Jamie Draper

This paper critically assesses the theory of loss and damage developed in Laura García-Portela's (2025) Rectifying Climate Injustice. The keystones in García-Portela’s theory are her “minimal capability” interpretation of loss and damage, her “continuity account” of historical responsibility for climate change, and her “adequacy-for-purpose” account of attribution in climate science. In this paper, I focus primarily on the latter two of these elements. I begin by raising a problem of indeterminacy for the continuity account of historical responsibility. Then, I examine some external and internal limits to the adequacy-for-purpose account of attribution science. Finally, I conclude by raising a broader issue about the conception of reparations that figures within García-Portela’s account.

Labour migration from low- to high-income states displays striking patterns of occupational segregation. Occupational segregation in labour migration generates what I call the distributive–relational dilemma : on the one hand, labour migration can promote global distributive equality; on the other hand, labour migration can create or exacerbate relational inequalities within the receiving society. This conflict between distributive and relational equality can be attenuated to some degree, but it is difficult to eliminate entirely. Faced with the distributive–relational dilemma, relational egalitarians might conclude that they should support immigration restrictions to reduce domestic relational inequalities. In this paper, I argue that relational egalitarians should resist this conclusion. First, I argue that restricting immigration to protect domestic relational equality fails as a justification for exclusion, because it involves members of receiving societies treating their own hostility towards immigrant workers as a reason for their exclusion. Second, I argue that excluding would-be immigrants in order to maintain domestic relational equality reproduces inegalitarian social hierarchies at the global level, because it reinforces a global regime of migration governance that expresses racialised inequalities in social status. These arguments suggest that relational egalitarians have the theoretical resources that they need to resist the conclusion that they should support restrictive immigration policies in response to the distributive–relational dilemma.

This paper investigates the claim that immigrants have a moral duty to integrate. I argue that socially excluded immigrant minorities have a moral permission to form enclaves, which means that they have at most only limited duties to integrate. Positively, I argue that enclaves can play an important role in supporting the self-respect of socially excluded immigrants. Negatively, I argue social exclusion makes the putative duty to integrate—when it conflicts with enclave formation—unreasonably burdensome. I also argue that even if integration is a genuine duty, it cannot be permissibly enforced as a social expectation vis-à-vis socially excluded immigrants because members of dominant social groups lack standing to blame socially excluded immigrants for failing to integrate. My argument is pessimistic because it recognizes that integration may nonetheless play an important role in tackling relational inequality. Social exclusion thus means that immigrant minorities have only limited duties to integrate, but it also makes integration particularly valuable.

The “Anthropocene” is a term used to mark a period of history where humans have become the dominant force in the transformation of the Earth system. Humans are fundamentally altering the Earth system through processes with potentially catastrophic consequences, such as anthropogenic climate change, ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, mass extinction, and environmental degradation. Thus, the Anthropocene is often employed as an ethical and critical concept, in order to prompt critical reflection on the relationship that humans have to their environment. Three sites of critical reflection are examined in this entry: the Anthropocene as a diagnosis and prognosis of our ecological predicament; ethics and politics in the Anthropocene; and the Anthropocene and the “End of Nature.”

In the literature on refugeehood in political theory, there has been a recent turn towards what have been called “state system legitimacy” views. These views derive an account of states’ obligations to refugees from a broader picture of the conditions for international legitimacy. This paper seeks to develop the state system legitimacy view of refugeehood by subjecting the most developed version of it—the account developed by David Owen—to critical scrutiny. We diagnose an ambiguity in Owen’s theory of refugeehood, in the concept of political membership, and unpack the implications of this ambiguity for state system legitimacy views. First, we reconstruct the key aspects of Owen’s account of refugeehood and show how it represents an advance over competing theories. Then we discuss the methodological underpinnings of Owen’s account, showing the constraints and opportunities faced by state system legitimacy views. Next, we raise some problems for the conceptual distinctions that Owen develops between different types of refugee protection: asylum, sanctuary, and refuge. The underlying feature that leads to these problems is an ambiguity in the concept of political membership, which is at the core of Owen’s view of refugeehood. Finally, we distinguish two interpretations of political membership in the institution of refugeehood and chart out some possible ways forward for state system legitimacy views. The critique developed here is a sympathetic one, aimed at the further development of state system legitimacy views.

