Jan Voosholz

This book presents an argument for a new type of scientific realism beyond naturalism, correlationism and what the author terms 'objective realism'. To achieve this positive philosophical proposal, Jan Voosholz develops a thorough critique of current debates surrounding realism and antirealism in philosophy of science as well as those concerning new and speculative realism. Moreover, in order to provide a new outlook for the philosophy of the natural sciences, this book advances and introduces decisive arguments to that debate from speculative and new realist discussions in ontology and epistemology. Consequently, it develops a unique starting point for a pluralistic philosophy of nature. