Jake Long

This paper presents the Monistic Ontological and Pluralistic Epistemological Theory (MOPET), a metaphysical system grounded in a single dispositional substrate. The substrate is not a bearer of properties but identical with its generative capacities, expressed through differentiation, constraint, and stabilization. From these capacities arise regions, coherent configurations individuated by generative lineage rather than categorical kind. Grounding is internal to the substrate as generative dependence, terminating regress without invoking external laws or layered ontologies. Modality is articulated as the space of generative compatibility. Consciousness is treated as reflexive modeling: a structural mode that emerges when regions maintain stable internal correspondence to both environment and self-activity under constraint. From monism it follows that epistemic plurality is necessary, since no localized region can sustain coherence with the entire substrate. A final constraint result is given against ontologically independent “I” substrates, showing that irreducible selves either reintroduce dualism, require brute emergence, or collapse into causal inertness. The system aims to maximize ontological economy while preserving explanatory closure across individuation, grounding, modality, and conscious perspective.