Jan-Christoph Heilinger

Mit dem Abschluss des Humangenomprojekts und den Fortschritten der Lebenswissenschaften stellt sich die Frage nach dem Selbstverstandnis des Menschen in geradezu dramatischer Weise. DAs neu gewonnene Wissen uber den Menschen muss analysiert, aufgearbeitet und bewertet werden. NIcht nur in den Lebens-, sondern auch in den Kulturwissenschaften stellt sich daher die Frage nach dem Selbstverstandnis des Menschen, das unsere Handlungen und Bewertungen sowie unsere Orientierung in der Welt pragt. DIe Forschenden stehen hierbei jedoch vor der Herausforderung, dass vertraute Intuitionen fragwurdig geworden sind, feststehende Terminologien nicht zur Verfugung stehen und die neuen Erkenntnisse vielleicht grundlegend neue Antworten verlangen. DIe Buchreihe Humanprojekt nimmt diese Herausforderung an. SIe schafft eine Plattform, um einen forschungsrelevanten, dabei aber auch offentlich wirksamen Dialog der Natur-, Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften uber die vielfaltigen Dimensionen der Frage nach dem Menschen zu fuhren. MOnographien und thematisch fokussierte Sammelbande, verfasst von ausgewiesenen Forscherinnen und Forschern, behandeln umfassend einzelne Elemente einer aktuellen Anthropologie. EIn systematischer uberblick und vielfaltige interdisziplinare Verknupfungen auf dem aktuellsten Stand der Forschung weisen die Bande als Referenzwerke zum jeweiligen Thema aus. AKtuelle Referenzwerke zur Anthropologie Analyse und Bewertung neuester Entwicklungen in den Lebenswissenschaften Erstklassige WissenschaftlerInnen Interdisziplinare Kompetenz Klare Darlegung aller verwendeten Begriffe: ideale Werke fur interessierte Laien Reihenherausgeber: Detlev Ganten, Charité Universitatsmedizin Berlin Volker Gerhardt, Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin Jan-Christoph Heilinger, Universitat Zurich Julian Nida-Rumelin, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munchen.

The notion of “human rights” is widely used in political and moral discussions. The core idea, that all human beings have some inalienable basic rights, is appealing and has an eminently practical function: It allows moral criticism of various wrongs and calls for action in order to prevent them. On the other hand it is unclear what exactly a human right is. Human rights lack a convincing conceptual foundation that would be able to compel the wrong-doer to accept human rights claims as well-founded. Hence the practical function faces theoretical doubts. The present collection takes up the tension between the wide political use of human rights claims and the intellectual skepticism about them. In particular two major issues are identified that call for conceptual clarification in order to better understand human rights claims both in theory and in practice: the question of how to justify human rights and the tension between universal normative claims and particular moralities.

Die Frage des Menschen nach sich selbst beschäftigt Menschen zu allen Zeiten und an allen Orten, so auch in der Gegenwart. Die hier versammelten Wissenschaftler, Politiker, Theologen, Journalisten und Schriftsteller aus verschiedenen kulturellen Traditionen geben in über fünfzig prägnanten Beiträgen ihre persönliche Antwort auf die aufgeworfene Frage. Was ist davon zu erwarten? Sicherlich keine abschließende Lösung der Frage. Doch ist ein schillerndes Spektrum aktueller Positionen zum menschlichen Selbstverständnis entstanden - zugleich kritisch und konstruktiv, pointiert und tiefgründig. Eingeleitet und kommentiert wird die Sammlung mit Beiträgen von Volker Gerhardt, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Detlev Ganten und Jan-Christoph Heilinger.

Normen beeinflussen die Interaktion von Menschen miteinander und den Umgang von Menschen mit ihrer Umwelt. Was aber ist Normativität? Muss sie unabhängig von Menschen sein, um objektiv sein zu können? Oder entsteht sie erst in Abhängigkeit von Menschen, die sie formulieren oder nach ihr handeln, und ist deshalb nicht objektiv? Oder ist dieser Gegensatz grundsätzlich verfehlt und es bedarf eines anderen Ansatzes, um die Rolle von Normativität in der lebensweltlichen Verständigungspraxis angemessen zu bestimmen? Die Beiträge in vorliegendem Band widmen sich diesem Problemkomplex unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bereiche Moral und Wissenschaft.

This primarily diagnostic paper offers, from the perspective of relational egalitarianism, a normative analysis of three major injustices in the context of adaptation finance. Adaptation finance includes payments provided by the affluent countries of the Global North to low-income countries in the Global South, countries particularly exposed to the harms of climate change. Relational egalitarianism is the normative view that interactions between people and between institutions have to respect the equal moral status of every human being. The first injustice, from this perspective, consists in the sheer fact that adaptation measures are required at all to deflect harm from people who did not significantly contribute to the causes of climate change. The second injustice consists in the persisting, even increasing adaptation finance gap, as countries of the Global North do neither provide adequate financial means to reduce climate risks, nor even fulfil their commitments to adaptation finance pledged in the Copenhagen Accord in 2009. The third injustice emerges from current procedures to determine criteria for distributing scarce financial resources that consolidate structural injustice. The paper concludes by providing the contours of a practical response to these injustices that respects the demands of relational egalitarianism.

