Jan G. Michel

By holding a very vague ontology of fictional entities, Peter van Inwagen tries to avoid many difficulties which more precise theories on this topic face. Moreover, he claims that his theory also easily solves several problems without creating new ones. In order to prove whether this is really so, we confront (a fictional?) Peter van Inwagen in a dialogue with implications and follow-up questions of his theses concerning creatures of fiction. However, we do not hold one central thesis against him, but rather try to help him overcome his vagueness and be more precise by answering our questions which relate – among other things – to the genesis of fictional creatures as well as particular border cases.

Dreh- und Angelpunkt des vorliegenden Bandes ist der Begriff der Wahrnehmung. Für die anthropologische Forschung handelt es sich dabei um einen Begriff von besonderer Bedeutung, da er mit weiteren Begriffen verwoben ist, die in der Auseinandersetzung mit Kernfragen mit Blick auf die sog. conditio humana unerlässlich zu sein scheinen. So ist der Begriff der (menschlichen) Wahrnehmung im Allgemeinen wohl auch immer eng mit den Begriffen des Körpers (oder des Leibes), des Geistes und der Welt des Menschen verknüpft sowie mit zumindest einigen der vielfältigen und vielschichtigen Verschränkungen dieser Begriffe untereinander.

This habilitation thesis explores the foundations of scientific discovery by examining the roles of language, conceptual structures, and artificial intelligence in knowledge production. It contributes to the emerging field of the philosophy of scientific discovery by addressing fundamental questions: What constitutes a scientific discovery? What structural features characterize discovery processes? How do language and naming practices shape scientific progress? And to what extent can machines participate in or even independently generate discoveries? Drawing from case studies in biology, epistemology, and AI research, this work argues that scientific discovery is a structured process encompassing three core elements: finding, acceptance, and knowledge. Special attention is given to declarative speech acts in the validation of discoveries, the role of ambiguity and naming in the evolution of scientific terminology, and the potential for artificial agents to engage in meaning-making and scientific inference. By integrating perspectives from the philosophy of science, language, and mind, this work lays the groundwork for a systematic and interdisciplinary approach to understanding scientific discovery.

This habilitation thesis explores the foundations of scientific discovery by examining the roles of language, conceptual structures, and artificial intelligence in knowledge production. It contributes to the emerging field of the philosophy of scientific discovery by addressing fundamental questions: What constitutes a scientific discovery? What structural features characterize discovery processes? How do language and naming practices shape scientific progress? And to what extent can machines participate in or even independently generate discoveries? Drawing from case studies in biology, epistemology, and AI research, this work argues that scientific discovery is a structured process encompassing three core elements: finding, acceptance, and knowledge. Special attention is given to declarative speech acts in the validation of discoveries, the role of ambiguity and naming in the evolution of scientific terminology, and the potential for artificial agents to engage in meaning-making and scientific inference. By integrating perspectives from the philosophy of science, language, and mind, this work lays the groundwork for a systematic and interdisciplinary approach to understanding scientific discovery.

This introduction provides an overview of William Lycan’s contributions to philosophy, with a particular focus on his work in the philosophy of mind, language, and method. Lycan has been a major figure in contemporary philosophy, defending materialist and functionalist views of the mind, while also engaging with issues such as representationalism, perception, and epistemology. His work on language has significantly shaped debates on truth-conditional semantics, reference, and natural-kind terms. Furthermore, Lycan has contributed to metaphilosophy, especially concerning the nature and progress of philosophical inquiry. The volume is structured into three sections—Mind, Meaning, and Method—each of which reflects key themes in Lycan’s thought. The contributions explore topics such as olfactory representation, the epistemic role of intuitions, and the philosophy of conditionals. By examining Lycan’s work from multiple angles, this volume aims to provide a deeper understanding of his influence and the ongoing relevance of his ideas in contemporary debates.

This chapter examines the identity theory and eliminativism, two materialist positions in the philosophy of mind that address the mind-body problem. While both perspectives share the assumption that mental phenomena are ultimately physical, they diverge significantly in their implications. The identity theory, originally developed by Herbert Feigl, U.T. Place, and J.J.C. Smart, asserts that mental states are identical to neurophysiological processes. However, objections such as the argument from multiple realizability have challenged this view, leading to functionalist alternatives. In contrast, eliminativism—developed by thinkers such as Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and the Churchlands—denies the existence of mental states as traditionally conceived, arguing that folk psychology is a flawed theoretical framework that will eventually be replaced by neuroscience. This chapter explores the historical development of both positions, their core arguments, and the ongoing debates about their viability. While the identity theory has evolved into more nuanced forms, including physicalist and panpsychist interpretations, eliminativism remains a controversial yet influential challenge to traditional conceptions of the mind.

