James Taylor

The question, “Who created the concept of God?” is a multiply complex question-it presupposes answers to at least two prior questions. One is “Is there one and only one concept of God?” Another (which presupposes that there is only one such concept) is “Is this concept of God created?” I will argue that there is more than one concept of God and that at least one of these concepts may be uncreated. If I am right, then the question “Who created the concept of God?” is based on a clearly false presupposition (that there is one and only one concept of God) and a presupposition that is not clearly true (that the concept of God was created). It follows that this question does not have a straightforward answer. Nonetheless, there is much to learn-about concepts of God and their origins-by analyzing it.

In Models of God, Ted Peters discusses a methodology for formulating and evaluating models of God, surveys nine models, and proposes one that he entitles Eschatological Panentheism. This paper provides critical comments on Peters’ methodological claims, taxonomy of models of God, and specific proposal. This paper has been delivered during APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.Both Peters’ Models of God and these comments were presented at the Models of God mini-conference at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in April of 2007

Philosophers continue to debate about David Hume’s case against the rationality of belief in miracles. This article clarifies semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical questions addressed in the controversy. It also explains the main premises of Hume’s argument and discusses criticisms of them. The article concludes that one’s evaluation of Hume’s argument will depend on one’s views about (a) the definitions of ’miracle’ and ’natural law’; (b) the type of reasoning one ought to employ to determine the probability that a particular miracle claim is true; and (c) whether reasonable people proportion their beliefs about the occurrence of miracles to their evidence

The main thesis of this paper is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from scientific psychological investigation. I call this view the strong thesis of methodological psychologism. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of at least one justified belief a psychological capacity which humans do not have. That is, the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from scientific psychological investigation. After defending these subtheses, I point out some interesting consequences of the overall thesis which present a challenge to traditional epistemology.