclesiastical tyranny’ and someone who had ‘the greatest aversion to all persecution on account of religious matters.’ In her short biography of Locke, Masham returned the compliment by commending Locke for convincing others that ‘Liberty of Conscience is the unquestionable Right of Mankind.’ These comments attest to Masham’s personal commitment to the cause of religious liberty. Thus far, however, there has been no scholarly discussion of the tolerationist ethic underlying Masham’s 1705 publication, Occasional Thoughts. In this chapter, I argue that Masham’s work appeals to three common tolerationist principles of her time: the idea that the authorities should not use coercion and penalties as ways of imposing religious beliefs on others; the view that God requires human beings to attain salvation through their own efforts, and not by blindly following the dictates of the state-established religion; and the idea that the granting of liberty of conscience helps to ensure the peace and stability of political society. I show that Masham goes further than her tolerationist contemporaries by arguing that together these principles imply that a woman’s intellectual education—or the conscious cultivation of a woman’s ability to reflect critically on her religious beliefs—is vital for the good of the commonwealth.

Some scholars have identified a puzzle in the writings of Mary Astell (1666–1731), a deeply religious feminist thinker of the early modern period. On the one hand, Astell strongly urges her fellow women to preserve their independence of judgement from men; yet, on the other, she insists upon those same women maintaining a submissive deference to the Anglican church. These two positions appear to be incompatible. In this paper, I propose a historical-contextualist solution to the puzzle: I argue that the seeming inconsistency can be dispelled through a close examination of (i) the concepts of selfhood and self-government in Anglican women’s devotional texts of the period, and of (ii) the role that these concepts play in Astell’s feminist arguments.

Little is known about the shaping and development of Anne Conway’s thought in relation to her early modern contemporaries. In one part of her only surviving treatise, The Principles, Conway criticises “those doctors” who uphold a dualist theory of soul and body, a mechanist conception of body (as dead and inert), and the view that the soul is “intimate present” in the body. In this paper, I argue that here she targets Walter Charleton, a well-known defender of Epicurean atomism in mid-seventeenth-century England. My intention is to highlight the sophistication of Conway’s theory of soul-body relations vis-a-vis that of Charleton.

This paper focuses on the English philosopher Mary Astell’s marginalia in Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s personal copy of the 1704 edition of Pierre Bayle’s Pensées diverses sur le comète (first published in 1682). I argue that Astell’s annotations provide good reasons for thinking that Bayle is biased toward atheism in this work. Recent scholars maintain that Bayle can be interpreted as an Academic Sceptic: as someone who honestly and impartially follows a dialectical method of argument in order to obtain the goal of intellectual integrity. In her commentary, however, Astell suggests that: (i) if Bayle were honest and impartial in his inquiries, then he would not have pretended to attack popular superstition, only to undermine generally-held religious beliefs; and (ii) if Bayle valued intellectual integrity, then his argument for a society of virtuous atheists would not have relied upon a deceptive equivocation in terms. I conclude that the rediscovery of this marginalia is valuable for enhancing our appreciation of Astell as an astute reader of one of her most enigmatic contemporaries.

Mary Astell is best known today as one of the earliest English feminists. This book sheds new light on her writings by interpreting her first and foremost as a moral philosopher—as someone committed to providing guidance on how best to live. The central claim of this work is that all the different strands of Astell’s thought—her epistemology, her metaphysics, her philosophy of the passions, her feminist vision, and her conservative political views—are best understood in light of her ethical objectives. To support that claim, this work examines Astell’s programme to bring about a moral transformation of character in her fellow women. This ethical programme draws on several key aspects of seventeenth-century philosophy, including Cartesian and Neoplatonist epistemologies, ontological and cosmological proofs for the existence of God, rationalist arguments for the soul’s immateriality, and theories about how to regulate the passions in accordance with reason. At the heart of Astell’s philosophical system lies a theory of virtue, including guidelines about how to cultivate generosity of character, a benevolent disposition towards others, and the virtue of moderation. This book explains the foundations of that moral theory, and then examines how it shapes and informs Astell’s response to male tyranny within marriage and to political tyranny in the state. It concludes with some reflections on the historiographical implications of writing Mary Astell back into the history of philosophy.

Our modern ideals about liberty were forged in the great political and philosophical debates of the 17th and 18th centuries, but we seldom hear about women's contributions to those debates. This paper examines the ideas of early modern English women – namely Margaret Cavendish, Mary Astell, Mary Overton, ‘Eugenia’, Sarah Chapone and the civil war women petitioners – with respect to the classic political concepts of negative, positive and republican liberty. The author suggests that these writers' woman-centred concerns provide a unique historical perspective on these much-discussed ideals of freedom from external interference, freedom as self-determination and freedom from domination.