In this article, I explore the connections between imagination, names, and discoveries by engaging with the works of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. While these two thinkers had divergent philosophical perspectives, I argue that their ideas can be fruitfully integrated into the broader framework of the philosophy of scientific discovery. First, I examine Whitehead’s notion of imagination, distinguishing between two types: counterfactual reasoning within a given theoretical framework and imaginative narrative construction that reshapes the framework itself. This distinction, I suggest, helps clarify how imagination contributes to scientific discoveries. Second, I revisit Russell’s theory of names, proposing a reinterpretation in light of contemporary debates. I advocate for a predicativist reading of Russell’s theory, which, I argue, provides a better account of how names function in the process of scientific discovery—particularly in the naming of newly identified species or concepts. By integrating Whitehead’s insights on imagination and Russell’s refined theory of names, I offer a systematic contribution to the philosophy of scientific discovery, highlighting the structural role of both conceptual tools in shaping scientific progress.

This entry provides an overview of materialism, a philosophical position asserting that everything that exists is fundamentally material or, in its modern form, physical. I begin by exploring the historical roots of materialism, from its early formulations in ancient Greek atomism (Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus) to its revival in early modern thought (Gassendi, Hobbes) and its further development in 18th- and 19th-century scientific materialism. The entry then examines the transition from classical materialism to contemporary physicalism, which emerged with logical empiricism and the Vienna Circle’s emphasis on the language of physics. I outline key variants of materialism, including reductive and non-reductive materialism, eliminative materialism, and supervenience-based physicalism. Finally, I discuss major arguments for and against materialism, particularly the causal argument for physicalism and Jackson’s knowledge argument, which challenges materialism’s ability to fully account for subjective experience.

In this entry, I provide an overview of determinism, the philosophical thesis that the state of a system at one time, together with the laws of nature, completely determines its state at any other time—most notably in the future. I begin by tracing the historical development of determinism from its origins in ancient Greek atomism to its resurgence in early modern science, particularly through figures like Galileo, Newton, and Laplace. I then outline key distinctions within determinism, differentiating it from fatalism and highlighting various interpretations, such as causal, logical, and physical determinism. Finally, I discuss one of the most prominent debates concerning determinism: its relationship to free will. While some thinkers—such as Laplace and Holbach—have viewed determinism as incompatible with human freedom, others—such as Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant—have sought ways to reconcile the two. The entry concludes by considering contemporary perspectives on determinism, including Karl Popper’s critique and the impact of quantum mechanics on traditional deterministic views.

In this paper, I first explain the core thesis of transhumanism, which I understand as the position that humans can expand their current physical and mental limits with the help of technologies provided by science. I then turn to the so-called extended mind thesis discussed in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that, contrary to first impressions, the central concept in these debates is not that of the mind, but the concept of cognition, which, in my view, can be extended by external technological aids without serious ethical implications for a person. This leads me to finally consider the concept of an extended person, which is often seen as a cornerstone of transhumanism.

Scientific progress fundamentally depends on discoveries, yet the philosophy of scientific discovery has received relatively little attention. This volume seeks to address this gap by bringing together interdisciplinary perspectives on the nature, process, and implications of making scientific discoveries. By adopting a broad conception of science—including not only the natural and social sciences but also areas of the humanities—the book explores a set of interrelated questions: What are the preconditions for making discoveries? What constitutes a scientific discovery, and how does it differ from other forms of knowledge acquisition? Are discoveries in physics, biology, linguistics, and environmental studies fundamentally similar, or do they follow discipline-specific patterns? How do naming conventions and conceptual frameworks shape discoveries, and what role do errors and serendipities play in scientific progress? Furthermore, the volume reflects on the societal significance of scientific discoveries, questioning their purposes and epistemic boundaries. By engaging with these fundamental issues, the book aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the structures, dynamics, and epistemic impact of scientific discoveries across disciplines.

