James Klagge

While the published works of Ludwig Wittgenstein reveal the final, coalesced thoughts of this philosophical giant, Wittgenstein’s diary reveals his process of _doing _philosophy. Only in his private writing does Wittgenstein's philosophical practice fully come to light. Wittgenstein’s diary entries from the 1930s reveal themselves as a first-person spiritual epic. Wittgenstein agonizes over his relationship with Marguerite Respinger and tries to come to terms with its failure. He relates and interprets several of his dreams. He comments on his philosophical colleagues Frank Ramsey and G.E. Moore; on musicians such as Beethoven, Bruckner and Brahms; and on authors such as Kraus, Mann, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Kierkegaard. He struggles to make confessions to friends and family. He relates in painful detail his spiritual crisis in Norway in the late winter of 1937. From a man who once recommended silence about spiritual matters, we find here an honest and searing articulation of his attempts to believe and live what he finds in the Bible. Here are the raw materials for what could have been one of the great spiritual autobiographies of the twentieth century. It is available here for the first time in an affordable edition, with updated and expanded editorial notes to help the reader understand Wittgenstein’s many allusions, and with a new Introduction by Ray Monk, which places the diary in the larger arc of Wittgenstein's life.

Wittgenstein’s aphorism about the fly-bottle (PI 2009, §309) and Plato’s parable of the cave (Rep.VII, 514a-521a) provide two of the most memorable images in the history of Western philosophy. In addition to their use in making philosophical points, they do so in a literary fashion through this imagery. In this paper, I examine and compare how this literary feature functions in their two philosophies. Then I consider both the positive and less-explored negative aspects of these images. It turns out that both Plato and Wittgenstein are engaged in that “ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy” (Rep., 607b).

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is an annual publication which includes original articles on a wide range of topics in ancient philosophy, and review articles of major books. In this supplementary volume, a number of renowned scholars of Plato reflect upon their interpretative methods. Topics covered include the use of ancient authorities in interpreting Plato's dialogues, Plato's literary and rhetorical style, his arguments and characters, and his use of the dialogue form. The collection is not intended as a comprehensive survey of methodological approaches; rather it offers a number of different perspectives and clearly articulated interpretations by leading scholars in the field.

An essential resource for students of Wittgenstein, this collection contains faithful, in some cases expanded and corrected, versions of many important pieces never before available in a single volume, including Notes for the 'Philosophical Lecture', published here for the first time. Fifteen selections, with bi-lingual versions of those originally written in German, span the development of Wittgenstein's thought, his range of interests, and his methods of philosophical investigation. Short introductions, an index, and an updated version of Georg Henrik von Wright's The Wittgenstein Papers situate the selections within the broader context of the Wittgenstein corpus and the history of its publication.

This volume contains twelve essays by friends, colleagues, and former students of Philippa Foot: Anscombe, Blackburn, Hursthouse, Kenny, Lawrence, McDowell, Quinn, Sachs, Scanlon, Michael Thompson, Wiggins, and Williams. The essays concern issues relevant to or raised by Foot's work in moral philosophy, only sometimes specifically addressing her views. Unfortunately, there is no contribution by Foot herself, either in the form of replies or a new paper. This certainly lessens the interest of the volume. Perhaps Foot was driven by modesty in not wanting the focus to be on her comments, or by the need to conserve her time for larger ongoing projects. Whatever the explanation, readers would have benefited from the chance to hear her latest thinking on the issues raised in some of these papers (especially those by Blackburn and McDowell).

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is one of the most important philosophical works of the Twentieth Century, yet it is brief and offers little orientation for the reader. This causes two problems: The first-time reader is left wondering what it could be about, and often leaves off reading in frustration after a few pages. The scholar is left with little guidance for interpretation. This paper recounts selected material from my book Tractatus in Context. While the book includes familiar material from Wittgenstein’s notebooks and letters, it also includes lesser-known material such as untranslated correspondence and notebook entries, later lectures and dictations, notes from Ramsey, and previously unknown reviews. Some of the topics to be examined are: simple objects, atomic facts and elementary propositions, limits and boundaries, superstition, the shape of the visual field, and the role of the will. Given the occasion, I’ll also focus on some ways in which conversations with the Vienna Circle help illuminate obscure passages in the Tractatus.

