Jacques Balayla

Bayesian epistemology models learning as the revision of credence under evidence, yet it says comparatively little about when revision ceases to matter. This paper imports a structural object from clinical decision theory — the prevalence threshold ϕ_e, the geometrically distinguished point of sharpest turning in the curve that maps prior probability to posterior probability — and develops it into a general epistemological concept: the epistemic threshold. I argue that belief revision is not uniform motion toward certainty but motion through a threshold-governed space in which the marginal epistemic return of evidence varies systematically with one’s current credal position. Two distinct thresholds emerge from a single geometry. The first is a persuasion threshold: the minimal prior plausibility at which a fixed body of evidence can carry a belief across a boundary of justified action. The second is a saturation, or information, threshold: the point beyond which additional evidence no longer meaningfully revises belief, or no longer repays the cost of acquiring it. Reconceiving justification as threshold-relative actionability rather than as approach-to-certainty dissolves several standing puzzles about rational stopping, the burden of proof, and the structure of reasonable disagreement. It also exposes a sharp and unwelcome corollary: the concentration of belief is not the same as its correctness. A posterior may stabilize sharply and remain false. The epistemic threshold is therefore offered not as a route to certainty but as a disciplined account of where inquiry may rationally rest, and of why such rest is constitutive of rational belief rather than a regrettable concession to finitude.

Ever since its first documented live birth in 2014, the use of uterine transplantation (UTx) for the treatment of absolute uterine factor infertility (UFI) has seen major clinical advances, which include the use of alternative surgical approaches, different donor states, and diverse patient populations. In addition to the thorough research programs that developed the technique, this accomplishment has occurred in large part following a number of ethical frameworks, such as the Montreal Criteria and the Indianapolis Consensus, which paved the way to transition from experimental animal trials to human ones. To date, over 60 uterine transplants have been performed in the world, and at least 18 births have been thus far confirmed. While the procedure remains experimental, the vast knowledge and procedural experience amassed over the last 20 years of rigorous research have hinted at the next step of discovery. In particular, advancing social circumstances have prompted the question regarding the use of this technology in transgender individuals. Though the potential use of uterine transplants in the transgender population has been hypothesized, no in‐depth ethical framework has been developed towards this purpose. Herein, we explore the ethical issues revolving around the use of this technology in this patient population and provide key insights that may advance this cause.