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115Ambiguity in argumentArgument and Computation 1 (2): 125-146. 2010.The use of ambiguous expressions in argumentative dialogues can lead to misunderstanding and equivocation. Such ambiguities are here called active ambiguities . However, even a normative model of persuasion dialogue ought not to ban active ambiguities altogether, one reason being that it is not always possible to determine beforehand which expressions will prove to be actively ambiguous. Thus, it is proposed that argumentative norms should enable each participant to put forward ambiguity critici…Read more
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112One-sided argumentsSynthese 154 (2): 307-327. 2007.When is an argument to be called one-sided? When is putting forward such an argument fallacious? How can we develop a model for critical discussion, such that a fallaciously one-sided argument corresponds to a violation of a discussion rule? These issues are dealt with within ‘the limits of the dialogue model of argument’ by specifying a type of persuasion dialogue in which an arguer can offer complex arguments to anticipate particular responses by a critic.
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102Ambiguity in a Dialectical PerspectiveInformal Logic 21 (3). 2001.The distinction between constitutive and regulative rules is applied to rules for critical discussion that have to do with the use of ambiguous expressions. This leads to a distinction between rule violating fallacies, by which one abandons a critical discussion, and norm violating fallacies, which are in a way admissible within a critical discussion. According to the formal model for critical discussion, proposed in this paper, fallacies of the norm violating type arc not prohibited. Instead, i…Read more
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99About Old and New Dialectic: Dialogues, Fallacies, and StrategiesInformal Logic 27 (1): 27-58. 2007.We shall investigate the similarities and dissimilarities between old and new dialectic. For the ‘old dialectic’, we base our survey mainly on Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistical Refutations, whereas for the ‘new dialectic’, we turn to contemporary views on dialogical interaction, such as can, for the greater part, be found in Walton’s The New Dialectic. Three issues are taken up: types of dialogue, fallacies, and strategies. Though one should not belittle the differences in scope and outlook tha…Read more
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74The Ways of CriticismArgumentation 25 (2): 199-227. 2011.This paper attempts to systematically characterize critical reactions in argumentative discourse, such as objections, critical questions, rebuttals, refutations, counterarguments, and fallacy charges, in order to contribute to the dialogical approach to argumentation. We shall make use of four parameters to characterize distinct types of critical reaction. First, a critical reaction has a focus, for example on the standpoint, or on another part of an argument. Second, critical reactions appeal t…Read more
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65Argument Schemes from the Point of View of Hamblin’s DialecticInformal Logic 31 (4): 344-366. 2011.This paper aims at a normative account of non-deductive argumentation schemes in the spirit of Hamblin’s dialectical philosophy. First, three principles are presented that characterize Hamblin’s dialectical stance. Second, argumentation schemes, which have hardly been examined in Hamblin’s book Fallacies, shall be dealt with by applying these principles, taking an argumentation scheme from authority as the leading example. Third, a formal dialectical system, along the lines indicated by Hamblin,…Read more
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59That’s no argument! The dialectic of non-argumentationSynthese 192 (4): 1173-1197. 2015.What if in discussion the critic refuses to recognize an emotionally expressed argument of her interlocutor as an argument, accusing him of having presented no argument at all. In this paper, we shall deal with this reproach, which taken literally amounts to a charge of having committed a fallacy of non-argumentation. As such it is a very strong, if not the ultimate, criticism, which even carries the risk of abandonment of the discussion and can, therefore, not be made without burdening oneself …Read more
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54A pragma-dialectical response to objectivist epistemic challengesInformal Logic 30 (2): 122-141. 2010.The epistemologists Biro and Siegel have raised two objections against the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation. According to the first objection the pragma-dialectical theory is not genuinely normative. According to the second objection the rejection of justificationism by pragma-dialecticians is unwarranted: they reject justificationism prematurely and they are not consistent in accepting some arguments (‘justifications’) as sound. The first objection is based on what we regard as the …Read more
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52The Burden of Criticism: Consequences of Taking a Critical StanceArgumentation 27 (2): 201-224. 2013.Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convincingly. Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer’s position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of “directiveness” that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether there are normati…Read more
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52The Burden of Criticism: Consequences of Taking a Critical StanceArgumentation 27 (2): 201-224. 2013.Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convincingly. Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer’s position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of “directiveness” that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether there are normati…Read more
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49J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (eds): Conductive Argument: An Overlooked Type of Defeasible Reasoning (review)Argumentation 27 (3): 337-344. 2013.
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48Criticism in Need of ClarificationArgumentation 28 (4): 401-423. 2014.It furthers the dialectic when the opponent is clear about what motivates and underlies her critical stance, even if she does not adopt an opposite standpoint, but merely doubts the proponent’s opinion. Thus, there is some kind of burden of criticism. In some situations, there should an obligation for the opponent to offer explanatory counterconsiderations, if requested, whereas in others, there is no real dialectical obligation, but a mere responsibility for the opponent to cooperate by providi…Read more
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45Room for maneuver when raising critical doubtPhilosophy and Rhetoric 41 (3). 2008.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Room for Maneuver When Raising Critical DoubtJan Albert Van Laar1When interlocutors start talking at cross-purposes it becomes less likely that they will be able to resolve their initial difference of opinion (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 125). How much room should we give a party for rephrasing or revising her adversary’s standpoint in a manner that suits her individual purposes in the dialogue? Certainly, as textbooks in argu…Read more
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45Argumentative Bluff in Eristic Discussion: An Analysis and EvaluationArgumentation 24 (3): 383-398. 2010.How does the analysis and evaluation of argumentation depend on the dialogue type in which the argumentation has been put forward? This paper focuses on argumentative bluff in eristic discussion. Argumentation cannot be presented without conveying the pretence that it is dialectically reasonable, as well as, at least to some degree, rhetorically effective. Within eristic discussion it can be profitable to engage in bluff with respect to such claims. However, it will be argued that such bluffing …Read more
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42In the quagmire of quibbles: a dialectical explorationSynthese 198 (4): 3459-3476. 2019.Criticism may degenerate into quibbling or nitpicking. How can discussants keep quibblers under control? In the paper we investigate cases in which a battle about words replaces a discussion of the matters that are actually at issue as well as cases in which a battle about minor objections replaces a discussion of the major issues. We survey some lines of discussion dealing with these situations in profiles of dialogue.
