James Ryan

Michael Ruses Darwinian metaethics has come under just criticism from Peter Woolcock (1993). But with modification it remains defensible. Ruse (1986) holds that people ordinarily have a false belief that there are objective moral obligations. He argues that the evolutionary story should be taken as an error theory, i.e., as a theory which explains the belief that there are obligations as arising from non-rational causes, rather than from inference or evidential reasons. Woolcock quite rightly objects that this position entails moral nihilism. However, I argue here that people generally have justified true beliefs about which acts promote their most coherent set of moral values, and hence, by definition, about which acts are right. What the evolutionary story explains is the existence of these values, but it is not an error theory for moral beliefs. Ordinary beliefs correspond to real moral properties, though these are not objective or absolute properties independent of anyones subjective states. On its best footing, therefore, a Darwinian metaethics of the type Ruse offers is not an error theory and does not entail moral nihilism.

I show that Susan Haack's foundherentist theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification (a role which has seemed mysterious since experience is not a proposition and therefore cannot, seemingly, support any propos/non). Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certain beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their justification from experience, contrary to coherentism.

The Yijing/Binary System Episode involved Leibniz' discovery of a de facto representation of the binary number system in the sixty-four-hexagram Fu Xi "Yijing." Scholars have left the match unexplained, since they have found no evidence of a forgotten binary number system in ancient China. The interesting similarities and differences are discussed between the thought of Leibniz and that of Shao Yong, both of whom, it is argued, understood and recognized the importance of the double geometric progression in the diagram

This paper defends both an interpretation of Mencius' moral theory and that theory itself against alternative interpretive defences. I argue that the 'virtue ethics' reading of Mencius wrongly sees him as denying the distinction between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Virtue ethics is flawed, because it makes such a denial. But Mencius' moral theory, in spite of Mencius' obvious interest in moral psychology, does not have that flaw. However, I argue that Mencius is no rationalist. Instead, I show that he upholds a coherentist moral theory, in which reason and psychology both have a role. The final third of the paper compares my interpretation with the work of various important Mencius scholars. I point out that the issue of the difference between moral philosophy and moral psychology is quite important in contemporary Western moral theory.

After briefly arguing that neither (Kantian or utilitarian) rule-based ethics nor virtue ethics offers promise as a moral theory, I state that argument by analogy (i.e., deliberation within coherence constraints) is a satisfactory form of moral deliberation. I show that what is right must be whatever corresponds to the largest and most coherent set of a society’s moral values. Since we would not know how to interpret the claim that what is right might be repugnant to all our shared moral values, I argue that a definitional naturalist position passes Moore’s open question test. “X is right” just means “performing X satisfies the largest and most coherent set of our altruistic and self-interested desires.” On this view, moral properties are real relational properties. I raise and respond to several objections.

I argue that Mencius puts forth a defensible form of ethical naturalism, according to which moral properties, moral motivation, and moral deliberation can be accounted for within the parameters of a naturalistic worldview. On this position, moral properties are the subjectively real properties which acts have in virtue of their corresponding to our most coherent set of shared desires. I give a naturalistic definition of 'right' which, I argue, is implicit in Mencius' philosophy. I address the objection that some of the contemporary-sounding views which I attribute to Mencius are positions which are alien to the ancient thinker, and I argue that the version of Mencius given here is not only quite faithful to Mencius but also a true metaethical theory.

After briefly arguing that neither (Kantian or utilitarian) rule-based ethics nor virtue ethics offers promise as a moral theory, I state that argument by analogy (i.e., deliberation within coherence constraints) is a satisfactory form of moral deliberation. I show that what is right must be whatever corresponds to the largest and most coherent set of a society’s moral values. Since we would not know how to interpret the claim that what is right might be repugnant to all our shared moral values, I argue that a definitional naturalist position passes Moore’s open question test. “X is right” just means “performing X satisfies the largest and most coherent set of our altruistic and self-interested desires.” On this view, moral properties are real relational properties. I raise and respond to several objections.

Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: moral education and economic culture in Japan and the four mini‐dragons Tu Wei‐Ming, 1996 Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press ii + 418pp., hb £28.50, pb £12.50, ISBN 0 674 16086 X The Recluse of Loyang: Shao Yung and the moral evolution of early Sung thought Don J. Wyatt, 1996 Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press xii + 340 pp., hb, ISBN 0 8248 1755 9 Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School and questions of nationalism James W. Heisig & John C. Maraludo, 1995 Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press hb $40.00, pb $19.95 Untying the Knots in Buddhism. Selected essays Buddhist Tradition Series Volume 28, 1997 Alex Wayman 1997 Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass x + 618 pp, hb Rs. 495; ISBN 81 208 1321 9 Historical Dictionary of Hinduism Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements, No. 13 Bruce M. Sullivan 1997 Lanham, MD & London, The Scarecrow Press xviii, 346 pp, pb £46.55, ISBN 0 8108 3327 1 Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion. Eastern and Western thought William L. Reese, 1996 New York, Humanities Press xiv + 856 pp., pb, ISBN 0 391 03864 8