Jamie B. Turner

This chapter examines Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), the leading figure of the Ḥanbalī/Atharī tradition, whose theology combines strict textualism with a distinctive realism about God, nature, and knowledge. Ibn Taymiyya's epistemology recognises sense perception, reason, and report as the main sources of knowledge, all grounded in the fiṭra, the innate human disposition that enables recognition of both truth and moral value. Ibn Taymiyya maintains that belief in God is intuitive and non-inferential, though it can also be supported by rational argument from contingency and origination. God acts perpetually and voluntarily, creating and sustaining the world in time without beginning, and all divine acts proceed from His wisdom and purpose. Rejecting Ashʿarī occasionalism, he affirms that God creates natural bodies with real causal powers that operate within His will, giving rise to stable natural regularities and allowing a dynamic relation between divine and created agency. Miracles are exceptional signs that confirm prophethood by breaking the normal course of nature, but they remain acts of God within His created order. Ibn Taymiyya's hermeneutics rejects both figurative reinterpretation and consignment of meaning, affirming that divine attributes such as God's hand or settling on the throne are real yet unique to Him and ontologically unlike the corresponding attributes of creation. Human beings, endowed with will and power, act freely within divine determination and fulfil their purpose through worship and moral formation, reflecting God's wisdom on earth. Ibn Taymiyya's outlook accommodates a pragmatic form of methodological naturalism, seeing scientific enquiry as a way of discerning the regularities and wise purposes that God has placed in creation while insisting that divine agency remains the ultimate ground of all causation.

This chapter aims to offer a contemporary brand of foundationalist epistemology in an Islamic milieu. In focusing on Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 728/1328) concept of fiṭra, the chapter develops a faculty-based epistemology and noninferentialist religious epistemology. It positioned itself as a plausible alternative to classical foundationalism, in that it avoids an implausible kind of scepticism and resonates with some of our basic intuitions about knowledge. If successful in countering some key objections, it has shown how theistic belief may be a type of foundational knowledge for religious believers.

One version of the problem of hell when posed against Islamic theism runs something like this: (1) if the model of hell in the Islamic theistic tradition involves eternal conscious torment, then, plausibly, Islamic theism is false, (2) the model of hell in the Islamic theistic tradition involves eternal conscious torment, (3) therefore, plausibly, Islamic theism is false. Significantly, however, and in contrast to the traditional soteriological model, the oft-labelled staunch traditionalist medieval Muslim theologian, Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 CE), controversially argued for salvific universalism. In this article, I critically examine the three theological arguments Ibn Taymiyya offers for universalism. Following an assessment of these arguments, I conclude that although independently inconclusive, when taken together they constitute a plausible cumulative case for universalism and thus reason to dismiss the problem of hell for Islamic theism.

The design argument has taken on different formulations among Muslim thinkers. Arguably, most of these approaches might be described as Paleyan. In this chapter, however, I seek to develop a non-Paleyan approach toward design discourse by focusing on the thought of the Muslim theologian, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 CE). In developing a Taymiyyan model of design-based theistic belief, I argue that this model can resist some of the problems associated with Paleyan approaches. Specifically, it avoids concerns over the soundness or cogency of the Paleyan inference amid Darwinian objections. I argue that this is because on the Taymiyyan model, design-based theistic beliefs are noninferential and concern the ultimate or metaphysical cause of the design in nature, such that they do not rival naturalistic scientific explanations of biological phenomena. Despite three noteworthy objections to the model, I suggest that it offers a plausible way to defend design-based theistic belief.

In this article, I consider how the epistemic problem of religious disagreement has been viewed within the Islamic tradition. Specifically, I consider two religious epistemological trends within the tradition: Islamic Rationalism and Islamic Traditionalism. In examining the approaches of both trends toward addressing the epistemic problem, I suggest that neither is wholly adequate. Nonetheless, I argue that both approaches offer insights that might be relevant to building a more adequate response. So, I attempt to combine insights from both by drawing a distinction between inferential and noninferential reflective responsibility. Given this distinction, I argue that it may be possible for a theist to remain steadfast in upholding their tradition-specific theistic belief, without having to hold that belief by way of inference; but nevertheless, having to be sufficiently reflectively responsible in forming their theistic belief noninferentially.