In this paper, I argue that we need a philosophy of scientific discovery. Before turning to the question of what such a philosophy might look like, I address two questions: Don’t we have a philosophy of scientific discovery yet? And do we need one at all? To answer the first question, I take a closer look at history and find that we have not had a systematic philosophy of scientific discovery worthy of the name for over 150 years. To answer the second question, I put forward three arguments that show the importance of a philosophy of scientific discovery. Briefly, I arrive at the following answers: No, we don’t yet have a philosophy of scientific discovery, and yes, we definitely need one. To remedy this shortcoming, I analyze the concept of discovery, leading me to the insight that scientific discoveries have an underlying structure with certain structural features. Some of these features may be important but not indispensable to scientific discovery processes; these include eureka moments, serendipities, joint discoveries, special science funding, and others. In addition, I identify three indispensable structural features which I examine in detail and which I place in a picture with a certain dynamics according to which the process of making scientific discoveries can be seen as a path, leading us from finding and acceptance to knowledge.

Building on William G. Lycan’s insight that proper names are paronymous, I pursue two goals in this paper: I argue that Lycan’s insight is not restricted to proper names, but can be extended to include certain general terms, and I aim to demonstrate how this contributes to a better understanding of sentences in the context of scientific discovery. To this end, I first address the question of how to best grasp the largely unknown concept of paronymy by tracing it back to Aristotle, and by exploring recent developments in the philosophy of language and in linguistics. I then focus in greater detail on Lycan’s argument that proper names are paronymous and extend this reasoning to general terms, using analogous examples to show that general terms, like proper names, exhibit paronymy. Shifting the focus to scientific discovery, I show how recognizing the paronymy of general terms enhances our understanding of how scientific terms evolve over time and relate to other terms. My analysis also reveals that the “is” in scientific sentences does not necessarily function as the “is” of identity but can, among others, also be interpreted as the “is” of explication. This allows not only for the resolution of various puzzles, but also for different readings of sentences to coexist peacefully.

This volume brings together selected works by the philosopher Rosemarie Rheinwald (1948–2009). The title "Logic, Causation, Freedom" indicates the broad range of topics, which extends from the Achilles paradox to the problem of free will. Rheinwald preferred to address difficult and fundamental problems: logical and semantic paradoxes, the riddles of inductive reasoning, and the nature of causation. Over the years, her early research interests in the philosophy of mathematics, logic, and the philosophy of science were joined by interests in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics. Each essay in this collection is preceded by an introductory note by a philosopher who knew Rheinwald and is familiar with her work. The introductory notes contain information about the context of the discussion and critical objections, as well as personal memories and comments. An annotated bibliography at the end of the volume provides information about all of Rosemarie Rheinwald's publications, including those that were not included in this collection. May this volume keep alive the memory of a lovely person and encourage further engagement with her impressive work.

The investigation of the mind has been a central undertaking in philosophy for centuries. It is characterized, among other things, by the following questions: What are the characteristics of the mind? What types of mental states can be distinguished? Is a scientific or physical explanation of the mind possible? Can the mental be reduced to the physical? Is the realm of the physical causally closed? What does it mean for something to be physical? How can the mind bring about actions? Are we free to act as we will? Is our will free? What role do neuroscientific findings play in the development of a convincing theory of mind? And what role do philosophical thought experiments play? What exactly characterizes a good theory of mind? This volume, which is also aimed at beginners, brings together contributions to the investigation of the mind by Andreas Hüttemann, Holger Lyre, Jan G. Michel, Gernot Münster, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Achim Stephan, and Henrik Walter.

William Lycan is an internationally renowned American philosopher whose work since the late 1960s has been not only extensive but also influential, particularly in the areas of philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and more recently metaphilosophy. This contributed volume features high-quality contributions by prominent or up-and-coming philosophers who critically examine many aspects of Lycan’s work; it also contains an essay by Lycan responding to these contributions. In this way, not only is the importance of William Lycan’s work appreciated, it is also made accessible for further research. The book is also suitable for teaching purposes at universities.

