Jairus Diesta Espiritu

Rituals in medical practice have either been seen as an anthropological aspect of current biomedical processes or as a pre-scientific aspect of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM). In either tendency, the literature has since failed to account for these rituals as rituals—conveyors of meaning, expressions of identity, and even as a rite of passage from illness to wellness. As an alternative to current discussions, this paper presents the case study of tawas, a diagnostic ritual from Philippine traditional medicine that determines personalistic and mystical causes of illnesses. As a non-intrusive procedure, tawas involves incantations and some ritual objects, e.g., rice, candle, axe, etc., that do not pose any direct harm nor benefit to the patient. While complete reliance on tawas at the expense of proper medical procedures could harm patients, the very ritual of tawas itself occupies a limbo within non-beneficence and non-maleficence. Following a Wittgensteinian perspective of treating rituals as meaning-laden human activities, this paper argues that rituals like tawas, much like other rituals embedded in biomedical practices, should be understood as rituals and not as empirical cures, thereby allowing their tolerance in medical practice in general.

In the book God as Reason, Vittorio Hosle attempts at sketching a rationalistic philosophy of religion where he provides a rationalistic interpretation of Christian theology. While such an attempt provides Christianity a place in rational secular society, it needlessly reduces the unique, divine figure of Christ into a mere historical figure, thereby dissolving the very foundation of Christian doctrine. Admitting to the difficulties of traditional Christology, Hosle openly resorts to such a reductive interpretation of the figure of Christ. This paper, however, proposes an interpretation that could salvage the figure of Christ in Hosle's rationalistic philosophy of religion. Drawing from Alain Badiou's interpretation of St. Paul, I argue that the Christ-event can be interpreted as inevitably exclusionary, rationally contradictory, and specifically divine without resorting to any fideistic interpretations. Therefore, a fully human and fully divine Christ can properly be maintained within a rationalistic philosophy of religion.

Metaphysics, seen as a legitimizing narrative or a paradigm (Lyotard, 1984), prop up a certain practice in providing the basis for its assumptions. While Western medicine can be properly characterized as governed by a biophysical model (Hewa, 1994; Bates, 2002), such a model for traditional healing practices in the Philippines has yet to be derived. No philosopher has attempted to derive an indigenous metaphysics from traditional healing practices. The only study made so far (Fajardo & Pansacola, 2013), however, needlessly pigeonholes these unique practices into incommensurable Western scientific concepts. While they collated data from healers all over the country, they attempted to use Western scientific concepts such as oxygen, carbon, electro-magnetic force, and others. These concepts dangerously obfuscate indigenous understandings of the human body and reality as a whole since they are directly lifted from a language and practice informed by Western metaphysics. Therefore, there has yet to be an adequate extraction of a locally derived metaphysics that informs and self-legitimizes these medicinal practices. Conscious of recent critiques to homogenizing tendencies in Philippine Studies (Guillermo, 2009) and Filipino philosophy (Pada, 2014; Abulad, 2016), specifically that of Mercado (1972) and Timbreza (2017), I attempt to derive a Filipino metaphysics from the traditional healing practices of two traditional healers in San Mateo, Rizal of the Southern Tagalog Region in Luzon through a particularist anthropological approach in Filipino philosophy. I derive four distinct characteristics of this metaphysics which are distinct from the biophysical presuppositions of Western medicine: (1) a law of conservation based on the concept of “balik,” (2) predestination, (3) an ontological dualism between the visible and the invisible, and (4) the performativity of words as utterances.

This paper is a critical appraisal of Lee’s framework (2020) for the Community of Inquiry (CoI) pedagogy in light of Garrison’s work (2000, 2001, 2010, 2016, 2017) in the context of synchronous and asynchronous distance learning. Using the latter as springboard, Lee’s CoI framework is examined based on Garrison’s three presences: cognitive, social, and teaching presence. The paper discusses the similarities between Lee’s CoI and Garrison’s CoI, and expounds on the differences between the two (i.e. the end goal of a CoI for cognitive presence, the realization of asynchronous social presence, and the role of the facilitator in teaching presence). It also presents practical suggestions to improve Lee’s CoI in a distance education setting. Lastly, it concludes with institutional recommendations for applying CoI for distance learning in the Philippine context.

Owing to the analytic tradition, contemporary analytic existentialism deliberately avoids metaphysical discussions to the detriment of the field. Specifically, Thaddeus Metz’ Fundamentality Theory invokes metaphysical categories without adequately clarifying what they really mean. This paper aims to remedy these problems by formulating a theory of meaning in life grounded on the metaphysical category of truth. Deriving from Alain Badiou’s relevant writings, this paper formulates a theory of meaning in life based on a metaphysical notion of truth with the particular advantage of compensating for Fundamentality Theory’s (1) lack of metaphysical grounding, and (2) the inherent vagueness of its two central notions: fundamentality and substantiality. I argue that the Badiouan Theory that this paper formulates opens up the field to the rich conceptual repertoire of metaphysics and that it designates substantiality as fidelity to truths, while designating truths as fundamental.

Wittgenstein has been considered one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century while being one of its most popular mystics. Considering the staunch secularization of philosophy during the Enlightenment, such combination is rarely seen in philosophers of more recent times. The farthest explication of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his mysticism has not went as far as making a Christian nature explicit. This can be read as analytic philosophy’s identification as an heir to the Enlightenment. There has been much ink spilled in the mystical aspects of his philosophy. Although there are hints of his Christian leanings, patent parallelisms have yet to be drawn properly. Exploring Christian faith and rule-following, this paper asserts that the former is how the latter is characterized in the Philosophical Investigations. Faith and rule-following both provide a way of seeing and are sufficient for action.