The paper offers a normative analysis of the new Loss & Damage Fund supporting vulnerable countries grappling with climate change-related harms. This fund is primarily financed by affluent nations, often identified as historical polluters. However, the perspective of relational egalitarianism highlights persistent structural injustices in the background of the fund. Addressing them necessitates conceptualizing the fund not merely as an act of cooperative solidarity but as compensation for the consequences of historical and ongoing structural injustices. Properly conceived, the fund manages adverse climate effects and simultaneously tackles their underlying root causes, including the unjust distribution of advantages and power.

The article outlines the distributive demands of relational equality in the form of a dynamic corridor of legitimate distributive inequality. It does so by complementing the already widely accepted sufficientarian floor with a limitarian ceiling, leading, in a first step, to a "corridor" of limited distributive inequality as a necessary condition for relational equality. This corridor alone, however, only provides necessary distributive conditions for relational equality and still allows for degrees of distributive inequality that would risk undermining egalitarian relations. Thus, in a second step, intra-corridor distributive inequalities must be regulated by two further constraints: a (context- dependent) ratio between the best- and worst-off, and a demand for equality of opportunity so that inequalities result from people’s responsible choices. This set of demands spells out the distributive conditions that are not only necessary, but sufficient to provide a sound distributive basis for relational equality. After presenting this view, the article defends it against several objections.

Hate speech is endemic in digital space, and it does not spare academia. Especially scholars working in fields prone to political debate - from migration to climate change, from gender to refugee integration, and many more topics - find themselves increasingly attacked. With this chapter, we hope to raise awareness for the increasingly prevalent phenomenon of cyberhate targeting academics. Our intention is to shed light on some of its harmful effects, and, by providing some conceptual analysis, to contribute to individual and organisational prevention and coping strategies. We conclude that guarding against cyberhate is now part of academics’ and their institutions’ responsibility.

"The overall aim of this book is to understand the character of moral progress, so that making moral progress may become more systematic and secure, less chancy and less bloody. Drawing on three historical examples - the abolition of chattel slavery, the expansion of opportunities for women, and the increasing acceptance of same-sex love - it asks how those changes were brought about, and seeks a methodology for streamlining the kinds of developments that occurred. Moral progress is conceived as pragmatic progress, progress from rather than progress to, achieved by overcoming the problems and limits of the current situation. Two kinds of problems are distinguished: problems of exclusion, found when the complaints of some people are ignored; and problems of false consciousness, present when the oppressed adopt judgments from the ambient society and do not protest their condition. The proposed methodology advocates procedures for listening to voiced complaints and for systematically reviewing the way in which particular self-conceptions, ideals and identities are taken to be appropriate for various groups of people. Through outlining a picture of moral practice, at both the individual and the societal levels, the book seeks to orient moral philosophy away from metaethical questions of realism and towards moral methodology"--

Ideas about freedom and related concepts like autonomy and self-determination play a prominent role in the moral debate about human enhancement interventions. However, there is not a single understanding of freedom available, and arguments referring to freedom are simultaneously used to argue both for and against enhancement interventions. This gives rise to misunderstandings and polemical arguments. The paper attempts to disentangle the different distinguishable concepts, classifies them and shows how they relate to one another in order to allow for a more structured and clearer debate. It concludes in identifying the individual underpinnings and the social conditions of choice and decision-making as particularly salient dimensions of freedom in the ethical debate about human enhancement.

The paper presents an ethical analysis and constructive critique of the current practice of AI ethics. It identifies conceptual substantive and procedural challenges and it outlines strategies to address them. The strategies include countering the hype and understanding AI as ubiquitous infrastructure including neglected issues of ethics and justice such as structural background injustices into the scope of AI ethics and making the procedures and fora of AI ethics more inclusive and better informed with regard to philosophical ethics. These measures integrate the perspective of AI justice into AI ethics, strengthening its capacity to provide comprehensive normative orientation and guidance for the development and use of AI that actually improves human lives and living together.

The COVID-19 pandemic is affecting countries across the globe. Only a globally coordinated response, however, will enable the containment of the virus. Responding to a request from policy makers for ethics input for a global resource pledging event as a starting point, this paper outlines normative and procedural principles to inform a coordinated global coronavirus response. Highlighting global connections and specific vulnerabilities from the pandemic, and proposing standards for reasonable and accountable decision-making, the ambition of the paper is two-fold: to raise awareness for the justice dimensions in the global response, and to argue for moving health from the periphery to the centre of philosophical debates about social and global justice.