James Winchester

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche, Naturalism and InterpretationJames WinchesterChristoph Cox. Nietzsche, Naturalism and Interpretation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Pp. 241. Cloth, $45.00.This is a well-written book. It is clear. Making use of a wide variety of sources both analytic and continental, it argues that Nietzsche is a naturalist. By that Cox means that Nietzsche rejects other worldly sources of knowledge and being. Cox argues that Nietzsche rejects both the epistemological notion of a "God's eye view" and the ontological notion of a "pregiven world." For Nietzsche there is "a primacy and irreducibility of interpretation" (70). Nietzsche's commitment to naturalism allows him to argue that some interpretations are better than others, for naturalism becomes the bar according to which interpretations are judged. The best interpretations are those that eliminate all references to other-worldly phenomena.Cox does what he sets out to do. Assuming that there is a coherency to Nietzsche's thought—particularly to the writings from The Gay Science through to the end of Nietzsche's works—Cox buttresses his interpretation through extensive quotations from the published works. He also makes extensive use of the Nachlass—actually he uses the Will to Power to show Nietzsche's naturalism. And why not? Assuming that there is a unity in Nietzsche's thought, the book seeks to package the oft unruly Nietzsche in terms used in recent analytical debates about ontology and epistemology—and this the book does very well. Passages out of the Will to Power buttress Cox's argument that Nietzsche's thought fits into these categories. Still I would have preferred that he used the Nachlass. It is important to know when Nietzsche is writing. With the Will to Power we do not know how it fits into what Nietzsche was writing at the time.The book does not consider Nietzsche's own claim that his writing cannot be so neatly packaged. Nietzsche is suspicious of the will to systematize and I find that at times Cox overly systematizes Nietzsche's work. For example, according to Cox, Nietzsche rejects the notion that "there exists a pre-given world, nothing can serve as the foil for an interpretation except other interpretations." We transform interpretations not by confronting them with fact, but rather we transform one interpretation by leveraging it against another interpretation. Cox argues that for Nietzsche we never encounter a world outside of interpretation (160-161). For the most part this is right. Cox quotes extensively from Beyond Good and Evil. If we read the first section of that work "On the Prejudices of Philosophers," as a whole, then Nietzsche is not as consistent as Cox suggests. In aphorism 1 Nietzsche argues that no one ever seems to question the will to truth. He seems to be saying that one could seek out truth, but that it may be impossible to live with the truth. Nietzsche asks not what is true, but rather what is necessary for life and why has truth been valued. In aphorism 4 he writes that for him the falsity of a judgment is not an objection to it and that his philosophy might sound strangest when he claims that the falsest judgments are for him the most necessary. In aphorism 9, nature is described as something other than people have thought it to be. He writes, "In truth it is much different." In other words, here Nietzsche claims that he is right about the nature of the world and those who believe there are laws of nature are wrong. As Cox notes, in aphorism 22 Nietzsche does imply that his own vision of nature is "only an interpretation," but "On the Prejudices of Philosophers," or for that matter Nietzsche's [End Page 606] entire later philosophy is not as unambiguous about this as Cox suggests. (Cox also argues for a unitary interpretation of Will to Power in Nietzsche. I have argued against this position in my Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn: Reading Nietzsche After Heidegger, Deleuze and Derrida [Albany: SUNY Press, 1994]).Cox is a good reader of Nietzsche, a good reader of current analytical thought, and a good reader of contemporary continental figures. To overemphasize Nietzsche...