This article diagnoses a novel problem with gentrification: that it can hinder valuable forms of everyday democratic communication. In order to make this argument, I develop a democratic interpretation of Iris Marion Young's ‘ideal of city life’, according to which social differentiation is valuable because of the epistemic role that it plays in the production and circulation of diverse social perspectives. I then leverage that ideal to examine two kinds of spatial and demographic changes associated with gentrification: community disintegration in enclaves and homogenisation in public spaces. I argue that community disintegration in enclaves can make the production of social perspectives within disadvantaged communities more difficult. I then argue that homogenisation in public spaces can undermine the role of such spaces as sites of democratic performance for the wider circulation of social perspectives in the public sphere. Finally, I reflect on the reach of my argument for broader judgements about the permissibility of policies that foster or permit gentrification.

This paper sets out a research agenda for a political theory of climate displacement, by critically examining one prominent proposal—the idea of a normative status for ‘climate refugees’—and by proposing an alternative. Drawing on empirical work on climate displacement, I show that the concept of the climate refugee obscures the complexity and heterogeneity of climate displacement. I argue that, because of this complexity and heterogeneity, approaches to climate displacement that put the concept of the climate refugee at their centre will fail to treat like cases alike and relevantly different cases differently. In response to these failings, I outline an alternative—the pluralist theory of climate displacement—which confronts the specific challenges that climate displacement poses in different practical and institutional contexts, whilst also treating climate displacement as a unified phenomenon at the second-order level of burden-sharing.

Social scientific evidence suggests that labor migration can increase resilience to climate change. For that reason, some have recently advocated using labor migration policy as a tool for climate adaptation. This paper engages with the normative question of whether, and under what conditions, states may permissibly use labor migration policy as a tool for climate adaptation. I argue that states may use labor migration policy as a tool for climate adaptation and may even have a duty to do so, subject to two moral constraints. First, states must also provide acceptable alternative options for adaptation so that the vulnerable are not forced to sacrifice their morally important interests in being able to remain where they are. Second, states may not impose restrictive terms on labor migrants to make accepting greater numbers less costly for themselves because doing so unfairly shifts the costs of adaptation onto the most vulnerable.

This article develops a normative theory of the status of ‘internally displaced persons’. Political theorists working on forced migration have paid little attention to internally displaced persons, but internally displaced persons bear a distinctive normative status that implies a set of rights that its bearer can claim and correlate duties that others owe. This article develops a practice-based account of justice in internal displacement, which aims to answer the questions of who counts as an internally displaced person and what is owed to internally displaced persons (and by whom). The first section addresses the question of who counts as an internally displaced person by offering an interpretation of the conditions of non-alienage and involuntariness. The second section articulates an account of what is owed to internally displaced persons that draws on and refines the idea of ‘occupancy rights’. The third section sets out an account of the role of the international community in supplementing the protection of internally displaced persons by their own states.

The current practices of refugee protection refugees largely leave the burdens of the refugee regime to lie where they fall. Those states which are geographically proximate to refugee-producing regions, already amongst the least advantaged, bear the bulk of these burdens. In this paper, I critically assess two proposals which seek to address this maldistribution: a market in asylum services and a principle of comparative advantage. I argue that from the standpoint of justice, these proposals share two objectionable features. First, they enable relations of domination between states, because they ignore the background relations of inequality upon which they depend for their effectiveness. Second, they institute an injustice of ‘misframing,’ in that they preclude consideration of refugees’ legitimate claims to be hosted (or not to be hosted) in a particular state. The failings of these approaches are illuminating and, I argue, provide us with some theoretical desiderata for a positive account of justice in the distribution of responsibilities to refugees.

This paper addresses the phenomenon of climate-induced displacement. I argue that there is scope for an account of asylum as compensation owed to those displaced by the impacts of climate change which needs only to appeal to minimal normative commitments about the requirements of global justice. I demonstrate the possibility of such an approach through an examination of the work of David Miller. Miller is taken as an exemplar of a broadly ‘international libertarian’ approach to global justice, and his work is a useful vehicle for this project because he has an established view about both responsibility for climate change and about the state’s right to exclude would-be immigrants. In the course of the argument, I set out the relevant aspects of Miller’s views, reconstruct an account of responsibility for the harms faced by climate migrants which is consistent with Miller’s views, and demonstrate why such an account yields an obligation to provide asylum as a form of compensation to ‘climate migrants.’