Jan Forsman

Theological mysticism holds that there are certain aspects of God that are beyond human comprehension, and that our rational capacities can never truly understand. Such aspects would need to be merely accepted as features of the infinite divine nature, even if (or specifically if) they seem to contradict our rational understanding and logical analysis. In the early modern discussion, one of the most famous examples of theological mysticism is Descartes’s proclamation that even though God’s divine providence seems to contradict our own free agency, we should not be worried about this, since God’s divine nature ‘overrides’ our finite minds: while we might not understand how divine preordination of the universe does not undermine our free actions, we should not consider either to be untrue, since God’s power is beyond our comprehension. Descartes’s solution came later under heavy criticism by Leibniz, especially in the Theodicy (1710), in which Leibniz replaces the “Cartesian” theological mysticism with the doctrine of pre-established harmony: we are free when our actions are spontaneous (the causal origin of our actions is solely in us), intelligent (we act according to the most distinct knowledge) and contingent (our actions are not metaphysically or logically necessitated and could have been otherwise); and even though our actions are causally isolated (there can be know causal influence between substances), God has from the beginning of times arranged a perfect harmony between our actions and the rest of the events in the world. This, according to Leibniz, allows us to reconcile our freedom with God’s preordination without having to rely on mysticism about God’s inconceivable power. The doctrine of pre-established harmony was later upheld by Christian Wolff (1679–1754) as the most likely candidate for the communion between the actions of the will and the physical actions of the body in his German Metaphysics. Although the work in question does not specifically argue against theological mysticism, it is safe to consider that Wolff, just like Leibniz, rejects it. However, theological mysticism makes a rather surprising return in Émilie Du Châtelet's (1706–1749) unpublished manuscript On Freedom (c. 1737), where Du Châtelet uses it to argue against the ‘opponents of freedom’ on the issue of God’s omniscience undermining our free actions. This is surprising not only due to Du Châtelet’s support for a Cartesian doctrine that appears nearly medieval compared to her otherwise forward-looking, even ahead of its time work in philosophy and physics, but also for her otherwise strong influence from Leibizian-Wolffian philosophy, especially in her early writings. Why does she go back to a doctrine that is considered a controversial aspect of Descartes’s philosophy, and which Leibniz had already so unceremoniously cast-aside, not gaining support from Wolff either? In this paper, I will analyze Du Châtelet’s use of theological mysticism in On Freedom and discuss her most likely motivations for relying on it over other options (like pre-established harmony). The structure of the paper is the following. I will first introduce and analyze Du Châtelet’s text, concentrating on the argument for theological mysticism at its end. In the second section, I will give a brief history of theological mysticism from Descartes’s arguments to Leibniz’s rejection. In the third section, I contextualize Du Chatelet’s manuscript with the so-called pietist debate on Wolff’s account of personal freedom. In the last section, I will pull these strings together and motivate Du Châtelet’s return to the Cartesian doctrine of theological mysticism as a way to resolve the pietist critique of the Wolffian account of freedom. In

Our dear friend and mentor Jani Hakkarainen reaches his half-century on December 23rd, 2025. Jani has been a constant presence for almost all of our academic lives. This includes, but is not limited to, his teaching, organizing the talk series at the Tampere University philosophy unit, arranging conferences on contemporary and historical philosophy, walking the corridors in his Tappara-slippers, stopping for an insightful chat at the coffee table, and often giving detailed, but always fair, criticism on our philosophical ideas and writings. In order to celebrate Janis’s birthday, we have invited a group of his colleagues and students to write articles on topics he has himself contributed to, or at least would find interesting and stimulating. This anthology is our birthday gift for him. The anthology is divided into five sections based on a larger theme of the papers, with these themes being related to one of the several fields of study Jani has partaken in during his philosophical career. It should be noted that, due to Jani’s love of 70’s progressive music, each section is titled after a song or a piece of lyric from a progressive rock band’s catalogue (including Genesis, Emerson Lake & Palmer, Rush, Pink Floyd, and King Crimson).

