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James Watkins

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  •  Publications
    4
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    4

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Homepage
0009-0004-7151-433X
Areas of Specialization
History of Western Philosophy
Normative Ethics
Meta-Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
Areas of Interest
History of Western Philosophy
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
Ancient Greek Political Philosophy
1 more
  • All publications (4)
  •  537
    Lying and Speaking Falsely, and other Relevant Musings
    In recent decades, the traditional meaning of the word "lie" has evolved in ordinary American usage, leading to widespread confusion about what constitutes a lie. This article provides an introductory clarification of the historic distinction between lying and speaking falsely and then examines several specific categories of lies, including white lies, lies of omission, benevolent lies, and Plato’s noble lie.
    Normative Ethics, MiscellaneousMoral LanguageSocial EthicsApplied Ethics, MiscellaneousPhilosophy, M…Read more
    Normative Ethics, MiscellaneousMoral LanguageSocial EthicsApplied Ethics, MiscellaneousPhilosophy, MiscellaneousCulture and CulturesSocial Philosophy
  •  403
    The Ideological Receptor in Normal Cognitive Function
    In this article I review the defining qualities of an ideology, and I introduce the notion of an ideological receptor, which I propose to be an innate cognitive structure in normal human beings. The existence of this ideological receptor would explain the common human tendency toward embracing ideologies essentially spontaneously and uncritically. This tendency is relevant to critical thinking due to the fact that some ideologies are comprised of beliefs that are false, or maladaptive, or belief…Read more
    In this article I review the defining qualities of an ideology, and I introduce the notion of an ideological receptor, which I propose to be an innate cognitive structure in normal human beings. The existence of this ideological receptor would explain the common human tendency toward embracing ideologies essentially spontaneously and uncritically. This tendency is relevant to critical thinking due to the fact that some ideologies are comprised of beliefs that are false, or maladaptive, or beliefs that prescribe actions that are immoral. The ideological receptor should be relatively uncontroversial since it simply groups together several widely acknowledged functions of normal human cognition into a larger, functional cognitive system. That being said, grouping these independent functions together under a unifying label can constitute an arguably useful model of yet another obstacle to critical thinking, and in theory, an awareness of this obstacle can potentially facilitate its neutralization.
    Cognitive Sciences, MiscInformal LogicCritical ThinkingPhilosophy of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneou…Read more
    Cognitive Sciences, MiscInformal LogicCritical ThinkingPhilosophy of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
  •  1048
    Three New Fallacies: Appeals to Polite Conversation, Trivial Refutation, and Trivial Defense
    Fallacious reasoning can stem from interacting with purported advocates and/or critics who are not competent to fulfil their respective roles relative to the topic under discussion. The notions of the “incompetent advocate” and the “incompetent critic” are introduced and described, and they are then invoked in the descriptions of three new fallacies. I conclude with some recommendations as to how one can avoid these fallacious traps.
    Informal LogicLogical Consequence and Entailment
  •  420
    Dysinferentia: A Potential Learning Disability in Logic
    Having taught informal logic and critical thinking for decades, I surmise that there are rare learners who seem to manifest an undocumented learning disability marked by the incapacity to recognize the presence or absence of inferential relationships between propositions. In this brief paper I propose that such a learning disability exists, and I argue that this learning disability should be termed dysinferentia.
    Logical Consequence and EntailmentPhilosophy of Cognitive Science, MiscellaneousInformal Logic
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