Jan Friis

Book Symposium on Don Ihde’s Expanding Hermeneutics: Visualism in Science Content Type Journal Article Category Book Symposium Pages 1-22 DOI 10.1007/s13347-011-0060-5 Authors Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis, University of Copenhagen, Nørre Farimagsgade 5 A, Room 10.0.27, 1014 Copenhagen, Denmark Larry A. Hickman, The Center for Dewey Studies, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Carbondale, IL 62901, USA Robert Rosenberger, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, DM Smith Building, 685 Cherry Street, Atlanta, GA 30332-0345, USA Robert C. Scharff, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824-3574, USA Don Ihde, Stony Brook University, Harriman Hall 221, Stony Brook, NY 11794-3750, USA Journal Philosophy & Technology Online ISSN 2210-5441 Print ISSN 2210-5433

This article explores the concept of animal technics, building on the work of Don Ihde to examine the intricate relationships between technology, animals, and human experiences. Drawing from postphenomenology, philosophy of technology and posthumanist thought, the discussion challenges anthropocentric perspectives that frame technology as a purely human domain. Instead, it argues that animals actively shape and are shaped by technics, engaging with tools, environments, and human-mediated technological systems in complex ways. Through a critical engagement with Ihde’s postphenomenology, the article interrogates the co-constitutive interactions between animal life and technology, revealing how nonhuman agency disrupts traditional boundaries between nature and artifact. Case studies illustrate the diverse ways animals participate in technics, from bioengineered species to digital interfaces designed for nonhuman cognition. This analysis highlights the ethical and epistemological stakes of recognizing animals as technological actors, calling for an expanded framework that accounts for their role in shaping technoscientific realities. By situating animal technics within broader debates in philosophy of technology, this article contributes to ongoing discussions about agency, materiality, ecology, and the limits of human-centered technological narratives. It concludes by advocating for a more inclusive and responsive technological ethics—one that acknowledges the entangled futures of humans, animals, and machines.

Drawing on essays from leading international and multi-disciplinary scholars, _A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology_ is the first comprehensive and authoritative reference source to cover the key issues of technology’s impact on society and our lives. Presents the first complete, authoritative reference work in the field Organized thematically for use both as a full introduction to the field or an encyclopedic reference Draws on original essays from leading interdisciplinary scholars Features the most up-to-date and cutting edge research in the interdisciplinary fields of philosophy, technology, and their broader intellectual environments.

Drawing on essays from leading international and multi-disciplinary scholars, _A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology_ is the first comprehensive and authoritative reference source to cover the key issues of technology’s impact on society and our lives. Presents the first complete, authoritative reference work in the field Organized thematically for use both as a full introduction to the field or an encyclopedic reference Draws on original essays from leading interdisciplinary scholars Features the most up-to-date and cutting edge research in the interdisciplinary fields of philosophy, technology, and their broader intellectual environments.

Forensic sciences, originating from nineteenth-century efforts to support law enforcement through medical expertise, have evolved into a robust field grounded in a rich tradition of interpretative practices. The discipline now incorporates an array of advanced techniques and technologies—sophisticated imaging modalities, cutting-edge analytical methods, and comprehensive statistical models—pushing the field to transcend biases rooted in subjective experience. Despite these technological strides, forensic practitioners continue to grapple with fundamental challenges surrounding the reliability and validity of interpretative methodologies.

Interpretation is not confined to a single method of object-analysis; rather, it encompasses a diverse range of approaches across different domains of experience. This plurality of interpretive methods stems from a fundamental shift in philosophical hermeneutics, which paralleled the transformation of scientific thought in the nineteenth century. During this period, long-established idealist philosophical systems came under scrutiny, prompting a broader intellectual upheaval that reshaped not only philosophy but also the sciences. In response, a movement emerged advocating for the autonomy of individual scientific disciplines while fostering a dynamic interplay between philosophy and these fields. Heidegger was a vocal critic of the era’s dominant positivist and empiricist philosophies, which sought to universalize the research methods of the natural sciences. He condemned this prevailing perspective as a reductive materialism—one that stripped inquiry of its depth by subordinating all understanding to the framework of the natural sciences.

