James Garrison

Although Richard Rorty has done much to renew interest in the philosophy of John Dewey, he nonetheless rejects two of the most important components of Dewey's philosophy, that is, his metaphysics and epistemology. Following George Santayana, Rorty accuses Dewey of trying to serve Locke and Hegel, an impossibility as Rorty rightly sees it. Rorty (1982) says that Dewey should have been Hegelian all the way (p. 85). By reconstructing a bit of Hegel's early philosophy of work, and comparing it to Dewey's metaphysics and epistemology we can see that Dewey was indeed Hegelian all the way and that Rorty has constructed a false dilemma. We also gain some interesting insight into Dewey's philosophy by viewing it in terms of labor, tools and language.

[Cause and effect], if they are distinct, are also identical. Even in ordinary consciousness that identity may be found. We say that a cause is a cause, only when it has an effect, and vice versa. Both cause and effect are thus one and the same content: and the distinction between them is primarily only that the one lays down, and the other is laid down.1In the quote above, Hegel claims that cause and effect are only distinct from a particular point of view. A cause only becomes a cause when it has an effect, thus the two apparently opposing terms reverse their roles. The effect is the cause of the cause, and the cause is the effect of its own effect. This article begins with a discussion of what we believe to be ..

The purpose of this paper is to argue that however impressive and useful its results, neuroscience alone does not provide a complete theory of mind. We specifically enlist John Dewey to help dispel the notion that the mind is the brain. In doing so, we explore functionalism to clarify Dewey’s modified functionalist stance and argue for avoiding “the mereological fallacy.” Mereology is the study of part-whole relations. The mereological fallacy arises from confusing the properties of a necessary subfunction with the properties that derive from the unity of the whole functional coordination. We conclude that the mind is a complex distributed biologicalsociocultural function that is not simply located anywhere and, therefore, is not completely in the possession of any one : it occurs wherever it has consequences.

[Cause and effect], if they are distinct, are also identical. Even in ordinary consciousness that identity may be found. We say that a cause is a cause, only when it has an effect, and vice versa. Both cause and effect are thus one and the same content: and the distinction between them is primarily only that the one lays down, and the other is laid down.The Logic of Hegel, Translated from ““The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences,”” 3rd ed., trans. William Wallace, §153; hereafter cited as ““Lesser Logic”” parenthetically in the text by section number. Similarly, in the Science of Logic Hegel writes: ““Cause is cause only in so far as it produces an effect, and cause is nothing but this determination, to have an effect, and effect is nothing but this, to have a cause. Cause as such implies its effect, and effect implies cause; in so far as cause has not yet acted, or if it has ceased to act, then it is not cause, and effect in so far as its cause has vanished, is no longer effect but in indifferent actuality””. See also Hegel’s discussion of rain and wetness, color and pigment, and act and motion in ibid., 560–61.

Having taken the linguistic turn, neo-pragmatists eschew "experience." Prominent among them are Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom who admire Wilfrid Sellars's critique of the Myth of the Given. Brandom affirms, "I have by and large followed my teacher [Rorty] in rejecting the notion of experience as too burdened by noxious baggage—in particular, by the Myth of the Given—to be worth trying to recruit for serious explanatory and expressive work in philosophy".2 My paper removes the burden supposedly imposed by the myth by resorting to Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, especially chapter 8, "Immediate Knowledge: Understanding and Inference" where the reader finds arguments against immediate...

We explore some aspects of the elusive idea of a "teachable moment" with a special emphasis on the role of emotion, intuition, and imagination as well as intuition, paradox and possibility. The teachable moment occurs when students and teachers genuinely share an interest in better understanding something, some situation, or, in the case discussed, some text, and wish to inquire into the object of mutual concern together. Some of the aesthetic elements of John Dewey's theory of inquiry serve as a way to gain insight into the "logic" of creating and sustaining teachable moments

The reason the title of my paper is not Making Meaning Together Bridging Theory and Practice is that there is nothing to bridge. Theory and practice are simply sub-functions within the larger function of making meaning, knowledge, and value in our lives, although few thinkers have ever conceived it as such. The philosophy of John Dewey is a striking exception. Theory and practice unite within his account of production, or if you prefer, his account of construction and reconstruction. It indicates a constructivism far beyond anything found in the contemporary educational conversation. In “Construction and Criticism,” Dewey writes, “I have used the word construction rather than creation because it seems less ..