Even while proclaiming that God is dead, Nietzsche often praises Islam and explicitly endorses the Laws of Manu. His praise of Islam and the Laws of Manu is usually tied to a critique of Christianity. Nietzsche’s own social ethic, based in Will to Power, advocates the exploitation of the weak. Tariq Ramadan often speaks appreciatively of Nietzsche, but his vision of social justice seems very similar to the Christian social ethic that Nietzsche constantly attacks. This essay examines the role that Islam plays for Nietzsche and the role that Nietzsche plays for Ramadan. Despite their differences, both thinkers criticize the provincial tendencies in Western thought

In this paper, I will first argue that the refugee crises in Europe and along the southern border of the United States are the direct result of colonial and neo-colonial politics. The nations that have caused the problems, therefore, have a moral responsibility first to accept refugees and then to work to fix the problems they created. The nations that are responsible for the problems should work to fix them so that the refugees can return home. We will also see that at times, for example in the case of Central America, the problems first-world people are facing are directly tied to the problems that are making refugees flee. In the second part of the paper, I will argue that there are good reasons to think that Western nations can accept more refugees without creating a xenophobic backlash if they work to address the problems that their own citizens are facing.

The book invites its readers to explore the role erotic love, pleasure, and friendship play in crafting a good life. These topics are enduring themes that captures the heart of human existence, and have been the focus of many works of philosophy and literature. However, there remains scope for further examination. This book offers a compelling case to expand the exploration beyond the preponderance of white, male canonical figures that have dominated the field, in order to include an array of scholars that more accurately capture the diversity of humanity. It does so by drawing on Greek, Asian, Africana, Continental, and Feminist thinkers, and exploring a myriad of literary works to illustrate and interrogate the theories.

Eros, pleasure, and friendships are, for me, three of the most important things to investigate in an effort to live a good life. Careful as we may be, there is no guarantee that we will live a good life. Catastrophes lurk, but often we are our own worst enemies. We often fail to consider what really matters to us. The story of King Croesus reminds us that even the lives of the wealthy and powerful often end in tragedy. Audre Lorde died of cancer when she was only 58, but lived a life embracing the erotic, and surrounded by many friends. Unable to reveal the truth of eros, pleasure, friendship, I can explore how a wide variety of thinkers from many traditions have understood what are for me the keys to the good life. My hope is that as I survey what others have said, my readers can form their own views of eros, pleasure, friendship, and what they think will make their life good.

This chapter examines the Dhammapada’s (a Buddhist text) warnings about pleasure as well as stories about Aristippus, the legendary founder of Hedonism. It also surveys writings by Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Theodore Adorno, and Michel Onfray. I tell the story of Francois Mitterrand’s (former president of France) last meal, where he ate an ortolan (“bunting” in English)—a small songbird. For many French it is a great delicacy. French law actually prohibits eating it. Tradition has it that one puts a towel over their face as they eat the bird. The towel hides one’s ecstasy from the gods. Such ecstasy rivals the joy of the Gods, and the Gods do not take kindly to that. The chapter ends by looking at Adorno’s argument that Odysseus’s sailing by the sirens marks a sentinel moment in our turning away from our primordial desires. Adorno worries that capitalism has taken away our ability to feel pleasure. Certainly, Epicurus was right to say that not all pleasures are to be embraced nor all pains to be avoided. I have never tried heroine and have no plans to do so, but am wary of putting off enjoying life. It is important to listen to the Sirens’ calls and the body’s yearnings even if we do not always follow them!

Here, I compare my own views of the good life with Aristotle, Marcus Aurelius, Confucius, Nietzsche, and Audre Lorde. Like all ancient stoics, Aurelius has confidence that the universe is ruled by Zeus and anything that might look bad for an individual is actually part of Zeus’s plan for the universe. I have no such confidence. Nietzsche and Lorde offer compelling arguments that the good life requires becoming who we are as opposed to conforming to society’s expectations. Nietzsche’s essay “Schopenhauer as Educator” gives a powerful prescription for how to affirm life, by getting in touch with our own inner genius. As I look out on the lives of family, friends, colleagues, philosophers, and literary characters as well as my own life, I see patterns that lead me to some ways of living and away from others. Murder, greediness, and lack of friends seem very bad. Other ways of living—extravagant wealth, 60-hour work weeks, or the life of a hobo—might work for some even while I doubt they would work for me. That said, in my days, hitch-hiking through the United States, Europe, and Morocco I was not far from a hobo. Older now, I am no longer willing to wait for rides by the side of the road or sleep in fields and under bridges when I travel.

