James Martin

Including articles translated from the Italian for the first time, this unique set is the first systematic collection of critical commentary on this influential figure. Reprinting some thirty years of Gramsci criticism, the collection features individual volume introductions as well as a general overview introduction. The thematically-organized volumes include: * Volume I: Life, Context and Intellectual Development * Volume II: Marxism, Philosophy and Politics * Volume III: Revolution, Praxis and the Party * Volume IV: Contemporary Applications.

En este artículo trato de aclarar el controversial uso de pathêmata tîs psuchês, empleado por Aristóteles en el De Anima y en el De Interpretatione, especialmente cuando significa el acto de pensar, pensamientos y conocimiento en general. Defiendo la tesis de que el término pathos es esencial en la teoría aristotélica del conocimiento. Mi argumento se basa en la distinción, hecha por Aristóteles en el De Anima y la Metafísica, entre dos significados de este término: como movimiento hacia otro, y como crecimiento en el mismo. Interpreto este último en conexión con el acto y enuncio los sentidos en los que sería apropiado predicar la pasibilidad y la impasibilidad de las facultades de la cognición, las cosas que son conocidas y el conocimiento mismo como acto.

Modern Italy is frequently diagnosed with having suffered an excess of ideological antagonism. However, poststructuralist political theory implies that, as a form of negative exclusion, antagonism serves a crucial purpose in shaping political discourse and delimiting social and political identities. This essay outlines the poststructuralist argument and sets out an agenda for rethinking ideological conflict in the Italian context. Taking the rise and decline of Italian Anti?Fascism as an example, it argues that antagonism is as important to ideological coherence as is the positive content of political ideology itself

In De Anima 3. 5 Aristotle discusses an active cause of human cognition. Although this cause, referred to as poietikos nous , seems not to have raised any difficult questions for the philosopher, it has been an endless source of controversy for his commentators, among whom one finds no clear consensus about the status of active mind--whether it is part of the soul of the individual knower, or a separate, external cause. ;This study, which approaches the problem of active mind in the light both of the De Anima's treatment of sensation and thinking and of the relevant texts on actuality in the Metaphysics, concludes that active mind is a separate, external cause of human knowing. Furthermore, the perfect agreement of attributes and activities between active mind and the unmoved mover of Metaphysics Lambda strongly suggests that the principle on which the argument for active mind rests is the Metaphysics' argument for a pure actuality. Accordingly, active mind, like the unmoved mover, would be a final cause, but not an efficient cause; whereas for Aristotle an efficient cause is a moved mover, active mind as "essentially an actuality" is necessarily unmoved. Most commentators, however, think that active mind is an efficient cause, first because they assume that the sensible form must be made actually intelligible by active mind before thinking can take place; second, because the text as generally interpreted requires that active mind exercise efficient causality. There is in the text of the De Anima, however, no evidence that for Aristotle thinking requires any kind of abstraction. Second, De Anima 3. 5 does not require that active mind be an efficient cause. Light, to which Aristotle compares active mind, "makes potential colors, colors in actuality" without exercising efficient causality. Furthermore, the text can be given a coherent interpretation only if one accepts this and other evidence that poiein is used there in an extended sense