Margaret Cavendish’s (1623–1673) philosophy has been gaining increasing interest in recent years. Untypically to her time, she was a materialist, who denied the existence of immaterial substance. Deviating from other materialists of the period, like Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), she likewise considered that matter was not in fact a ‘dead’ thing moved by external motion, but living, sensing, and thinking. Such curious commitments obviously raise questions about her views on human experience like perception, thinking, imagining, and dreaming. Of these, most commentary interest has focused on perception and thinking in Cavendish (e.g. Michaelian 2009; Boyle 2015; Adams 2016; Cunning 2016; 2023; Georgescu 2020; Lascano 2023; Peterman 2025) and Cavendish’s views on fancy and imagination have likewise seen large discussion in recent years (e.g., Hock 2018; Gilman Sherman 2021). However, Cavendish account of dreaming is noticeably less discussed (with Cunning 2016; Lascano 2023; and Manzo 2023 as exceptions). In this paper, I focus on Cavendish’s views on dreaming, arguing that her approach to dreaming evolved between her early works and her later ones. While in the World’s Olio (WO; 1655) and Philosophical and Physical Opinions (PPO; 1655), Cavendish connects dreaming more strongly with memory, by her more systematic natural philosophical works, such as Philosophical Letters (PL; 1664) and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy (OEP; 1666), her account has changed to comparing dreaming more with imagination than with remembering. This change seems to coincide with a larger systematization of her philosophical thinking and genuine interest in skeptical themes in philosophy. Thus, at the end of the paper, I discuss whether her account of dreaming allows for material for a response to a dreaming based skeptical scenarios.

Artikkeli tarkastelee Émilie du Châtelet’n vuonna 1737 kirjoittamaa ja pitkään unohduksissa ollutta käsikirjoitusta Vapaudesta (Sur/De la liberté), jonka Voltaire lähetti Preussin kruununprinssi Fredrikille omissa nimissään. Artikkeli rekonstruoi tekstin syntyhistorian, sen filosofiset ja poliittiset kontekstit sekä analysoivat sen tahdonvapauskäsitystä suhteessa aikakauden keskeisiin ajattelijoihin, kuten Christian Wolffiin, Leibniziin, Locke’en ja Samuel Clarkeen. Teksti puolustaa tahdon ja tekojen vapautta viittä argumenttia vastaan, mutta ei sitoudu yksiselitteisesti kompatibilistiseen tai libertarianistiseen kantaan. Kirjoittajat osoittavat, että du Châtelet’n ajattelu heijastelee erityisesti Wolffin intellektualistista tahdonvapausoppia, mutta myös hänen pyrkimystään välttää pietistien kritisoimaa ennalta säädetyn harmonian oppia. Vapaudesta näyttäytyy näin filosofisesti rikkaana ja historiallisesti merkittävänä tekstinä, jonka unohtuminen liittyy sekä sen monimutkaiseen syntyprosessiin että du Châtelet’n näkymättömyyteen Voltairen varjossa. Artikkeli tuo esiin tekstin uudelleenlöytämisen merkityksen sekä sen potentiaalin rikastuttaa käsitystämme 1700-luvun valistusfilosofiasta ja naisten roolista sen muovaajina.

At the beginning of the First Meditation, Descartes’s meditator considers not only the famous scenarios of dreaming and deceiver but also a third scenario: that she might be insane. This madness scenario is apparently rejected in favor of dreaming. I analyze the scenario of madness, drawing from Descartes’s comments about insanity as a medical condition, and compare it with the dreaming scenario. Overall, the scenario of madness has been generally neglected, receiving only minor discussion in the literature, most of which I take to be misguided, without well-driven attempts to place it in the narrative of the First Meditation or contrast it with Descartes’s more medical analysis of defects in the brain. However, the scenario deserves to be discussed more as it serves an important argumentative turning point in the narration of the First Meditation. I view the role of the madness scenario to be acting as a transitional passage between the natural common-sense attitude, used in practical everyday life, and the unnatural metaphysical doubt. These two should be considered two different states of mind, with the latter being the metaphysical attitude required for the Cartesian suspension of judgment.

