Jae Ryeong Sul

This paper reorients the problematic of political epistemology to put power at the centre of analysis, through an analysis of writings on the relationship between power and knowledge by Horkheimer, Habermas and Foucault. In their work, political epistemology was pursued analogously to the development of political economy, which explored the background conditions and assumptions of economic research. I also show that Horkheimer, Habermas and Foucault each had normative aims intended to improve both epistemology and knowing practices. Though their approaches are distinct, the shared element was a concern with redefining truth.

This paper lays out one positive role that humour can play in intimate relationships, focusing on the value of not taking oneself too seriously. It begins by looking at the positive value of humour in general (Section I), before applying this to intimate relationships (Section II). In doing so, it draws upon a general account of the value of humour, which claims that humour can defuse our fight or flight responses, and help us see ourselves honestly as others do. I make the case that both of these are beneficial in intimate relationships, as spaces where we can be safe and accepted for the particular individuals we are. Not taking ourselves too seriously, I argue, can help us cultivate vulnerability, trust, safety, and acceptance together.

This paper aims to explore from a philosophical perspective the experience of silence in social anxiety. Moving from the account of lived silences in mood disorders developed by Degerman (2024a), I argue that while “imposed”, “depressed”, “unknowing”, and “peaceful” silences can all be experienced by those who are socially anxious, this condition is also associated with two distinct ways of perceiving silence that are not captured by Degerman’s taxonomy. More specifically, drawing also on the exploration of published first-person reports of this condition, I maintain that social anxiety may be accompanied by both a perceived inability to fill certain silences when one wants to do so, and a weakened sense of control over how silences are filled. I then proceed to outline how these dynamics may be rooted in forms of self-experience that are affectively laden and shape one’s sense of possibility when interacting with other people.

There is an obvious role for self-assertion within discourse. It is much less obvious what role self-withdrawal might play. Indeed, it is far from obvious what role it could play. For how can we enter into discourse at all if we pull ourselves from the fray? Heidegger, however, claims not only that self-withdrawal has a role to play but that reticence is the authentic mode of discourse. In this paper, I develop an account of reticence that explains its importance to Being and Time. I argue that Heidegger's conception of reticence is central to his explanation of how the understanding can be developed in terms of the things themselves, rather than in terms of what one says about things.