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Jan Sprenger

University of Turin
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    78
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 More details
  • University of Turin
    Professor
Universität Bonn
Institut für Philosophie
PhD, 2008
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Torino, Piemonte, Italy
0000-0003-0083-9685
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Probability
General Philosophy of Science
Causal Reasoning
Probabilistic Reasoning
Scientific Method
1 more
Areas of Interest
Cognitive Sciences
Decision Theory
Conditionals
  • All publications (78)
  • Correction to:Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Florian Cova, Brent Strickland, Angela Abatista, Aurélien Allard, James Andow, Mario Attie, James Beebe, Renatas Berniūnas, Jordane Boudesseul, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman, Rodrigo Diaz, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Vilius Dranseika, Brian D. Earp, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Ivar Hannikainen, José V. Hernández-Conde, Wenjia Hu, François Jaquet, Kareem Khalifa, Hanna Kim, Markus Kneer, Joshua Knobe, Miklos Kurthy, Anthony Lantian, Shen yi Liao, Edouard Machery, Tania Moerenhout, Christian Mott, Mark Phelan, Jonathan Phillips, Navin Rambharose, Kevin Reuter, Felipe Romero, Paulo Sousa, Emile Thalabard, Kevin Tobia, Hugo Viciana, Daniel Wilkenfeld, and Xiang Zhou
    A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00559-0.
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  22
    Scientific Objectivity
    with Julian Reiss
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2014.
  •  136
    Trivalent Conditionals and Truthmaker Semantics
    with Matteo Plebani
    This paper connects truthmaker semantics with a trivalent interpretation of the indicative conditional. This merger substantially extends the scope of both approaches and has attractive philosophical implications. First, it need not postulate a third, non-classical truth value with contentious interpretation. Second, it unifies a realist and an epistemic interpretation of when a state verifies or accepts a sentence. Third, the framework recaptures central features of various analyses of conditio…Read more
    This paper connects truthmaker semantics with a trivalent interpretation of the indicative conditional. This merger substantially extends the scope of both approaches and has attractive philosophical implications. First, it need not postulate a third, non-classical truth value with contentious interpretation. Second, it unifies a realist and an epistemic interpretation of when a state verifies or accepts a sentence. Third, the framework recaptures central features of various analyses of conditionals: the material conditional analysis, Leitgeb’s HYPE conditional, the Chrysippus test, and the Ramsey test.
    Many-Valued LogicDynamic SemanticsTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsLogical Conse…Read more
    Many-Valued LogicDynamic SemanticsTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsLogical Consequence and EntailmentTruthmaker Semantics
  •  174
    No Classical Probability for Counterfactuals
    Analysis. forthcoming.
    This paper strengthens a triviality result by Santorio (2022, Analysis) for the probability of counterfactuals. The best response may be to drop the idea that the probability of counterfactuals behaves classically.
    Bayesian ReasoningConditional ProbabilitySubjunctive Conditionals, Misc
  •  113
    Trivalent Conditionals and Quantification
    with Paul Egré and Lorenzo Rossi
    Belnap (1970, 1973) proposed to formalize the restriction of first-order quantifiers ∀ and ∃ by means of a single sentential connective: a trivalent conditional that takes the semantic value ‘void’ when the antecedent is false. Thus, ‘every A is B’ is represented as ∀x(Ax → Bx) and ‘some A is B’ is represented as ∃x(Ax → Bx)—a notable unification compared to the standard representation in first-order logic that uses distinct connectives. This paper implements Belnap’s program, henceforth called …Read more
    Belnap (1970, 1973) proposed to formalize the restriction of first-order quantifiers ∀ and ∃ by means of a single sentential connective: a trivalent conditional that takes the semantic value ‘void’ when the antecedent is false. Thus, ‘every A is B’ is represented as ∀x(Ax → Bx) and ‘some A is B’ is represented as ∃x(Ax → Bx)—a notable unification compared to the standard representation in first-order logic that uses distinct connectives. This paper implements Belnap’s program, henceforth called Conditional Reduction, in full generality and applies it to all conservative ⟨1, 1⟩ quantifiers. By combining Conditional Reductions with the Conservativity Theorem, due to Keenan and Stavi, any conservative type ⟨1, 1⟩ quantifier turns out to be equivalent to Boolean combinations of three basic type ⟨1⟩ quantifiers (‘everything’, ‘at least λ many things’ and the possessives) scoping over a trivalent conditional.
