Jae Hetterley

Être transgenre implique des relations uniques à son propre corps, ainsi que la question du récit dans la formation du sujet – deux thèmes-clés chez Merleau-Ponty. Mais même si l’on accepte d’aller au-delà de l’histoire stéréotypée d’être « pris·e dans le mauvais corps », tant dans les communautés trans que dans le discours public plus large il existe une tendance fâcheuse à universaliser de tels récits – et ce, en dépit de l’hétérogénéité apparente que l’on retrouve dans les descriptions individuelles à la première personne. La question émerge donc à savoir : comment rendre compte philosophiquement de cette différence à la première personne tout en visant une politique de solidarité? Cet essai cherche à utiliser la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty dans un sens pratique, en se concentrant sur sa description du « schéma corporel » pour atténuer cette tension. En effet, tandis que Merleau-Ponty nous fournit un ensemble général d’instruments pour comprendre la relation entre incarnation et comportement, ses exemples phénoménologiques sont souvent fortement singuliers. De la sorte, dans le contexte des subjectivités transgenres, le but est de creuser davantage cet espace discursif, comme prologue pour une praxis qui soit plus réceptive à l’expérience vécue des personnes trans.

The aim of this thesis is to provide a systematic interpretation of the influence of Kant’s theoretical philosophy on Heidegger’s early project of ‘fundamental ontology’. Beginning from Heidegger’s early neo-Kantianism, I trace the development of his engagement with Kant through to his post-transcendental thinking of the 1930s. However, my particular focus concerns Being and Time. Here, I argue that there is a structural analogy between Kant’s conception of the imagination and Heidegger’s conception of disclosedness, both of which define their respective ontological approaches. Moreover, I argue that making such an analogy allows us to draw out a single, clear line of argument in Being and Time that should guide our interpretation of the text. Through this, I argue that the question of transcendence is the key explanandum for Heidegger’s early project, and that a rethinking of Kantian schematism is Heidegger’s answer for this. Consequently, a further strategic aim is to critically examine Heidegger’s conception of schematism: to what extent can we defend and develop further the notion of schematism in considering the grounds of ontology? The thesis is divided into three parts. The first traces the development of Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology and attempts to locate Kant’s place within it. I argue that Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology as method develops from his critical engagements with his contemporaries, whereas the terms of his project as defined by the Seinsfrage derives from his interpretation of the history of philosophy. My claim is that Heidegger consequently develops an ontological interpretation of Kant to connect the two: the Copernican Revolution provides a way to think a phenomenological ontology that does not reduce to anthropology, whilst Kant’s notion of the imagination provides a formal structure through which to think Dasein’s ontologically disclosive abilities. The second part provides an extended comparative analysis of the first Critique with Being and Time, aiming to show how Heidegger’s concept of worldhood is a phenomenological reconsideration of the key themes of the Transcendental Deduction, and that Heidegger’s notoriously difficult account of ecstatic temporality becomes comprehensible when read alongside the Schematism. Through this, I aim to demonstrate the imagination/disclosedness analogy in practice, whilst also clarifying the problematic of transcendence that underlies their respective accounts. The final part then takes up the notion of transcendence as an explicit theme, firstly attempting to retrieve a positive signification for transcendence despite the later Heidegger’s retrospective criticisms. Then I return to the question of the relationship between transcendence and schematism in the final chapter, providing an interpretation and defence of Heidegger’s concept of ‘praesens’ as a proof of concept for further inquiry into this rich philosophical field.