James H. P. Lewis

A lineage of prominent philosophers who have discussed the second-person relation can be regarded as advancing structural accounts. They posit that the second-person relation effects one transformative change to the structure of practical reasoning. In this paper, I criticise this orthodoxy and offer an alternative, substantive account. That is, I argue that entering into second-personal relations with others does indeed affect one's practical reasoning, but it does this not by altering the structure of one's agential thought, but by changing what reasons can become available. The importance of second-personal thought for action is heterogenous. Second-person relations make possible the emergence of a wide variety of different kinds of practical reasons: creating some, revealing others. Recognising this diminishes the appeal of the traditional, structural accounts of the practical significance of such second-personal relations. Moving away from structural accounts facilitates a more thorough understanding of the intersubjective form of action.

To be together with other people, truly together, is a social good. Perhaps it is deeply entwined with other social goods that have been subjected to sustained philosophical discussion such as friendship. Still, in its own right, the topic of the nature and apparent value of togetherness has been largely neglected. This paper advances three claims: i) that togetherness of a certain relevant sort consists in sharing a sense of the meaningfulness of things; ii) that this sort of togetherness is a lead candidate for being the internal goal of personal relationships as such; and iii) that togetherness so understood is valuable because senses of the meaningfulness of things are to be shared. The argument of the paper articulates a sense in which even solitary meaningful experiences have a social structure.