James Gledhill

While Kantian constructivism has become one of the most influential and systematic schools of thought in analytic moral and political philosophy, Hegelian approaches to practical normativity hold out the promise of building upon Kantian insights into individual self-determination while avoiding their dualistic tendencies. James Gledhill and Sebastian Stein unite distinguished scholars of German idealism and contemporary Anglophone practical philosophy with rising stars in the field, to explore whether Hegelian idealist philosophy can offer the categories that analytic practical philosophy requires to overcome the contradictions that have so far plagued Kantian constructivism. The volume organizes the contributions into three parts. The first of these engages debates in metaethics regarding the relationship between realism and constructivism. The second part sees contributors draw on debates about the nature of political normativity, focusing primarily on the problems of historical contextualism, relativism, and critical reflection. The concluding part considers the application of the Hegelian framework to contemporary debates about specific ethical issues, including multiculturalism, democracy, and human rights. Hegel and Contemporary Practical Philosophycontributes to the on-going debate about the importance of systematic philosophy in the context of practical philosophy, engages with contemporary discussions about the shape of a rational social order, and gauges the timeliness of Hegelian philosophy. This book is a must read for scholars interested in Hegel and in the contemporary tradition of Kantian constructivism in moral and political philosophy.

The practice-dependent approach to global justice makes a welcome attempt to steer a course between egalitarian liberal cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and statism and nationalism, on the other. In so doing, it seeks to reconcile the universality of justice with the particular role principles of justice play within the context of different social practices. In this paper, I argue, however, that the “practice turn” in theorising about justice has not gone far enough, either methodologically or substantively. Methodologically, it is necessary to move beyond the residual positivism of the practice-dependent approach to an interpretive approach that takes account of the reflexive, developmental nature of social practices. Substantively, focusing on the reflexivity of social practices, and particularly practices of reflexive constitution-making, provides a framework for a republican approach to international justice concerned with reconciling Kant’s idea of the universality of justice with the emphasis on popular sovereignty of Rousseau and Hegel.

Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal ethical theory comes first, then applied principles, and politics is reduced to a kind of applied ethics. While the models of political moralism that Williams criticizes are endorsed by G.A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin respectively, I argue that this realist case against John Rawls cannot be sustained. In explicating and defending Rawls’s realistically utopian conception of ideal theory I defend a Kantian conception of theory where it is by abstracting from immediate realities that theory is fit to guide practice by providing a framework for political judgment.