The problem of religious disagreement between epistemic peers is a potential threat to the epistemic justification of one’s theistic belief. In this paper, I develop a response to this problem which draws on the central epistemological thesis of skeptical theism concerning our inability to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for permitting evil. I suggest that this thesis may extend over to our judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, and that when it does so, it can enable theists to remain steadfast amid disagreement with epistemic peers who hold a contrary theistic belief (i.e., atheistic belief). For if we’re unable to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, then for all we know, God has some reason for not revealing Himself to our apparent epistemic peer. Thus, their epistemic credentials needn’t provide reason to reduce one’s confidence to such a degree as to no longer uphold one’s theistic belief.

This chapter aims to lay out a map of the diverse epistemological perspectives within the Islamic theological tradition, in the conceptual framework of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. In order achieve that goal, it aims to consider epistemological views in light of their historic context, while at the same time seeking to “translate” those broadly medieval perspectives into contemporary philosophical language. In doing so, the chapter offers a succinct overview of the main epistemic trends within the Islamic theological tradition concerning religious epistemology. The chapter is divided into two main sections designated for discussions of differing accounts found in distinct trends of the tradition, namely the Rationalist and Traditionalist trends. The discussion concerning the Rationalist trend focuses on the philosophical-theologians of the dominant Mu’tazilite, Ash’arite, and Maturidite schools. The section on Islamic Traditionalism focuses on the Atharite scripturalism of Ibn Qudāma, and in particular the thought of Ibn Taymiyya. In order to map out these historic positions in light of contemporary religious epistemology, reference is made to a threefold typology of current views in the literature: (1) theistic evidentialism, (2) reformed epistemology, and (3) fideism. As such, the remainder of the chapter will attempt to outline the different approaches toward religious epistemology in the Islamic theological tradition with this threefold typology in mind.

This article aims to draw on the ‘Qur'anic Rationalism’ of Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) in elucidating an Islamic epistemology of theistic natural signs, in the lens of contemporary philosophy of religion. In articulating what Ibn Taymiyya coins ‘God's method of proof through signs (istidlāluhu taʿālā bi'l-āyāt)’, it seeks aid in particular from the work of C. Stephen Evans and other contemporary philosophers of religion, in an attempt to understand the relevance and force of this alternative to natural theology within the Islamic tradition. In doing so, it aims to respond to existing criticisms of Ibn Taymiyya's perspective in the literature, and to consider the implications of a Taymiyyan reading of theistic natural signs, on the epistemic function of Qur'anic āyāt as theistic evidence.

This chapter aims to draw on the critical threads of those vibrant theological conversations within the formative years of Islamic thought in considering the different theological models of the Divine within the broader Islamic tradition under the purview of classical theism as it is understood today in the contemporary philosophy of religion. In doing so, it makes reference to the major strands within the theological (‘ilm al- kalām & atharī scripturalism) and philosophical (falsafa) schools of the Islamic tradition. It aims to consider how these different trends, schools, and thinkers construct a model of God in light of the classical and neo-classical theistic model of God.

Contemporary philosophy of religion has been fascinated with questions of the rationality of religious belief. Alvin Plantinga—a prominent Christian philosopher—has contributed greatly to the exploration of these questions. Plantinga’s epistemology is rooted in the intuitions of Thomas Reid’s “common-sense” philosophy and has developed into a distinctive outlook that we may coin, Plantingian (Calvinist) Reidianism. This chapter aims to propose that, in fact, the central ideas of that outlook can be seen prior to Reid (and John Calvin), beyond the confines of exclusively Christian and European circles, in the theological epistemology of the Damascene Islamic theologian, Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 CE). In exploring the contours of a Taymiyyan worldview, primed upon the notion of fiṭra, Ibn Taymiyya can be seen to have developed a faculty-based account of knowledge, moderate foundationalism, and a distinct “Reformed” epistemology. Within the midst of these developments, Ibn Taymiyya offers a potential framework for a “common-sense” philosophical methodology. Taken together these ideas form the basis for the intuitions of Plantingian Reidianism. Therefore, Plantinga might have looked to an earlier figure working in another tradition for historical support and inspiration for his religious epistemology.

. This article seeks to outline how a Muslim believer can deflect a defeater for Islamic belief put forward by Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb. In doing so, it aims to reject the suggestion that an Islamic religious epistemology is somehow antithetical to a model of Reformed epistemology which is not fully compatible with Plantingian. Taken together with previous work on Islam and RE, the article not only aims to provide reason to think that Baldwin and McNabb’s proposed epistemic defeater for Islamic belief isn’t problematic, it also seeks to show how the concerns raised by Baldwin and McNabb over a Plantingian model of RE in Islamic milieu, are no longer tenable.