  •  178
    Trivalent Conditionals and Quantification
    with Paul Egré and Lorenzo Rossi
    Belnap (1970, 1973) proposed to formalize the restriction of first-order quantifiers ∀ and ∃ by means of a single sentential connective: a trivalent conditional that takes the semantic value ‘void’ when the antecedent is false. Thus, ‘every A is B’ is represented as ∀x(Ax → Bx) and ‘some A is B’ is represented as ∃x(Ax → Bx)—a notable unification compared to the standard representation in first-order logic that uses distinct connectives. This paper implements Belnap’s program, henceforth called …Read more
    Belnap (1970, 1973) proposed to formalize the restriction of first-order quantifiers ∀ and ∃ by means of a single sentential connective: a trivalent conditional that takes the semantic value ‘void’ when the antecedent is false. Thus, ‘every A is B’ is represented as ∀x(Ax → Bx) and ‘some A is B’ is represented as ∃x(Ax → Bx)—a notable unification compared to the standard representation in first-order logic that uses distinct connectives. This paper implements Belnap’s program, henceforth called Conditional Reduction, in full generality and applies it to all conservative ⟨1, 1⟩ quantifiers. By combining Conditional Reductions with the Conservativity Theorem, due to Keenan and Stavi, any conservative type ⟨1, 1⟩ quantifier turns out to be equivalent to Boolean combinations of three basic type ⟨1⟩ quantifiers (‘everything’, ‘at least λ many things’ and the possessives) scoping over a trivalent conditional.
    ConditionalsMany-Valued LogicQuantifier RestrictionGeneralized Quantifiers
  •  353
    Counterfactuals: Truth, Probability and Acceptance Conditions
    Synthese. 2026.
    This paper aims at an integrated account of truth, probability and acceptance conditions of counterfactuals. The basic idea is that truth conditions are an abstract semantic device: they are not directly tested against semantic judgments, but determine the probability of a sentence, and via probabilistic acceptance conditions, they generate predictions of semantic judgments. The proposed account has two notable features: first, the probability of counterfactuals can be understood in a purely sub…Read more
    This paper aims at an integrated account of truth, probability and acceptance conditions of counterfactuals. The basic idea is that truth conditions are an abstract semantic device: they are not directly tested against semantic judgments, but determine the probability of a sentence, and via probabilistic acceptance conditions, they generate predictions of semantic judgments. The proposed account has two notable features: first, the probability of counterfactuals can be understood in a purely subjective sense, without reference to objective chance, and second, Lewis-style truth conditions for counterfactuals that quantify over multiple scenarios can be interpreted as describing their acceptance conditions.
    Possible-World Theories of CounterfactualsBayesian ReasoningSubjunctive Conditionals, MiscChance and…Read more
    Possible-World Theories of CounterfactualsBayesian ReasoningSubjunctive Conditionals, MiscChance and Objective ProbabilityCausal Theories of CounterfactualsIndicative vs Subjunctive ConditionalsConditional Probability
  •  41
    Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise
    with Carlo Martini
    In Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson & Michael Weisberg (eds.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 180-202. 2017.
    Group judgments are often influenced by their members’ individual expertise. It is less clear, though, how individual expertise should affect the group judgments. This chapter surveys a wide range of models of opinion aggregation and group judgment: models where all group members have the same impact on the group judgment, models that take into account differences in individual accuracy, and models where group members revise their beliefs as a function of their mutual respect. The scope of these…Read more
    Group judgments are often influenced by their members’ individual expertise. It is less clear, though, how individual expertise should affect the group judgments. This chapter surveys a wide range of models of opinion aggregation and group judgment: models where all group members have the same impact on the group judgment, models that take into account differences in individual accuracy, and models where group members revise their beliefs as a function of their mutual respect. The scope of these models covers the aggregation of propositional attitudes, probability functions, and numerical estimates. By comparing these different kinds of models and contrasting them with findings in psychology, management science, and the expert judgment literature, the chapter provides a better understanding of the role of expertise in group agency, both from a theoretical and from an empirical perspective.
