James Forsdyke

In this paper, I will discuss ethical considerations when it comes to correcting assumptions about people with physical disabilities. In particular, I will discuss the assumption some individuals make that physical disabilities are necessarily accompanied by cognitive or intellectual ones. People with physical disabilities who face people making this assumption are often quick to point out that they are not cognitively impaired. Relevant moral questions may be raised here. Does this eagerness to correct the ignorant individual necessarily constitute a value judgement about the status of intellectual disabilities, or people with them? And if it does, is this necessarily a morally blameworthy speech act, or could it sometimes be considered permissible given the burden on physically disabled people in having to routinely deal with such assumptions? I shall offer some suggestions as to how we might respond to the different intuitions which come about as a result of our deliberations. I ultimately aim to make some practical ethical suggestions as to how people may wish to proceed when faced with others’ unwarranted assumptions about certain disabilities. These suggestions will, I hope, take account of, and respond appropriately to the different interests at play among people with different impairments.

I shall initially be discussing the term ‘disability’ in accordance with common‐sense intuition. The term itself is contested. But importantly for our discussion, on the mere‐difference view, Barnes attempts to philosophically define disability in conformity with what we ordinarily perceive to be disability day to day, and she does so by appealing to the rules of solidarity employed by the disability rights movement as definitive of those conditions that the movement should promote justice for and thus of who counts as disabled. I will operate on the assumption that this is correct during much of the essay, so as to assess whether Barnes' mere‐difference view is vulnerable to an argument from pain. I suggest that Barnes could follow three lines of argument in order to try to circumvent these difficulties, but that each of these faces further problems. I argue that for certain disabilities, in specific cases, the mere‐difference view cannot apply, particularly because pain is not necessarily sufficiently balanced by positives. Consequently, I discuss the nuances of when a mere‐difference view may be helpful, as opposed to when it might be misguided in its application, and conclude that speaking of disability as a whole as mere‐difference or otherwise is misguided, unless we are to reshape the concept of disability into something less heterogeneous.