My article is a rejoinder to Gert Biesta’s, ‘“This is My Truth, Tell Me Yours”. Deconstructive pragmatism as a philosophy of education.’ Biesta attempts to place Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction in ‘the very heart’ of John Dewey’s pragmatism. My article strives to impress Deweyan pragmatism in the heart of Derridian deconstruction. It does so by offering Dewey’s denotative, naturalistic, empirical perspectivalism as an alternative to Derrida’s anti-empirical quasi-transcendentalism for understanding otherness and difference. The first section of my article shows Biesta offers a catastrophically mistaken and confused argument. The second section imprints Deweyan pragmatism in the heart of Derrida’s deconstruction. Dewey specifically makes philosophical use of a version of the genetic method he calls the ‘empirical denotative method’ to trace the exclusions as well as the inclusions of our perspectival selections driven by our finite embodied needs, interest, desires, and purposes. We may derive the trace of quasi-transcendental différance from the trace of empirically perspectival inclusions and exclusions. Specifically, différance is a reified hypostatic abstraction. Next, I respond to Biesta’s claim that since the metaphysics of presence still entangles Dewey, he cannot appreciate the fact that presence depends on absence. Actually, presence in Dewey always depends on absence. Finally, we will find that Biesta’s own deconstructive pragmatism flounders on his commitment to self-refuting relativism.

Against the background of the Deweyan tradition of Democracy and Education, we discuss problems of complexity and reductionism in education and educational philosophy. First, we investigate some of Dewey’s own criticisms of reductionist tendencies in the educational traditions, theories, and practices of his time. Secondly, we explore some important cases of reductionism in the educational debates of our own day and argue that a similar criticism in behalf of democracy and education is appropriate and can easily be based on Deweyan terms. Thirdly, we draw some more general conclusions about complexity and reductionism as challenges for democracy and education. Among other things, we argue that powerful social tendencies of capitalist competition and social Darwinism support reductionisms in education and put the democratic project at risk. The tensional relation between democracy and capitalism constitutes a major challenge for educational philosophy in our own time as much as in Dewey’s.

My paper focuses on the following famous passage from Friedrich Nietzsche’s “Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”: “What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms”. I will show that John Dewey entirely agrees with this statement. Dewey and Nietzsche has a rich and novel understanding of metaphor, metonymy, simile, and such that they use to comprehend the creation of linguistic meanings, the identity of things, the creation of objects, cause and effect, free will, and necessity as serving anthropomorphic purposes. My conclusion presents Dewey as a gay scientist joining Nietzsche in making creative use of the genetic method. The result of is a surprisingly poetic and rhetorical interpretation of Dewey that should not astonish anyone who reads him carefully. We arrive at this radical reading of Deweyan pragmatism by a metaphorical transfer from Nietzsche as the more familiar source domain to Dewey as the target domain. All along the way, things will fall into place if we carefully distinguish our anoetic experience of existence from the cognitive linguistic meanings, identities, and essences we create from our experience of existence.

"We become what we love," states Jim Garrison in Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Teaching. This provocative book represents a major new interpretation of Dewey's education philosophy. It is also an examination of what motivates us to teach and to learn, and begins with the idea of education of eros (i.e., passionate desire)-"the supreme aim of education" as the author puts it-and how that desire results in a practical philosophy that guides us in recognizing what is essentially good or valuable. Garrison weaves these threads of ancient wisdom into a critical analysis of John Dewey's writings that reveal an implicit theory of eros in reasoning, and the central importance of educating eros to seek "the Good." Chapters: Plato's Symposium: Eros, the Beautiful, and the Good • Care, Sympathy, and Community in Classroom Teaching: Feminist Reflections on the Expansive Self • Play-Doh, Poetry, and "Ethereal Things" • The Aesthetic Context of Inquiry and the Teachable Moment • The Education of Eros: Critical and Creative Value Appraisal • Teaching and the Logic of Moral Perception This book can be used in graduate courses in foundations, teacher education, philosophy of education, qualitative research, arts and education, language and literacy, and women and education. Jim Garrison is Professor of Philosophy of Education at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, VA. He is pastpresident of the John Dewey Society and a winner of the Society's Outstanding Achievement Award.