This chapter examines theories of the erotic put forth by Plato and Audre Lorde, L.H. Stallings, Ariana Cruz, and Amia Srinivasan. Plato’s Socrates suggests that we can tame the erotic and use it to achieve the greatest philosophical wisdom. Lorde argues that proper use of the erotic can lead us to ourselves and empower us. Stallings highlights how eros can empower, among others, trans and queer people to live out their “perverse” desires. Cruz suggests that carefully studying porn and BDSM allows us to “speak the unspeakable in black female sexuality.” She sees her work as continuing what Hortense Spiller calls “the retrieval of mutilated bodies.” Srinivasan seems to turn back the clock. She is careful not to suggest disciplining erotic desire—as any reader of Foucault would be, but like Plato, Srinivasan suggests we consider trying to reshape our desires. Transforming our desires could be an emancipatory project. Do we really want to desire what Tinder tells us is desirable? My goal is not to come to a definitive understanding of the erotic. My hope is that this survey of several different takes on the erotic will allow readers to come up with their own understanding.

This dissertation attempts to make sense out of Nietzsche's last works where he appears unsystematic and professes to be unconcerned with questions of truth. ;Chapter 1 examines Martin Heidegger's and Bernd Magnus' attempts to give a unified interpretation to the Eternal Return and concludes that there is no single correct interpretation. ;Chapter 2 discusses the efforts by Heidegger and Wolfgang Muller-Lauter to give a unified interpretation to the Will to Power. I conclude that during the writing of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche does attempt to unify his thought around the Will to Power, but in the works which follow its importance diminishes. ;Chapters 3 and 4 examine the readings of Nietzsche by Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida. Deleuze is criticized for over-systematizing Nietzsche's thought while Derrida's reading of Nietzsche seems not to account for the fact that although Nietzsche claims emphatically that there is no truth he nonetheless believes that some interpretations are better than others. ;Chapter 5 shows how some interpretations are, according to Nietzsche, pragmatically speaking necessary. Life is possible only to the extent to which we use "necessary fictions" to create stability in a constantly changing world. We must act as if certain truths do exist even if we believe there are no truths. Chapter 6 discusses how Nietzsche uses what can be broadly interpreted as "aesthetic" criteria to justify the self-proclaimed superiority of his views. ;Chapter 7 offers a critique of Nietzsche's social thought from a Nietzschean perspective. Agreeing with Nietzsche that, in the absence of truth, there are only pragmatic necessities and aesthetic considerations I offer a critique of Nietzsche's lack of social conscience. There is, in my opinion, nothing wrong with Nietzsche's practice of basing our ethical decisions on our personal choices. What I object to is rather the particular choices he made. His lack of social concern is not suited to our world where survival is increasingly dependent upon our working together

Friendship is, in my view, essential to the good life. This chapter looks at the life-long friendships in Toni Morrison’s Love and Elena Ferrante’s the Neapolitan Quartet. It also examines theoretical accounts given by Plato, Aristotle, Montaigne, Emerson, and bell hooks before turning to an autobiographical account: Thomas Bernhard’s Wittgenstein’s Nephew. As with love, friendships are shaped by the time and place we live. I am struck by Lorde’s account of her growing up. In middle school she was the only Black child in an otherwise all-white school. None of her classmates would befriend her. She had, at the time, no friends. Theories attempt to give us the truth in the abstract, but we inhabit bodies and communities. In the United States, as in many other places, the color of our skin goes a long way in determining our social worlds—so does the size of our bank account, our zip code, and the social status of our family. Fictional stories paint portraits of people in social worlds and therefore give us something that abstract theories often do not.