Jakub Mihálik

While neurophenomenal structuralism (NPS) is typically viewed as an account of why an experience, i.e. a conscious mental state, has a specific phenomenal character, Sascha Fink has suggested that NPS might also account for why one has an experience in the first place. According to Fink, the character-determining structures are incorporated in larger (meta-)structures that make the incorporated structures conscious, while also contributing their own Gestalt-related phenomenology. We examine the commitments of such generalized ‘NPS+’, formulating three challenges for Fink’s approach. According to the unconsciously perceived gist objection, there is evidence for unconscious Gestalten, which suggests that the Gestalt-forming mechanism fails to make the relevant mental state conscious. Moreover, the existence of Ganzfeld experiences suggests that some experiences lack Gestalt-structures. Thirdly, as we explain, proponents of one-factor NPS+ face the mirroring dilemma of having to choose between a vicious regress of incorporating structures, and compromising their theory’s methodological promise. We then formulate two challenges for any two-factor form of NPS+: The more of the same challenge concerns the question of why adding more structures to content-related structural features makes these features conscious, while the structure-selection challenge concerns the question of why some neural structures, but not others, are selected for consciousness.

While for Brentano it is a mark of the mental that any mental state is an object of inner awareness, this suggestion is notably rejected by the Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOTT) of consciousness that posits non-conscious inner awareness, which isn’t an object of inner awareness, and yet is mental. I examine an objection against the HOTT, according to which inner awareness is phenomenally present in ordinary consciousness. To assess the objection, I investigate arguments of Chalmers and Montague in favor of this phenomenal presence. I argue that while these arguments may show that experience is not transparent, they crucially fail to demonstrate that ‘inner transparency’ must be false too, i.e. that inner awareness is phenomenally present. I conclude that non-conscious inner awareness is an open possibility and Brentano’s posit of inner awareness as a mark of the mental thus looks unpromising.

The paper critically discusses the treatment of Russellian monism in Tomáš Hříbek’s monograph Jaké to je, nebo o čem to je? (What It’s Like, or What It’s About?). According to Hříbek, Russellian monism, the approach to phenomenal consciousness inspired by the insights of Bertrand Russell, is not a real alternative to materialism, dualism and idealism. I argue that Russellian monism, on the contrary, can be viewed as a self-standing philosophical position which, moreover, avoids the main problems of these traditional approaches. I first address the objection that the fundamental entities of neutral monism have a mental, rather than neutral nature. In connection with neutral monism, I also express some worries concerning Hříbek’s via negativa definition of physicalism. Thereafter I explain why the causal closure of the physical which poses a serious difficulty for dualism is not a problem for Russellian monism and emphasize that Russellian monism is able to tackle challenges, such as the conceivability argument and the knowledge argument, better than materialism. While then Russellian monism has certain affinities with materialism, dualism and idealism, it avoids the most serious challenges for these approaches and we therefore have a good reason to view it as a self-standing and promising approach to phenomenal consciousness.

According to panqualityism, a form of Russellian monism defended by Sam Coleman and others, consciousness is grounded in fundamental qualities, i.e. unexperienced qualia. Despite panqualityism’s significant promise, according to David Chalmers panqualityism fails as a theory of consciousness since the reductive approach to awareness of qualities it proposes fails to account for the specific phenomenology associated with awareness. I investigate Coleman’s reasoning against this kind of phenomenology and conclude that he successfully shows that its existence is controversial, and so Chalmers’s critique is inconclusive. I then present a critique of panqualityism that avoids this controversial posit, arguing that the panqualityist treatment of awareness faces an explanatory gap, failing to account for the intimate cognitive access to qualities which we are afforded, i.e. for our ‘strong awareness’ of qualities. The real worry for panqualityists is thus not the contested phenomenology of awareness, which Chalmers relies on, but rather the special way in which we are aware of qualities.