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37The Role of Argument in NegotiationArgumentation 32 (4): 549-567. 2018.The purpose of this paper is to show the pervasive, though often implicit, role of arguments in negotiation dialogue. This holds even for negotiations that start from a difference of interest such as mere bargaining through offers and counteroffers. But it certainly holds for negotiations that try to settle a difference of opinion on policy issues. It will be demonstrated how a series of offers and counteroffers in a negotiation dialogue contains a reconstructible series of implicit persuasion d…Read more
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37J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (eds): Conductive Argument: An Overlooked Type of Defeasible Reasoning: College Publications, London, 2011 (review)Argumentation 27 (3): 337-344. 2013.
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37Don’t say that!Argumentation 20 (4): 495-510. 2006.According to pragma-dialectical methodology, a party in an argumentative discussion can be assumed to manoeuvre strategically between dialectical and rhetorical objectives. One confrontational form of strategic manoeuvring occurs when a critic charges an arguer with advancing a standpoint that has socially harmful consequences. In special situations this form of manoeuvring can be dialectically sound, for example when the standpoint is advanced in a way that damages the dialectical process. The …Read more
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35Splitting a Difference of Opinion: The Shift to NegotiationArgumentation 32 (3): 329-350. 2018.Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when wo…Read more
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34Norms of Public Argumentation and the Ideals of Correctness and ParticipationArgumentation 38 (1): 7-40. 2024.Argumentation as the public exchange of reasons is widely thought to enhance deliberative interactions that generate and justify reasonable public policies. Adopting an argumentation-theoretic perspective, we survey the norms that should govern public argumentation and address some of the complexities that scholarly treatments have identified. Our focus is on norms associated with the ideals of correctness and participation as sources of a politically legitimate deliberative outcome. In principl…Read more
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32Pragmatic Inconsistency and CredibilityArgumentation 21 (3): 317-334. 2007.A critic may attack an arguer personally by pointing out that the arguer’s position is pragmatically inconsistent: the arguer does not practice what he preaches. A number of authors hold that such attacks can be part of a good argumentative discussion. However, there is a difficulty in accepting this kind of contribution as potentially legitimate, for the reason that there is nothing wrong for a protagonist to have an inconsistent position, in the sense of committing himself to mutually inconsis…Read more
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30That’s no argument! The dialectic of non-argumentationSynthese 192 (4): 1173-1197. 2015.What if in discussion the critic refuses to recognize an emotionally expressed argument of her interlocutor as an argument, accusing him of having presented no argument at all. In this paper, we shall deal with this reproach, which taken literally amounts to a charge of having committed a fallacy of non-argumentation. As such it is a very strong, if not the ultimate, criticism, which even carries the risk of abandonment of the discussion and can, therefore, not be made without burdening oneself …Read more
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30Confrontation and RidiculeInformal Logic 28 (4): 295-314. 2008.Ridicule can be used in order to create concurrence as well as to en-hance antagonism. This paper deals with ridicule that is used by a critic when he is responding to a standpoint or to a reason advanced in support of a standpoint. Ridicule profits from humor’s good repu-tation, and correctly so, even when it is used in argumentative contexts. However, ridicule can be harmful to a discussion. This paper will deal with ridicule from the perspective of strategic maneuvering between the individual…Read more
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27Arguments that take Counterconsiderations into AccountInformal Logic 34 (3): 240-275. 2014.This paper examines arguments that take counter- considerations into account, and it does so from a dialogical point of view. According to my account, a counterconsideration is part of a critical reaction from a real or imagined opponent, and an arguer may take it into account in his argument in at least six fully responsive ways. Conductive arguments will be characterized as one of these types. In this manner, the paper aims to show how conducive, and related kinds of argument can be understood…Read more
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25When interlocutors start to talk at cross purposes it becomes less likely that they will be able to resolve their differences of opinion. Still, a critic, in the confrontation stage of a discussion, should be given some room of manoeuvre for rephrasing and even for revising the arguer’s position. I will distinguish between licit and illicit applications of this form of strategic manoeuvring by stating three soundness conditions.
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25The burden of criticismArgumentation 27 (2): 201-224. 2013.Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convinc-ingly. Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer’s position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of ‘directiveness’ that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether and to what exte…Read more
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23Fair and unfair strategies in public controversiesJournal of Argumentation in Context 5 (3): 315-347. 2016.Contemporary theory of argumentation offers many insights about the ways in which, in the context of a public controversy, arguers should ideally present their arguments and criticize those of their opponents. We also know that in practice not all works out according to the ideal patterns: numerous kinds of derailments are an object of study for argumentation theorists. But how about the use of unfairstrategiesvis-à-vis one’s opponents? What if it is not a matter of occasional derailments but of…Read more
University of Groningen, Netherlands
Areas of Specialization
2 more
Verbal Disputes |
Argument |
Critical Thinking |
Fallacies |
The Nature of Reasoning |
Reasoning, Misc |
Epistemology of Disagreement |
Areas of Interest
2 more
Argument |
Critical Thinking |
Deductive Reasoning |
Fallacies |
The Nature of Reasoning |
Deliberation |
Verbal Disputes |