We contextualize Du Châtelet’s On Freedom (c. 1737) within the framework of Christian Wolff’s theory of free will and action. Wolff’s account resulted in a conflict with the German Pietists on whether internal spontaneity is central to free action, in its own right, or whether there needs to be some causal contribution from the will, independent of reason, to the action for that action to be free. Contextualizing Du Châtelet’s account with Wolff’s German Metaphysics (1719) and the ensuing Pietist debate helps to clarify certain puzzling parts of On Freedom; particularly ones that are concerned with the connection of the will to physical action and the issue of whether Du Châtelet supports a more compatibilist or libertarian view of freedom. Regarding the latter, we propose a conciliatory reading due to textual evidence for both compatibilist and libertarian accounts. We argue that Du Châtelet does not commit to a clear compatibilist or libertarian position in On Freedom and merely responds to what she calls the “illustrious opponents” of freedom in the text.

Recent research in Baroque Scholastic and early modern meditational exercises has demonstrated similarity between Descartes’s Meditations and St. Teresa of Ávila’s El Castillo Interior. While there is growing agreement on the influence of Catholic meditations on Descartes, the extent of Teresa’s role is debated. Instead of discussing the full extent of Teresa’s influence, this paper concentrates on one example of the considered influence: the skeptical scenario of demonic deception, having clear anticipation in Teresa’s work where the exercitant faces off against deceiving demonic forces, which confound and temporarily halt the meditative progress. The paper analyzes Teresa’s use of deceptive demons and its influence on the Cartesian Evil Demon scenario, while contrasting both with a discussion of demonic deception in the late Medieval and Baroque Scholastic context, arguing that demonological discussions in 1500s allowed both Teresa’s and Descartes’s deceivers to not only cause diversions but to make the deception laborious to resist.

Kirja-arvio: Malin Grahn-Wilder : Skeptisismi: Epäilyn ja etsimisen filosofia. Gaudeamus, Helsinki 2016. 453 sivua. Mitä on tieto ja kellä sitä on? Voimmeko tietää miten asiat todella ovat? Voimmeko ylipäätään tietää mitään? Malin Grahn-Wilderin toimittama teos Skeptisismi on kattava läpileikkaus skeptisismin historiasta antiikin juuriltaan aina nykyajan keskusteluihin saakka. Samalla se sisältää ensimmäistä kertaa suomeksi käännettynä useammankin filosofian historialle ehdottoman olennaisen kirjoituksen.

I offer a novel reading in this dissertation of René Descartes’s (1596–1650) skepticism in his work Meditations on First Philosophy (1641–1642). I specifically aim to answer the following problem: How is Descartes’s skepticism to be read in accordance with the rest of his philosophy? This problem can be divided into two more general questions in Descartes scholarship: How is skepticism utilized in the Meditations, and what are its intentions and relation to the preceding philosophical tradition? I approach the topic from both a historical and a text-based analysis, combining textual and contextual research. I examine Descartes’s skepticism against two main traditions in the historical analysis: philosophical skepticism and Aristotelian Scholasticism. I argue that skepticism in the Meditations is intended to oppose and upheave both Scholasticism and skepticism. The intended results of the work are not merely epistemological but also metaphysical and even ethical. Furthermore, these ambitions cannot be neatly distinguished but merge into each other. The third historical context against which the skeptical meditations are examined is the literary genre of meditative exercises, particularly from the 1500–1600’s, which, while religiously and spiritually oriented, likewise provided the practitioner with an enlightened understanding of self-knowledge and their cognitive place in the world on the way to closer spiritual proximity to God. I argue by this reading that the skepticism of the Meditations is an attentive, meditational cognitive exercise that is not merely instrumental and methodological but is to have a genuine and serious (psychologically real) effect on our thinking. The skeptical meditation is not simply a theoretical thought experiment but is to be seriously practiced as a transformative process of reorienting one’s cognitive framework to discover truth, certainty, and a way to a happy, tranquil, and virtuous life. I offer a close reading in the textual analysis of the first three meditations of the Meditations. I argue that the meditative skepticism employed in the work does not reject the previous beliefs but suspends judgment on them, withdrawing assent until further evidence can be found. I introduce a new term into Descartes scholarship in this analysis, based on the terminology of ancient skepticism: Cartesian epochē (gr. epochē, suspension, withdrawal). Instead of rejecting previous beliefs or assenting to the probably false, the skeptical procedure of the Meditations is argued to emulate in important ways the suspension of judgment on equally balanced reasons in ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism. Novel interpretations are presented along the way of the will’s freedom, of the First Meditation’s skeptical scenarios, of the cogito, and of the vindication of metaphysical certainty, as well as a clarification of the Cartesian Circle problem. Reinterpreting the relation of Descartes’s skepticism to the preceding historical and literary traditions leads to a new look at the skeptical method itself. Presenting a new interpretation of skepticism in the Meditations leads at the same time to a new look at its relation to the historical context. The two research questions are, then, intrinsically tied together. My focus in the study is on the Meditations, but I also reference and discuss Descartes’s other philosophical works, as well as his correspondence, when necessary.