    Judgment Aggregation
  •  12
    Simpson’s Paradox
    with Naftali Weinberger
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021.
  •  729
    Conditionals, Presupposition, and Logic: Avoid Void
    with Paul Egré and Lorenzo Rossi
    Trivalent theories of indicative conditionals are thought to be at odds with trivalent theories of presupposition, and in particular, with an adequate analysis of the presuppositions of conditionals. We address this challenge based on (i) a semantics for conditionals and modals that combines trivalence with context updates, and (ii) a principle for felicitous assertion that we call Avoid Void: do not assert a sentence that takes the value void everywhere in the context. This account highlights …Read more
    Trivalent theories of indicative conditionals are thought to be at odds with trivalent theories of presupposition, and in particular, with an adequate analysis of the presuppositions of conditionals. We address this challenge based on (i) a semantics for conditionals and modals that combines trivalence with context updates, and (ii) a principle for felicitous assertion that we call Avoid Void: do not assert a sentence that takes the value void everywhere in the context. This account highlights the semantic differences between conditionals and other presupposition carriers, and yields the intuitively correct presuppositions of conditionals. Finally, we argue that Avoid Void constrains not only assertion, but also logical inference. In particular, Avoid Void explains the oddness of inferring "if A, B'' from "not A''.
    PresuppositionLogic of ConditionalsTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsLogical Cons…Read more
    PresuppositionLogic of ConditionalsTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsLogical Consequence and EntailmentConditional Assertion
  •  12
    Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Xiang Zhou, Daniel Wilkenfeld, Hugo Viciana, Kevin Tobia, Emile Thalabard, Paulo Sousa, Felipe Romero, Kevin Reuter, Navin Rambharose, Jonathan Phillips, Mark Phelan, Christian Mott, Tania Moerenhout, Edouard Machery, Shen-yi Liao, Anthony Lantian, Miklos Kurthy, Joshua Knobe, Markus Kneer, Hanna Kim, Kareem Khalifa, François Jaquet, Wenjia Hu, José V. Hernández-Conde, Ivar Hannikainen, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Brian D. Earp, Vilius Dranseika, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Rodrigo Diaz, Fiery Cushman, Matteo Colombo, Jordane Boudesseul, Renatas Berniūnas, James Beebe, Mario Attie, James Andow, Aurélien Allard, Angela Abatista, Brent Strickland, and Florian Cova
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4): 999-1003. 2021.
    Philosophy of MindExperimental Philosophy, Misc
  •  57
    Causal Conditionals, Tendency Causal Claims and Statistical Relevance
    with Michał Sikorski and Noah van Dongen
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 16 (1): 345-370. 2025.
    Indicative conditionals and tendency causal claims are closely related (e.g., Frosch and Byrne, 2012), but despite these connections, they are usually studied separately. A unifying framework could consist in their dependence on probabilistic factors such as high conditional probability and statistical relevance (e.g., Adams, 1975; Eells, 1991; Douven, 2008, 2015). This paper presents a comparative empirical study on differences between judgments on tendency causal claims and indicative conditio…Read more
    Indicative conditionals and tendency causal claims are closely related (e.g., Frosch and Byrne, 2012), but despite these connections, they are usually studied separately. A unifying framework could consist in their dependence on probabilistic factors such as high conditional probability and statistical relevance (e.g., Adams, 1975; Eells, 1991; Douven, 2008, 2015). This paper presents a comparative empirical study on differences between judgments on tendency causal claims and indicative conditionals, how these judgments are driven by probabilistic factors, and how these factors differ in their predictive power for both causal and conditional claims.
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  874
    Trivalent Semantics for Conditional Obligations
    with Paul Egre and Lorenzo Rossi
    In Kees van Berkel, Agata Ciabattoni & John Horty (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. 17th International Conference, DEON 2025, College Publications. pp. 119-138. 2025.