Scientific progress depends crucially on scientific discoveries. Yet the topic of scientific discoveries has not been central to debate in the philosophy of science. This book aims to remedy this shortcoming. Based on a broad reading of the term “science” (similar to the German term “Wissenschaft”), the book convenes experts from different disciplines who reflect upon several intertwined questions connected to the topic of making scientific discoveries. Among these questions are the following: What are the preconditions for making scientific discoveries? What is it that we (have to) do when we make discoveries in science? What are the objects of scientific discoveries, how do we name them, and how do scientific names function? Do discoveries in, say, physics and biology, share an underlying structure, or do they differ from each other in crucial ways? Are other fields such as theology and environmental studies loci of scientific discovery? What is the purpose of making scientific discoveries? Explaining nature or reality? Increasing scientific knowledge? Finding new truths? If so, how can we account for instructive blunders and serendipities in science? In the light of the above, the following is an encompassing question of the book: What does it mean to make a discovery in science, and how can scientific discoveries be distinguished from non-scientific discoveries?

This essay addresses the question whether artificial speakers can perform speech acts in the technical sense of that term common in the philosophy of language. We here argue that under certain conditions artificial speakers can perform speech acts so understood. After explaining some of the issues at stake in these questions, we elucidate a relatively uncontroversial way in which machines can communicate, namely through what we call verbal signaling. But verbal signaling is not sufficient for the performance of a speech act. To explain the difference, we elucidate the notion of a speech act developed by Austin in the mid-twentieth century and then discuss Strawson’s influential proposal for how that notion may be related to Grice’s conception of speaker meaning. We then refine Strawson’s synthesis in light of Armstrong’s reconceptualization of speaker meaning in terms of objectives rather than intentions. We next extend this conception of speech acts to the cases of recorded, proxy, and conditional speech acts. On this basis, we propose that a characteristic role for artificial speakers is as proxies in the performance of speech acts on behalf of their human creators. We also consider two objections to our position, and compare our approach with others: while other authors appeal to notions such as “quasi-assertion,” we offer a sharp characterization of what artificial speakers can do that does not impute intentions or similarly controversial powers to them. We conclude by raising doubts that our strategy can be applied to speech acts generally.

The focus of this article is a question that has been neglected in debates about digitalization: Could machines replace human scientists? To provide an intelligible answer to it, we need to answer a further question: What is it that makes (or constitutes) a scientist? I offer an answer to this question by proposing a new demarcation criterion for science which I call “the discoverability criterion”. I proceed as follows: (1) I explain why the target question of this article is important, and (2) show that it leads to a variant of the demarcation problem of science. (3) By arguing that it is probably an essential feature of science that we can make scientific discoveries, I suggest a novel way of dealing with this problem by proposing a new demarcation criterion. Before introducing it, (4) I analyze an exemplary case of a real scientific discovery, and (5) argue that scientific discovery processes have a general underlying structure. (6) I introduce my discoverability criterion for science and present my master argument that helps us understand which criteria have to be fulfilled in order to decide whether machines can replace human scientists or not. (7) I conclude by answering the article’s target question and bringing forward a take-home message.

In this entry, I provide an overview of reductionism, a family of philosophical positions unified by the idea that one entity—whether an object, property, theory, or conceptual scheme—can be subsumed under another. I first examine reductionism in the philosophy of science, distinguishing between three major approaches: reduction as translation, as proposed by logical empiricists; reduction as derivation, exemplified by Nagel’s model of theory reduction; and reduction as explanation, as found in eliminative accounts such as those of Kemeny and Oppenheim. I then turn to the role of reductionism in the philosophy of mind, where the identity theory claims that mental states are identical to neurophysiological states. This view, however, faces challenges from the multiple realization argument (Putnam), which suggests that mental properties cannot be straightforwardly reduced to physical properties and instead supports functionalist alternatives. While reductionist frameworks have played a crucial role in shaping scientific and philosophical inquiry, persistent challenges—including issues of theoretical pluralism and the explanatory gap—ensure that debates about the scope and limits of reductionism remain ongoing.

In this critical discussion, I examine Jimena Canales' "Bedeviled: A Shadow History of Demons in Science," which explores the historical and philosophical roles of imaginary demons in scientific thought. The book traces how conceptual figures such as Laplace’s demon—symbolizing determinism—and Maxwell’s demon—challenging the second law of thermodynamics—have shaped scientific discourse by questioning established principles and prompting paradigm shifts. While Canales primarily situates these demons within the broader history of science, I argue that her work also offers valuable insights for the philosophy of scientific discovery. By illustrating how conceptual constraints, paradoxes, and thought experiments influence the emergence of new theories, she provides a deeper understanding of the conditions under which scientific breakthroughs occur. This perspective aligns with recent discussions on the epistemic and heuristic dimensions of discovery, making a compelling case for the enduring role of imaginary constructs in scientific progress.