• Decision Theory and Morality
    In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Oup Usa. 2004.
  •  8
    Skepticism in Ethics
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 934-938. 1991.
  •  47
    Two Models of Agent-Centered Value
    Res Philosophica 97 (3): 345-362. 2020.
    The consequentializing project relies on agentcentered value, but many philosophers find the idea incomprehensible or incoherent. Discussions of agent-centered value often model it with a theory that assigns distinct better-than rankings of states of affairs to each agent, rather than assigning a single ranking common to all. A less popular kind of model uses a single ranking, but takes the value-bearing objects to be properties rather than states of affairs. There are rhetorical, presentational…Read more
  •  6
    Explaining the Quasi-Real
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10. 2015.
    This chapter discusses whether Quasi-Realism gains any advantage over Robust Realism with respect to the problem of explaining supervenience. The chapter starts with a summary of what the supervenience problem is and recounts the history of expressivist thinking about supervenience: the supervenience problem was a challenge raised by expressivist Robust Realists, with the idea that expressivism had an excellent explanation of the phenomenon and realism had none. The chapter then contrasts Quasi-…Read more
  •  114
    Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism?
    Philosophical Studies 176 (6): 1391-1408. 2019.
    The paper describes the problem for robust moral realism of explaining the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral, and examines five objections to the argument: The moral does not supervene on the descriptive, because we may owe different obligations to duplicates. If the supervenience thesis is repaired to block, it becomes trivial and easy to explain. Supervenience is a moral doctrine and should get an explanation from within normative ethics rather than metaethics. Supervenience is a con…Read more
  •  55
  •  94
    The real and the quasi-real: problems of distinction
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4): 532-547. 2018.
    This paper surveys some ways of distinguishing Quasi-Realism in metaethics from Non-naturalist Realism, including ‘Explanationist’ methods of distinguishing, which characterize the Real by its explanatory role, and Inferentialist methods. Rather than seeking the One True Distinction, the paper adopts an irenic and pragmatist perspective, allowing that different ways of drawing the line are best for different purposes.
  •  2
    Book Review (review)
    Ethics 102 164-166. 1991.
  •  9
    No Title available: Reviews
    Economics and Philosophy 15 (2): 311-318. 1999.
  •  16
    Meta-Ethics and Normative Commitment
    Noûs 36 (s1): 241-263. 2002.
  •  302
    Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality
    In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Clarendon Press. pp. 81-100. 1997.
  • When Do Goals Explain the Norms that Advance Them?
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 5--153. 2010.
  •  438
    Dispositions and fetishes: Externalist models of moral motivation
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3): 619-638. 2000.
    Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agent or they attribute a kind of …Read more
  •  344
    Transforming expressivism
    Noûs 33 (4): 558-572. 1999.
    In chapter five of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings Allan Gibbard develops what he calls a ‘normative logic’ intended to solve some problems that face an expressivist theory of norms like his. The first is “the problem of embedding: The analysis applies to simple contexts, in which it is simply asserted or denied that such-and-such is rational. It says nothing about more complex normative assertions.”1 That is the problem with which I will be concerned. Though he doesn’t list it as one of the problems…Read more
  •  15
    Books in Review
    Political Theory 19 (1): 129-133. 1991.
  •  191
    Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence
    Analytic Philosophy 53 (3): 269-287. 2012.
  •  133
    Lockean and logical truth conditions
    Analysis 64 (1): 84-91. 2004.
    1. In ‘A problem for expressivism’ Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit argue ‘that expressivists do not have a persuasive story to tell about how ethical sentences can express attitudes without reporting them and, in particular, without being true or false’ (1998: 240). Briefly: expressivists say that ethical sentences serve to express non-cognitive attitudes, but that these sentences do not report non-cognitive attitudes. The view that ethical sentences do report non-cognitive attitudes is not Expre…Read more
  •  24
    Disagreeing (about) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3): 714-721. 2006.
    Brown University.
  •  15
    The Supervenience Argument against Moral Realism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 13-38. 1992.
  •  79
    Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2006.
    _Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory _features pairs of newly commissioned essays by some of the leading theorists working in the field today. Brings together fresh debates on the most controversial issues in moral theory Questions include: Are moral requirements derived from reason? How demanding is morality? Are virtues the proper starting point for moral theorizing? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an accessible introduc…Read more
  •  22
    Skepticism in Ethics, by Panayot Butchvarov
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 934-938. 1991.
  •  405
    Practical conditionals
    In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge University Press. pp. 116--133. 2009.