    This paper provides a new framework for formalizing conditional obligations in natural language: it pairs a unary deontic operator with trivalent semantics for the indicative conditional and Kratzer's assumption that the antecedents of conditionals restrict the scope of modals in the consequent. Combining these three ideas, we obtain a fully compositional theory of "if" and "ought'" that validates plausible principles for deontic reasoning. Moreover, it resolves classical challenges such as the…Read more
    This paper provides a new framework for formalizing conditional obligations in natural language: it pairs a unary deontic operator with trivalent semantics for the indicative conditional and Kratzer's assumption that the antecedents of conditionals restrict the scope of modals in the consequent. Combining these three ideas, we obtain a fully compositional theory of "if" and "ought'" that validates plausible principles for deontic reasoning. Moreover, it resolves classical challenges such as the "if A then ought A" problem, the paradox of the miners and the modeling of contrary-to-duty obligations (e.g., Chisholm's quartet). All in all, our proposal is attractive from a logical point of view and squares well with general theories of natural language reasoning.
    Logic of ConditionalsLogical Semantics and Logical TruthIndicative Conditionals, MiscDeontic ModalsD…Read more
    Logic of ConditionalsLogical Semantics and Logical TruthIndicative Conditionals, MiscDeontic ModalsDeontic LogicFormal SemanticsMany-Valued Logic
  •  1034
    Trivalent conditionals, Kratzer style
    with Paul Egre and Lorenzo Rossi
    Journal of Semantics. 2026.
    This paper extends a trivalent semantics for indicative conditionals to a language including the modal operators "might" and "must". Specifically, we combine Cooper’s truth-functional, trivalent analysis of the conditional connective with Kratzer’s idea that if-clauses restrict modal operators. By hard-wiring both trivalence and the restriction operation into the truth conditions of conditional-modal expressions, we obtain an attractive theory that yields plausible predictions for the interactio…Read more
    This paper extends a trivalent semantics for indicative conditionals to a language including the modal operators "might" and "must". Specifically, we combine Cooper’s truth-functional, trivalent analysis of the conditional connective with Kratzer’s idea that if-clauses restrict modal operators. By hard-wiring both trivalence and the restriction operation into the truth conditions of conditional-modal expressions, we obtain an attractive theory that yields plausible predictions for the interaction of conditionals and modals, explains the intuitive appeal of the Restrictor View, and avoids the typical problems of Kratzer-style accounts, especially regarding the probability of conditional-modal expressions.
    Many-Valued LogicFormal SemanticsTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsEpistemic Moda…Read more
    Many-Valued LogicFormal SemanticsTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsEpistemic ModalsLogical Consequence and EntailmentIndicative Conditionals and Conditional ProbabilitiesLogic of Conditionals
  •  961
    The material and the suppositional conditional
    This paper investigates the relationship between the material and the suppositional analysis of indicative conditionals. I show that an axiomatic characterization of the suppositional analysis in terms of \textit{acceptance conditions} is represented by a particular trivalent semantics, whereas a slight tweak of the clause for negation yields the material conditional analysis (MCA). These two systems make the same predictions for conditional reasoning in a large fragment of the language, and so …Read more
    This paper investigates the relationship between the material and the suppositional analysis of indicative conditionals. I show that an axiomatic characterization of the suppositional analysis in terms of \textit{acceptance conditions} is represented by a particular trivalent semantics, whereas a slight tweak of the clause for negation yields the material conditional analysis (MCA). These two systems make the same predictions for conditional reasoning in a large fragment of the language, and so we can explain scope and limits of MCA systematically. I propose to consider MCA as a cognitively efficient approximation to valid conditional reasoning.
    Truth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsMany-Valued LogicBayesian ReasoningLogical Cons…Read more
    Truth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsMany-Valued LogicBayesian ReasoningLogical Consequence and EntailmentIndicative Conditionals and Conditional ProbabilitiesLogic of ConditionalsFormal SemanticsPropositional Logic
  •  91
    Productive explanation: A framework for evaluating explanations in psychological science
    with Noah van Dongen, Riet van Bork, Adam Finnemann, Jonas M. B. Haslbeck, Han L. J. van der Maas, Donald J. Robinaugh, Jill de Ron, and Denny Borsboom
    Psychological Review 132 (2): 311-329. 2025.
    Philosophy of Psychology
  •  426
    Causal modeling semantics for counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents
    with Giuliano Rosella
    Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 175 (9): 103336. 2024.