In this paper I will argue how Descartes in the First and Second Meditation of the Meditations uses a very clear suspension of judgments or assent that in many ways resembles the epoché of the ancient skepticism, especially that of pyrrhonistic variant. First I show how the pyrrhonistic epoché works and what purpose it was used. After that I show how this Cartesian epoché both resembles and differs from the ancient epoché. My main argument is that Descartes, when using the method of doubt, doesn’t really dismiss or abandon earlier knowledge or beliefs, as he is sometimes been viewed, but more likely doesn’t take any stance in them, suspending his judgment on the existence of the outside-world. I base my argument both on my reading of Meditations and the “as it were sensing” -interpretation of Descartes’ use of method of doubt by John Carriero.

Descartes’s meditator thinks that if she does not know the existence of God, she cannot be fully certain of anything. This statement seems to contradict the cogito, according to which the existence of I is indubitable and therefore certain. Cannot an atheist be certain that he exists? Atheistic knowledge has been discussed almost exclusively in relation to mathematics, and the more interesting question of the atheist’s certainty of his existence has not received the attention it deserves. By examining the question of atheistic knowledge in relation to the cogito, I articulate the advantage Descartes sees in having knowledge of God. I challenge a long-held reading of the cogito where “I exist” is the first full certainty and argue that while atheistic cogito is more certain than atheistic knowledge in mathematics, it cannot be a starting point for lasting and stable science, because science requires knowing the existence of the non-deceiving God.

In this paper I will argue how Descartes in the First and Second Meditation of the Meditations uses a very clear suspension of judgments or assent that in many ways resembles the epoché of the ancient skepticism, especially that of pyrrhonistic variant. First I show how the pyrrhonistic epoché works and what purpose it was used. After that I show how this Cartesian epoché both resembles and differs from the ancient epoché. My main argument is that Descartes, when using the method of doubt, doesn’t really dismiss or abandon earlier knowledge or beliefs, as he is sometimes been viewed, but more likely doesn’t take any stance in them, suspending his judgment on the existence of the outside-world. I base my argument both on my reading of Meditations and the “as it were sensing” -interpretation of Descartes’ use of method of doubt by John Carriero.

In this paper, I join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judgment. Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of control over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt. According to a long-held reading, the control that the will has over doxastic states in Descartes’s theory is direct; the doxastic states are affected by the mere act of will. This reading is called direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV), or direct voluntarism (DV) for short, and it states that we are capable of assenting, rejecting and suspending a judgment based only on our will to do so. Thus, these actions would be utterly and merely volitional. DV can be divided into two further positions, direct positive voluntarism (+DV) and direct negative voluntarism (-DV). Direct positive voluntarism deals with the act of forming judgments, maintaining that one can accept or deny a proposition wilfully and either merely believe or not believe something voluntarily. Direct negative voluntarism deals with the suspension of judgment, maintaining that it can likewise be accomplished by a simple act of will. However, I support an alternate account of Descartes’s voluntarism, which is called indirect doxastic voluntarism (IDV), or indirect voluntarism (IV) for short. By this account, the will is capable of affecting a doxastic state indirectly by making one concentrate on essential tasks for forming that state, such as gathering up and paying attention to strong reasons and evidence. IV is also possible to divide into indirect positive voluntarism (+IV) and indirect negative voluntarism (-IV). Per indirect positive voluntarism the will needs to pay attention to reasons for accepting or denying some proposition. Likewise, by indirect negative voluntarism, in order to suspend judgment the will needs to direct this attention to the reasons for doubt. By attending to these reasons, the will also comes face-to-face with its own freedom. This feeling of freedom can be described as affectivity of the reasons for belief (assent) and doubt (suspension).