"Ludwig Wittgenstein's brief Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is one of the most important philosophical works of the Twentieth Century, yet it offers little orientation for the reader. The first-time reader is left wondering what it could be about, and the scholar is left with little guidance for interpretation. In Tractatus in Context, James C. Klagge presents the vital background necessary for appreciating Wittgenstein's gnomic masterpiece. Tractatus in Context contains the early reactions to the Tractatus, including the initial reviews written in 1922-1924. And while we can't talk with Wittgenstein, we can do the next best thing-hear what he had to say about the Tractatus. Klagge thus presents what Wittgenstein thought about germane issues leading up to his writing the book, in discussions and correspondence with others about his ideas, and what he had to say about the Tractatus after it was written-in letters, lectures and conversations. It offers, you might say, Wittgenstein's own commentary on the book. Key Features: Illuminates what is at stake in the Tractatus, by providing the views of others that engaged Wittgenstein as he was writing it. Includes Wittgenstein's earlier thoughts on ideas in the book as recorded in his notebooks, letters, and conversations as well as his later, retrospective comments on those ideas. Draws on new or little-known sources, such as Wittgenstein's coded notebooks, Hermine's notes, Frege's letters, Hänsel's diary, Ramsey's notes, and Skinner's dictations. Draws connections between the background context and specific passages in the Tractatus, using a proposition-by-proposition commentary"--

In this supplementary volume, a number of renowned scholars of Plato reflect upon their interpretive methods. Topics covered include the use of ancient authorities in interpreting Plato's dialogues, Plato's literary and rhetorical style, his arguments and characters, and his use of the dialogue form. The collection is not intended as a comprehensive survey of methodological approaches; rather it offers a number of different perspectives and clearly articulated interpretations by leading scholars in the field.

Is “good” a family-resemblance concept? Wittgenstein holds it is, since cases of goodness may not have anything in common, but there may be a continuous transition from some cases to others. Von Wright and Hacker argue it is not. They hold that family-resemblance concepts satisfy two conditions that goodness does not satisfy. I assess their arguments and then present a constitutivist account of goodness that Wittgenstein seems to endorse. The constitutivist account is what one would expect if goodness was a family-resemblance concept. Finally, I note that Wittgenstein's nod towards non-descriptivism in the Investigations is paralleled by Stevenson's ethical emotivism.

I formulate and defend a realist theory of the truth of moral judgements according to which moral properties are synthetically but necessarily determined by natural properties of people, actions, or states of affairs. This view can be found in Moore's later ethical writings. The view reconciles two apparently conflicting intuitions: Moral properties supervene upon natural properties, but judgements about moral properties are generally not entailed by any judgements about natural properties. The view is realist in the sense that moral judgements possess a truth-value independently of our means of knowing it. They are true or false in virture of a reality existing independently of us. ;One promising way of understanding this synthetic, necessary connection between moral and natural properties is in terms of the Kripke-Putnam account of natural kinds: Moral properties are type-identical with configurations of natural properties. But this turns out to be unsatisfactory. Another promising way of understanding this connection is on analogy with the connection between the mental and physical. I reject a token-identity theory of the moral and natural, but the analogy itself is helpful in understanding the relationship between the moral and natural. It offers a model for that relationship. ;I distinguish two senses in which supervenience could be understood in morality--ascriptive and descriptive--and argue that ascriptive supervenience depends on descriptive. A realist must defend descriptive supervenience. Moral properties decriptively supervene upon natural properties because moral differences must be explicable and justifiable in terms of natural differences. ;I construct an epistemology for moral properties in which natural properties are criteria, in Wittgenstein's sense, of moral properties. This conforms with the metaphysics of moral properties, and can be reconciled with the phenomenon of moral conflict. Finally, a careful formulation of moral realism is defended against Dummett's objections to realism generally. The moral realist cannot be forced to hold that there are moral truths that humans could not, even in principle, come to know. Yet this is what seems objectionable about realism in other realms. We can know all moral truths in principle, though perhaps not in practice