    Causal Modeling Semantics (CMS, e.g., Galles and Pearl 1998; Pearl 2000; Halpern 2000) is a powerful framework for evaluating counterfactuals whose antecedent is a conjunction of atomic formulas. We extend CMS to an evaluation of the probability of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents, and more generally, to counterfactuals whose antecedent is an arbitrary Boolean combination of atomic formulas. Our main idea is to assign a probability to a counterfactual (A ∨ B) € C at a causal model M …Read more
    Causal Modeling Semantics (CMS, e.g., Galles and Pearl 1998; Pearl 2000; Halpern 2000) is a powerful framework for evaluating counterfactuals whose antecedent is a conjunction of atomic formulas. We extend CMS to an evaluation of the probability of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents, and more generally, to counterfactuals whose antecedent is an arbitrary Boolean combination of atomic formulas. Our main idea is to assign a probability to a counterfactual (A ∨ B) € C at a causal model M as a weighted average of the probability of C in those submodels that truthmake A ∨ B (Briggs 2012; Fine 2016, 2017). The weights of the submodels are given by the inverse distance to the original model M, based on a distance metric proposed by Eva, Stern, and Hartmann (2019). Apart from solving a major problem in the epistemology of counterfactuals, our paper shows how work in semantics, causal inference and formal epistemology can be fruitfully combined.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicConditionalsCausal Modeling
  • The paradoxes of confirmation
    In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, Routledge. 2023.
    Confirmation
  •  4990
    The Conditional in Three-Valued Logic
    In Paul Egre & Lorenzo Rossi (eds.), Handbook of Three-Valued Logic, The Mit Press. forthcoming.
    By and large, the conditional connective in three-valued logic has two different functions. First, by means of a deduction theorem, it can express a specific relation of logical consequence in the logical language itself. Second, it can represent natural language structures such as "if/then'' or "implies''. This chapter surveys both approaches, shows why none of them will typically end up with a three-valued material conditional, and elaborates on connections to probabilistic reasoning.
    Many-Valued LogicLogic of ConditionalsTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsLogical C…Read more
    Many-Valued LogicLogic of ConditionalsTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsLogical Consequence and EntailmentIndicative Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities
  •  854
    Causal Conditionals, Tendency Causal Claims and Statistical Relevance
    with Michał Sikorski and van Dongen Noah
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 1-26. 2024.
    Indicative conditionals and tendency causal claims are closely related (e.g., Frosch and Byrne, 2012), but despite these connections, they are usually studied separately. A unifying framework could consist in their dependence on probabilistic factors such as high conditional probability and statistical relevance (e.g., Adams, 1975; Eells, 1991; Douven, 2008, 2015). This paper presents a comparative empirical study on differences between judgments on tendency causal claims and indicative conditio…Read more
    Indicative conditionals and tendency causal claims are closely related (e.g., Frosch and Byrne, 2012), but despite these connections, they are usually studied separately. A unifying framework could consist in their dependence on probabilistic factors such as high conditional probability and statistical relevance (e.g., Adams, 1975; Eells, 1991; Douven, 2008, 2015). This paper presents a comparative empirical study on differences between judgments on tendency causal claims and indicative conditionals, how these judgments are driven by probabilistic factors, and how these factors differ in their predictive power for both causal and conditional claims.
    Epistemic Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsIndicative Conditionals and Conditional ProbabilitiesTr…Read more
    Epistemic Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsIndicative Conditionals and Conditional ProbabilitiesTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsPhilosophy of MindExperimental Philosophy: Causation
  •  1496
    The Epistemic and the Deontic Preface Paradox
    with Lina Maria Lissia
    Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
    This paper generalizes the preface paradox beyond the conjunctive aggregation of beliefs and constructs an analogous paradox for deontic reasoning. The analysis of the deontic case suggests a systematic restriction of intuitive rules for reasoning with obligations. This proposal can be transferred to the epistemic case: it avoids the preface and the lottery paradox and saves one of the two directions of the Lockean Thesis (i.e., high credence is sufficient, but not necessary for rational belief)…Read more
    This paper generalizes the preface paradox beyond the conjunctive aggregation of beliefs and constructs an analogous paradox for deontic reasoning. The analysis of the deontic case suggests a systematic restriction of intuitive rules for reasoning with obligations. This proposal can be transferred to the epistemic case: it avoids the preface and the lottery paradox and saves one of the two directions of the Lockean Thesis (i.e., high credence is sufficient, but not necessary for rational belief). The resulting account compares favorably to competing proposals; in particular, we can formulate the rules of correct doxastic reasoning without reference to probabilistic features of the involved propositions.