Harvey Siegel’s conception of critical thinking is riddled with unnecessary and confusing dualisms. He rigidly separates ‘critical skill’ and ‘critical spirit’, the philosophical and the causal, ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and the moral and the epistemological. These dualisms are easily traced to his desire to defend an absolutist and decontextualised epistemology. To the Deweyan naturalist these dualisms are unnecessary. Appealing to the pragmatist notion of beliefs as embodied habits of action evincing emotion, I show how language, meanings and the mind, including the mind of the critical thinker, emerge from our biological being.

Philosophers of education are largely unaware of Dewey's concept of transactionalism, yet it is implicit in much of his philosophy, educational or otherwise from the late 1890s onwards. Written by scholars from Belgium, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the USA, this book shows how transactionalism can offer an entirely new way of understanding teaching and learning, the sociocultural dimension of education, and educational research. The contributors show how the concept helps us to see beyond an array of false dualisms, such as mind versus body, self versus society, and organism versus environment, as well as an equally vast array of binaries, such as inside-outside, presence-absence, and male-female. They introduce the key critical ideas that transactionalism represents including emergence; living in a world without a within; the temporally and extensionally distributed nature of meaning, mind, and self. The theoretical discussion is grounded in practical discussions of educational issues and settings including museum education, coding and computer science, drama, teacher education, policy reform, and the Covid-19 pandemic.

Drawing on John Dewey and the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, this book employs philosophy as a conceptual resource to develop new methodological and analytical tools for conducting in situ empirical investigations. Chapter one explores the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Dewey. Chapter two exposits Deweyan ideas of embodiment, the primacy of the aesthetic encounter, and aesthetically expressive meaning underdeveloped in Wittgenstein. Chapter three introduces the method of practical epistemological analysis and a model of situated epistemic relations to investigate the learning of body techniques in dinghy sailing. The concluding chapter introduces a model of situated artistic relations to investigate the learning of artistic techniques of self-expression in the Swedish sloyd classroom.

_Democracy and Education Reconsidered_ highlights the continued relevance of John Dewey’s _Democracy and Education_ while also examining the need to reconstruct and re-contextualize Dewey’s educational philosophy for our time. The authors propose ways of revising Dewey’s thought in light of the challenges facing contemporary education and society, and address other themes not touched upon heavily in Dewey’s work, such as racism, feminism, post-industrial capitalism, and liquid modernity. As a final component, the authors integrate Dewey’s philosophy with more recent trends in scholarship, including pragmatism, post-structuralism, and the works of other key philosophers and scholars

walt whitman writes: “The Americans of all nations at any time upon the earth have probably the fullest poetical nature”. Naoko Saito is an American philosopher and something of a Whitmanesque philosophical poet. Saito’s book is “the product of many years spent reading and studying American philosophy”. She further indicates: “Mostly I have done this from a remote part of the world—far from America across the Pacific Ocean—and, like so many others, in a language that is not my own”. Saito is a scholar in and of translation.Saito states that the “tensioned relationship between Dewey and Emerson, and more broadly pragmatism and American transcendentalism... is carried forward into the present...

happens, how it happens, and why it happens. Our assumption ought to be that this is as true in education as it is in atomic physics. But this leaves many other questions to answer. The crucial ones: What kind of science is proper or appropriate to education? How does it differ from physics? What is wrong with the prevai1~ ing, virtually unopposed research tradition in education? What could or should be done to replace it with a more adequate tradi tion? What concepts are necessary to describe and explain what we find there? It is in this realm that we find ourselves. Where to start? One place - our place, needless to say - is with one limited but central concept in education, teaching. A long philosophical tradition concerned with the nature of teaching goes back to Plato, divulging most recent ly in the work of such philosophers as B. O. Smith, Scheffler, Hirst, Komisar, Green, McClellan, Soltis, Kerr, Fenstermacher, et al. An empirical tradition runs parallelto the philosophers -it has its most notable modern proponents in Gage, the Soars, Berliner, Rosen shine, but its roots can be traced to the Sophists. These two tradi tions have been at loggerheads over the centuries.