Are our perceptions and interpretations merely indirect representations—constructed and adjusted against prior experiences via predictive processing—where the brain as a “prediction machine” has minimal direct access to the external world? Or do sensations provide a direct, construction-free correspondence with that world? There is reason to consider a middle path between these two extremes: a perspective that embraces the dynamic interplay of individual perceptual engagement with the environment, navigating a complex array of known and unknown elements, both directly and indirectly, while engaging in ongoing processes of sense-making and skill acquisition.

An aging Martin Heidegger reemphasized in his 1966 book Discourse on Thinking the tension between two quite different modes of thinking—both typical of the human mind and intellect. One mode he termed “calculative thinking,” which is a conscious, intentional, and methodical deliberation of consequences and probabilities, and of opportunities. This thinking calculates utility by estimating the usability, cost, and value of things. Moreover, calculative thinking is, according to Heidegger, an objectifying thinking and as such, an intended disinterested pursuit of facts. It is a style of thinking that, as John D. Caputo puts it, and in agreement with Heidegger, characterizes the mathematical-technical sciences and modern technical philosophy. It is the thinking typical of our age. “For the present age stands dedicated to a technical understanding of reality and to the control of reality which this makes possible,” Caputo writes. The abstracting ability of mind is also the ability to take a step back from the concreteness of affairs with disinterest. The intellectual philosopher, physicist, or medical clinician will nevertheless have to struggle in order to keep their disinterested and detached gaze. The hurdle is to detach from personal, group, or organizational motives, interests, and needs defining the specific context of philosophical research or scientific practice. The rational philosopher, physician, or engineer, emphasizing calculative thinking, seems to share an assumption that one can subdue the influence of “subjective inputs” if one immerses oneself in the deliberative process of critical examination and subsequent exchange of information in order to inform their agreed-upon decisions.

Cognitivism, a dominant paradigm in cognitive psychology, seeks to understand mental processes through computational and representational models of the mind. While closely related, cognitivism and cognitive psychology serve distinct roles: cognitivism provides a theoretical framework for cognition, whereas cognitive psychology is an empirical discipline dedicated to studying mental processes. Despite their differences, both share a fundamental commitment to investigating how humans acquire, process, and apply information.

Don Ihde’s postphenomenological project expands Figal’s hermeneutics of the objective, extending it into the realm of technologically mediated experience. This shift reimagines the role of objects in human experience, presenting them not as static entities to be passively observed but as dynamic presences actively shaped by the tools through which we engage with them. Central to this idea is the concept of “material hermeneutics,” a term first coined by Peter Szondi in 1995 and later developed by Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek.

In the last twenty years, there has been a noticeable increase in dissatisfaction among scholars in the field of continental philosophy. They are fed up with the endless interpretations and abstract ideas that dominate philosophical discussions. Instead, there is a growing push to focus on the actual, physical world and the importance of real, tangible things. Essentially, this means a significant shift toward realism within the realm of continental philosophy. Günter Figal and Don Ihde belong to a group of thinkers within phenomenological-hermeneutical philosophy who have been reorienting hermeneutic philosophy toward the external origin of that something appearing in experience.

“The word itself says what an object is,” Figal states. It is what distinguishes between over and against, what is across from remains standing “across from.” These oppositions allows for human expression: with precision we can determine something insofar as it is “over against.” Figal extends Gadamer’s emphasis on the factual nature of interpretations within his hermeneutical realism framework. Figal’s endeavor is externally focused; he prioritizes objectivity and real-world elements beyond the interpreting individual. We perceive of real-world objects. “An object is something standing in the way.” Consequently, Figal broadens Gadamer’s contextual scope beyond art and human expressions. Interpretation, according to Figal, entails engaging with the objective reality of phenomena. Our understanding relies on external stimuli confronting us. Interpretation, therefore, acts as a conduit, facilitating the transmission of external elements that are foreign to us. What places us in referential relation to the objects is, according to Figal, space. This referential relation to things is what generates interpretative possibilities—for us to make sense of them.