    Epistemic ParadoxesBayesian ReasoningDoxastic and Epistemic LogicProbabilistic PuzzlesDeontic Logic
  •  1323
    Certain and Uncertain Inference with Indicative Conditionals
    with Paul Égré and Lorenzo Rossi
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103 (3): 569-596. 2025.
    This paper develops a trivalent semantics for the truth conditions and the probability of the natural language indicative conditional. Our framework rests on trivalent truth conditions first proposed by Cooper (1968) and Belnap (1973) and it yields two logics of conditional reasoning: (i) a logic C of certainty-preserving inference; and (ii) a logic U for uncertain reasoning that preserves the probability of the premises. We show systematic correspondences between trivalent and probabilistic rep…Read more
    This paper develops a trivalent semantics for the truth conditions and the probability of the natural language indicative conditional. Our framework rests on trivalent truth conditions first proposed by Cooper (1968) and Belnap (1973) and it yields two logics of conditional reasoning: (i) a logic C of certainty-preserving inference; and (ii) a logic U for uncertain reasoning that preserves the probability of the premises. We show systematic correspondences between trivalent and probabilistic representations of inferences in either framework, and we use the distinction between the two systems to cast light on the validity of inferences such as Modus Ponens, Or-To-If, and Conditional Excluded Middle. Specifically, the conditional behaves monotonically in C, but non-monotonically in U; Modus Ponens is valid in C, but valid in U only for non-nested conditionals. The result is a unified account of the semantics and epistemology of indicative conditionals that can be fruitfully applied to analyzing the validity of conditional inferences.
    Many-Valued LogicLogic of ConditionalsConditional AssertionIndicative Conditionals and Conditional P…Read more
    Many-Valued LogicLogic of ConditionalsConditional AssertionIndicative Conditionals and Conditional ProbabilitiesTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative Conditionals
  •  1869
    Probability for Trivalent Conditionals
    with Paul Égré and Lorenzo Rossi
    Mind. 2026.
    This paper presents a unified theory of the truth conditions and probability of indicative conditionals and their compounds in a trivalent framework. The semantics validates a Reduction Theorem: any compound of conditionals is semantically equivalent to a simple conditional. We obtain Stalnaker’s Thesis in full generality and generalize Adams’s p-validity into a criterion for valid uncertain inference. Finally, we show that Bayesian updating on an indicative conditional is tantamount to updating…Read more
    This paper presents a unified theory of the truth conditions and probability of indicative conditionals and their compounds in a trivalent framework. The semantics validates a Reduction Theorem: any compound of conditionals is semantically equivalent to a simple conditional. We obtain Stalnaker’s Thesis in full generality and generalize Adams’s p-validity into a criterion for valid uncertain inference. Finally, we show that Bayesian updating on an indicative conditional is tantamount to updating on the corresponding material conditional.
    Conditional AssertionTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsConditionalizationBayesian…Read more
    Conditional AssertionTruth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsConditionalizationBayesian ReasoningUpdating PrinciplesIndicative Conditionals and Conditional ProbabilitiesMany-Valued LogicNonmonotonic LogicLogic of Conditionals
  •  298
    Disagreement behind the veil of ignorance
    with Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Mark Colyvan, Carlo Martini, and Giacomo Sillari
    Philosophical Studies 170 (3): 377-394. 2014.
    In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, …Read more
    In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a solution concept for disagreements behind the veil of ignorance.
    EthicsEpistemology of DisagreementReflective EquilibriumMoral DisagreementPolitical Theory
  •  57
    Editorial
    with Stephan Hartmann and Carlo Martini
    Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (2): 277-277. 2010.
