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3The Active Self and Perception in Berkeley's Three DialoguesIn Stefan Storrie (ed.), Berkeley's Three Dialogues: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 123-135. 2018.
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34The Role of Instinct in David Hume's Conception of Human ReasonJournal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (3): 273-288. 2020.This article investigates the role of instinct in Hume's understanding of human reason. It is shown that while in the Treatise Hume makes the strong reductive assertion that reason is ‘nothing but’ an instinct, in the First Enquiry the corresponding statement has been modified in several ways, rendering the relation between instinct and reason more complex. Most importantly, Hume now explicitly recognises that alongside instinctive experimental reasoning, there is a uniquely human intellectual p…Read more
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189Hume’s Theory of Causation: Is There More Than One?Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 33 (2): 233-249. 2011.It is traditionally assumed that there is only one theory of causality in Hume's writings. In this article it is shown that we can distinguish between an early and mature theory. It is argued that the mature theory, strongly influenced by Newton's physics, accords with the New Hume interpretation by asserting that real causal relations are not accessible to the human mind.
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187Na obranu nového Huma: odpověď Zuzaně ParusníkovéTeorie Vědy / Theory of Science 35 (1): 139-146. 2013.Tento článek se zastává skepticko-realistického tzv. novo- humovského, výkladu Humovy teorie kauzality navzdory kritice ze strany Zuzany Parusnikové. Autor však v souladu se svou vývojovou interpretací hájí tzv. „nového Huma" pouze pro pozdní tvorbu tohoto skot- ského filosofa.
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3The Synthesis of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley’s Doctrine of NotionsBerkeley Studies 3-15. 2010.This essay argues that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions is an account of concept-formation that offers a middle-way between empiricism and innatism, something which Berkeley himself asserts at Siris 308. First, the widespread assumption that Berkeley accepts Locke’s conceptual empiricism is questioned, with particular attention given to Berkeley’s views on innatism and ideas of reflection. Then, it is shown that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions comes very close to the refined form ofinnatism to be f…Read more
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The Epitome (Abrégé) of Locke's EssayIn Peter R. Anstey (ed.), The Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives, Routledge. pp. 3--25. 2003.
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24Concepts of Secondary QualitiesOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 5 (Supplement): 91-98. 1998.The properties of secondary qualities have recently become an object of interest again in analytic philosophy; it is generally assumed that secondary qualities - in the mind at least - tend to be irreducible to the physical: taste, smell, color perception, the aural, & the tactile all seem to be more subjectively perceived than most other qualities. This is shown to present such topics as realism vs anti-realism, description, & truth-value with a series of problems, which are then discussed. The…Read more
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The Cartesian element in Locke's anti-Cartesian conception of bodyIn Philippe Hamou & Martine Pécharman (eds.), Locke and Cartesian Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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46Hume after 300 YearsJournal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2): 163-181. 2012.It is argued that we should distinguish between an ‘early Hume’ and a ‘mature Hume’ on causality. In his early period, represented by the Treatise, Hume had not yet adopted Newtonian active principles. In the mature period, however, represented in particular by the First Enquiry, his theory of causation has been transformed by a reception of Newton. This leads Hume to drop the condition of contiguity, which had excluded action-at-a-distance in the Treatise. It also leads him to allow real necess…Read more
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46Common Sense and the Natural Light in George Berkeley’s PhilosophyPhilosophia 49 (2): 651-665. 2020.It is argued that George Berkeley’s term ‘common sense’ does not indicate shared conviction, but the shared capacity of reasonable judgement, and is therefore to be classed as a mental ability, not a belief-system. Common sense is to be distinguished from theoretical understanding which, in Berkeley’s view, is frequently corrupted either by learned prejudice, or by language that lacks meaning or camouflages contradiction. It is also to be distinguished from the deliverances of divine revelation,…Read more
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41John Locke and Natural PhilosophyBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1): 204-207. 2013.British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 21, Issue 1, Page 204-207, January 2013
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133Primary qualities, secondary qualities and Locke's impulse principleBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (1). 2009.In this paper I shall focus attention on a principle which lies at the heart of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is to be found explicitly or implicitly stated at many places in the Essay , but its clearest expression is at E.II.viii.11, where Locke writes that ' Impulse [is] the only way which we can conceive Bodies operate in'. Let us call it 'the impulse principle'. The first task is to describe what exactly the term impulse means here and to what the principle …Read more
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50Locke's account of cohesion and its philosophical significanceBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4). 2004.
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10Essays on the concept of mind in early-modern philosophy (edited book)Cambridge Scholars Press. 2010.An important task for every major philosopher is to offer us an understanding of the nature of mind. The essays in this volume discuss different aspects of the philosophical theories of mind put forward in the century and a half that followed Descartes' Meditations of 1641. These years, often referred to as the 'early-modern' period, are probably unparalleled for originality and diversity in conceiving the mind. The volume not only includes two essays on Descartes' own thinking, but there are al…Read more
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3""What does" to think"(" cogitare") mean in Descartes"Second Meditation'?Filosoficky Casopis 51 (5): 787-799. 2003.
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1On the causal role of meaningIn Michael J. Power & C. R. Brewin (eds.), The Transformation of Meaning in Psychological Therapies: Integrating Theory and Practice, John Wiley. 1997.
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
17th/18th Century Philosophy |