Artikkelissa otan kantaa niin sanottuun voluntarismikiistaan Descartesin tahdon käsitykseen ja arvostelmateoriaan liittyen kannattaen epäsuoraa voluntarismia. Käsittelen erityisesti kysymystä voiko tahdolla Descartesin mukaan olla suora kontrolli ihmisen arvostelmasta pidättäytymiseen? Pitkään vallassa olleen tulkintasuuntauksen mukaan Descartesin käsityksessä tahdolla on kyky vaikuttaa doksastisiin tiloihin suoraan, pelkällä tahdon aktilla. Tätä kutsutaan suoraksi voluntarismiksi ja se tarkoittaa lyhyesti sanottuna sitä, että meillä on kyky hyväksyä, olla hyväksymättä sekä pidättäytyä arvostelemasta täysin tahdonvaraisesti. Tässä tekstissä kannatan kuitenkin epäsuoraa voluntarismia: tahto kykenee vaikuttamaan doksastiseen tilaan epäsuorasti vaikuttamalla uskomuksen muodostamisen kannalta olennaisiin toimintoihin, erityisesti vahvoihin perusteisiin keskittymiseen. Argumentoin epäsuoran voluntarismin puolesta seuraavin tavoin: 1) Kohdat, joiden katsotaan puoltavan suoraa voluntarismia, voidaan yhtä lailla tulkita puoltamaan myös epäsuoraa voluntarismia, 2) Epäsuora voluntarismi on sekä filosofisesti että psykologisesti uskottavampi tulkinta siitä, kuinka ihminen arvostelmia muodostaa, ja 3) Epäsuora negatiivinen voluntarismi on koherentimpi ja ristiriidattomampi tulkinta epäilyn metodin käytöstä (siis yleisestä arvostelmasta pidättäytymisestä) Ensimmäisessä mietiskelyssä.

Tässä artikkelissa käsittelen Descartesin ikuisten totuuksien välttämättömyyteen liittyvää ongelmaa. Teoksessa Mietiskelyjä ensimmäisestä filosofiasta (1641–1642) Descartes nostaa esiin käsitteen ikuisista totuuksista, käyttäen esimerkkinään kolmiota. Kolmion muuttumattomaan ja ikuiseen luontoon kuuluu esimerkiksi, että sen kolme kulmaa ovat yhteenlaskettuna 180°. Se on totta kolmiosta, vaikka yhtään yksittäistä kolmiota ei olisi koskaan ollutkaan olemassa. Eräät ajattelemieni asioiden piirteet ovat siis Descartesin mukaan ajattelustani riippumattomia. Ikuisia totuuksia ovat ainakin matemaattiset ja geometriset tosiseikat sekä ristiriidan laki. Samoin Descartesin kuuluisa lause “ajattelen, siis olen” lukeutuu ikuisten totuuksien joukkoon. Descartesin ikuiset totuudet olisivatkin siis loogisesti välttämättömiä. Niillä on kyseinen olemus riippumatta ulkoisten kohteiden olemassaolosta tai siitä, ajattelenko niitä lainkaan. Kuitenkin kirjeenvaihdossaan Descartes pitää itsepintaisesti kiinni käsityksestään, että ikuiset totuudet ovat Jumalan vapaasti luomia ja Jumala olisi voinut luoda ne erilailla. Näin ollen luodut ikuiset totuudet eivät tarkkaan ottaen olisikaan välttämättömiä vaan kontingentteja. Ne voisivat olla myös toisella tavalla. Artikkelin alkuun esittelen Descartesin modaalista metafysiikkaa sekä luotujen ikuisten totuuksien kontingenttiudesta seuraavia tulkinnallisia vaikeuksia. Tämän jälkeen pureudun kolmeen erilaiseen ratkaisuyritykseen kommentaarikirjallisuudessa (Frankfurt 1977; Curley 1984 & Bennett 1994) ja osoitan, miksi ne eivät riitä vastaamaan ongelmaan. Lopussa vedän johtopäätöksiä ja luonnostelen mahdollisen ratkaisun.