    Social epistemology is a relatively new and booming field of research. It studies the social dimension of the pursuit of acquiring true beliefs and requires philosophical as well as sociological and economic expertise. The insights gained in social epistemology are not only of theoretical interest; they also improve our understanding of social and political processes, as the field includes the analysis of group deliberation and group decision-making. However, surprisingly little work has so far …Read more
    Social epistemology is a relatively new and booming field of research. It studies the social dimension of the pursuit of acquiring true beliefs and requires philosophical as well as sociological and economic expertise. The insights gained in social epistemology are not only of theoretical interest; they also improve our understanding of social and political processes, as the field includes the analysis of group deliberation and group decision-making. However, surprisingly little work has so far been done on the epistemic properties of group deliberation, belief aggregation, and decision-making procedures. To close this gap, the construction and analysis of formal models are especially promising as formal modeling combines representational adequacy with instructive analytical results. This special issue collects papers that follow this strategy from the point of view of different disciplines.
    Social Epistemology, Miscellaneous
  •  115
    Modelling Individual Expertise in Group Judgements
    with Dominik Klein
    Economics and Philosophy 31 (1): 3-25. 2015.
    Group judgements are often – implicitly or explicitly – influenced by their members’ individual expertise. However, given that expertise is seldom recognized fully and that some distortions may occur (bias, correlation, etc.), it is not clear that differential weighting is an epistemically advantageous strategy with respect to straight averaging. Our paper characterizes a wide set of conditions under which differential weighting outperforms straight averaging and embeds the results into the mult…Read more
    Group judgements are often – implicitly or explicitly – influenced by their members’ individual expertise. However, given that expertise is seldom recognized fully and that some distortions may occur (bias, correlation, etc.), it is not clear that differential weighting is an epistemically advantageous strategy with respect to straight averaging. Our paper characterizes a wide set of conditions under which differential weighting outperforms straight averaging and embeds the results into the multidisciplinary group decision-making literature.
    Philosophy of EconomicsSocial Choice Theory
  •  120
    Introduction, SI of Synthese “The collective dimension of science”
    with Cyrille Imbert, Ryan Muldoon, and Kevin Zollman
    Synthese 191 (1): 1-2. 2014.
    Collective Epistemology
  •  135
    Intuitions About the Reference of Proper Names: a Meta-Analysis
    with Noah van Dongen, Matteo Colombo, and Felipe Romero
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4): 745-774. 2020.
    The finding that intuitions about the reference of proper names vary cross-culturally was one of the early milestones in experimental philosophy. Many follow-up studies investigated the scope and magnitude of such cross-cultural effects, but our paper provides the first systematic meta-analysis of studies replicating. In the light of our results, we assess the existence and significance of cross-cultural effects for intuitions about the reference of proper names.
    IntentionalityPhilosophy of LinguisticsExperimental Philosophy: Crosscultural Research
  •  202
    Scientific self-correction: the Bayesian way
    with Felipe Romero
    Synthese 198 (S23): 5803-5823. 2020.
    The enduring replication crisis in many scientific disciplines casts doubt on the ability of science to estimate effect sizes accurately, and in a wider sense, to self-correct its findings and to produce reliable knowledge. We investigate the merits of a particular countermeasure—replacing null hypothesis significance testing with Bayesian inference—in the context of the meta-analytic aggregation of effect sizes. In particular, we elaborate on the advantages of this Bayesian reform proposal unde…Read more
    The enduring replication crisis in many scientific disciplines casts doubt on the ability of science to estimate effect sizes accurately, and in a wider sense, to self-correct its findings and to produce reliable knowledge. We investigate the merits of a particular countermeasure—replacing null hypothesis significance testing with Bayesian inference—in the context of the meta-analytic aggregation of effect sizes. In particular, we elaborate on the advantages of this Bayesian reform proposal under conditions of publication bias and other methodological imperfections that are typical of experimental research in the behavioral sciences. Moving to Bayesian statistics would not solve the replication crisis single-handedly. However, the move would eliminate important sources of effect size overestimation for the conditions we study.
    StatisticsIssues in PsychologyPhilosophy of StatisticsScientific ProgressDecision Theory and Hypothe…Read more
    StatisticsIssues in PsychologyPhilosophy of StatisticsScientific ProgressDecision Theory and Hypothesis TestingBayesian ReasoningScientific Method, MiscSocial EpistemologyExperimentation in Science
  •  37
    The Collective Dimension of Science, special issue of Synthese
    with Cyrille Imbert, Ryan Muldoon, and Kevin Zollman
    International audience.
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