James Clark Ross

Grounding and causation are remarkably similar phenomena. They have the same logical properties and bring about explanatory order by relating what does the explaining to what is explained. This thesis provides an answer to the question of whether they are unified. I argue that the answer is 'yes'. The case has already been made in the literature. Schaffer (2016) deems it significant that grounding and causation can be represented in structural equation models, where 'the ultimate test of unity is whether the concept can be successfully enfolded in a formalism in a unified way' (Schaffer 2016, p. 93). Bennett (2017) thinks that they are unified by resemblance. Kivatinos (2017) says that they impose similar ordering on ontological structure. Wilson (2018) believes that they are both types of causation. Zhang (2023) claims that they are the very same relation. In what follows I argue that the best way to understand their similarities is through analogy. Specifically, I put forward a novel account in which grounding and causation are analogates of the bringing-about relation. This work contributes to the field in three significant ways. First, it serves as a useful resource for those who take an active interest in grounding, causation, or both. I have carefully brought together contemporary accounts of each relation, focusing on those that are conducive to a unity hypothesis. Second, I demonstrate continuity between historical and contemporary thought. Notably, I find a historical precedent for the unity of grounding and causation in the work of Schopenhauer and I situate the question of unity within the Aristotelian tradition. Third, I make original research contributions. I am the first to argue that the relation between grounding and causation—this relation of relations—is one of analogy. I also provide the first metaphysically robust account of their unity through the genus–species relation. The upshot of this investigation is that my theory of analogy, when compared with the other theories, provides the most compelling account of the unity of grounding and causation. This theory (i) explains the systematic sharing of features by grounding and causation through a substantive metaphysical framework, (ii) can account for differences between them, and (iii) structures them such that there is a highly natural relation through which their natures are understood. While other accounts of grounding and causation's unity have their merits, my theory does better with respect to (i), (ii), and (iii).