Heidegger asserts that understanding is not something we acquire upon entering a situation; rather, it is an activity we are already engaged in. This insight applies directly to radiology, where image interpretation involves much more than merely observing images on a PACS. The interpretative process is shaped by the radiologist’s accumulated expertise, medical training, and the specific preparation for the case at hand. More experienced radiologists, in fact, often demonstrate greater precision in their diagnoses, sometimes bypassing established systematic procedures because they can intuitively recognize key features from their first glance at an image. This instinctive recognition reflects their advanced skill, but it is also important to acknowledge that interpretation remains the central cognitive task for the medical professional. Medicine, and radiology in particular, inherently relies on this interpretative knowhow of its practitioners. However, the reliance on human interpretation also introduces the potential for error, which drives researchers and engineers to explore alternatives. Error in radiology is in fact defined by inaccuracies in the interpretation of images resulting in diagnostic mistakes. Errors happen due to human, cognitive, technical, or systemic factors. Efforts to minimize the subjective variability of human cognition by turning to quantifiable, ostensibly objective methods drawn from the natural sciences, in an attempt to reduce the risk of misdiagnosis.

The experience of perceiving objects in the world is undeniable and fundamentally grounded in our engagement with our surroundings. For instance, when I consider Berkeley’s evocative example of “kicking a stone,” the resultant pain is not a detached intellectual concept but rather a direct consequence of my physical interaction with the stone. Such perception encompasses not only clear and distinct objects but also ambiguous scenarios, like interpreting partial shadows as a half-face on a wall. Even highly skilled observers may occasionally perceive things that lack an external material basis. These perceived yet non-existent entities are mind-dependent, as they emerge from the brain—and body. What we experience as “seen” is often a recontextualized interpretation of sensory input. When we cannot fully comprehend what we are observing, our minds frequently default to familiar forms, effectively filling in gaps with recognizable patterns. This perceptual process operates beyond our conscious awareness, managed by neural mechanisms that interpret and structure our sensory world without our explicit control.

This book explores the crucial role of interpretation in medical radiology and beyond, emphasizing its pervasive influence on medical knowledge. Friis examines radiological analysis through hermeneutics, cognition, and visual perception studies. He argues that interpretation is inherently embodied and essential to human action, particularly in radiology, where technology extends vision beyond the human eye’s limits. Yet, interpretation varies among radiologists. Can it be too relative, shaped by subjective factors irrelevant to the task? Attempts to eliminate cognitive bias through psychophysical and cognitivist approaches have failed. Interpretation is an active, context-dependent process, inseparable from human experience. Friis contends that the only solution is to expand cognitive reach through collaborative interpretative practices, integrating diverse perspectives. Radiology, like all medical fields, benefits from shared expertise, where multiple viewpoints refine diagnostic accuracy and mitigate individual bias. By fostering structured cooperation among radiologists, clinicians, interpretative reliability can be strengthened. The key is not to eliminate subjectivity but to harness it constructively through interdisciplinary dialogue, collective reasoning, and continuous knowledge exchange.

This article explores the profound impact of visualism and visual perception in the context of medical imaging diagnostics. It emphasizes the intricate interplay among vision, embodiment, subjectivity, language, and historicity within the realm of medical science and technology, with a specific focus on image consciousness. The study delves into the role of subjectivity in perception, facilitating the communication of opacity and historicity to the perceiving individual. Additionally, it scrutinizes the image interpretation process, drawing parallels to text interpretation and highlighting the influence of personal biases and individuality in medical practice. By revisiting Husserl’s conceptualization of “image consciousness” and introducing the notion of “image theme”, the paper seeks to establish a theoretical framework for making sense of images within the context of technological interpretation. A key objective is to enhance the phenomenology of technology through a systematic analysis of medical imaging diagnosis, contributing to an expanded epistemological foundation for medical practice. The article recognizes that the construction of medical knowledge incorporates subjective elements, especially within a historical context. The interpretation of images involves both instrumental and expert interpretation, with human subjectivity playing a crucial role. The article asserts that human creativity and conscious engagement are indispensable in interpreting all medical images.

The leap from primitive to scientific time represented as the “time” in “relativity physics,” or in “thermodynamics” or perhaps in “quantum physics” or even within “statistical mechanics” is large. Large also is the conceptual difference between these various understandings of the nature of time. How are we really to understand these physical perspectives on time: As knowledge about the real nature of time represented by the objective concepts: Or as epistemological-operational abstractions that cannot avoid elevating their results to the level of full-fledged reality, to ontology?