James Rocha

Among the various proposed ultrasound laws, a few have provisions that either provide the option for the pregnant woman to hear the heartbeat or require that the heartbeat be played and merely give the woman the option to somehow avert her ears. I will argue that these heartbeat provisions actually belie the argument that these laws are intended to assist autonomous choosing. Since the information could be provided just as easily through a factual statement , it cannot be justified to involve emotions in a way that the pregnant woman did not autonomously choose for herself.

Tom Regan argued that animal sports cannot be morally permissible because they are cruel and the animals do not voluntarily participate. While Regan is correct about actual animal sports, we should ask whether substantially revised animal sports could be permissible. We can imagine significant changes to certain animal sports, such as horse racing, that would avoid cruelty and even allow the animals to make their own choices. Where alternative options are freely available, we can consider the horses to have preference autonomy in that they make their own decisions, and we could thereby claim that we have their hypothetical consent. Though this scenario would be sufficient to constitute permissible animal games, these activities could not amount to sports because the events would be unpredictable with the animals not following the rules in the precise way that sport requires. Therefore, permissible animal sports are not possible.

It is well established that nonhuman animals are sentient, have feelings, have desires, and are conscious. For many of us, some set of those points is sufficient to ground moral duties to nonhuman animals. Yet, others retain doubts about whether humans have such duties. Perhaps these doubters set even higher standards—standards that they believe nonhuman animals are incapable of meeting. The task of this paper is to consider how nonhuman animals fare against an incredibly high standard for moral duties: autonomy. Given that we use autonomy as our theoretical starting point, this paper’s arguments will only apply to...

There is disagreement in the coercion literature over whether an offer, which necessarily lacks a threat, could be coercive, which tends to imply at least some affinity with coercion, which, in paradigm cases, includes a threat. In one difficult sexual harassment case, someone is offered a promotion in exchange for sex, but there is, due to the arrangement of the case, no implied threat or repercussion for refusal. I argue this case counts as coercive since the offer-making attempts to recast the agent's self-image simply by making the offer: the harasser attempts to define his employee as a sexualized object in the workplace to whom it is acceptable to make this kind of offer. Yet, such an offer can only be acceptably made to a woman who would accept sexual intrusions in her career, and it can never be right to assume others are willing to have their business lives sexualized. Thus, the offer is coercive in its disrespect for the employee's autonomy, although it involves no threat

While there is much literature on autonomy and the conditions for its attainment, there is less on how those conditions reflect on agents’ ordinary careers. Most people’s careers involve a great deal of subservient activity that would prevent the kind of control over agents’ actions that autonomy would seem to require. Yet, it would seem strange to deny autonomy to every agent who regularly follows orders at work—to do so would make autonomy a futile ideal. Most contemporary autonomy accounts provide purely theoretical analysis without reference to any practical goal that autonomy could serve. These accounts are likely to resolve this issue in one direction: either almost entirely including or excluding subservient workers from autonomy. Either solution would fail to distinguish agents who sufficiently control their lives, in spite of limited subservience, according to their own standards, from agents for whom subservience precludes a fulfilling life. I suggest the solution lies in a return to goal-oriented autonomy accounts, which can use the goal to distinguish when subservience overwhelms autonomy from when subservience and autonomy can coexist. I present an account that anchors autonomy in the happiness that it provides for agents who sufficiently control their lives as determined by their more important prudential standards. On this account, agents in subservient careers can be autonomous if they determine how to make their careers consistent with their happiness

While politicians seek to increase punitive measures against so-called "illegal aliens," it is worth asking whether unauthorized immigrants are obligated by immigration laws that would demand their punishment, whether it is deportation or jail time. I seek to examine this question in light of the traditional defenses of legal obligations: consent, prudential interest, and fairness. Due to the various ways in which the benefits of society are largely excluded from them and the severe penalties that the state seeks to impose on them, these obligations cannot be justified. Unauthorized immigrants do not consent to follow these immigration laws under any of the usual meanings of "consent." We cannot provide a Hobbesian argument since the state refuses to offer its protection in exchange for the acceptance of benefits. Finally, the principle of fairness could not require these immigrants to be obligated since their contributions to society outweigh the benefits they receive.

Immanuel Kant, in a much-maligned view, thought that we could only have indirect duties to nonhuman animals who have no inherent moral value since they lack rationality. While there are various responses to this worrisome position, no one seems to consider that animals could conceivably qualify as having rationality, even on Kantian high standards. Animals engage in various activities that could be taken as indicators of the core aspects of rationality that Kant requires for having absolute worth. While these animal behaviors will not prove that animals are rational, we must remember that we also cannot prove that other humans are rational. Instead, my goal is only to provide a basis for a precautionary moral principle that requires treating animals as minimally rational, given that they might be. On this basis, we ought to accept some direct Kantian duties for the respectful treatment of animals.

Recently, we have seen various proposed laws that would require that women considering abortions be given ultrasounds along with explanations of these ultrasounds. Proponents of these laws could argue that they are assisting with autonomous abortion choices by providing needed information, especially about the ontological status of the fetus. Arguing against these proposed laws, I first claim that their supporters fail to appreciate how personalized an abortion choice must be. Second, I argue that these laws would provide the pregnant woman no control over when and to what extent emotion is inserted into her deliberation. This unjustly inhibits her autonomy, making these ultrasound laws unjustified.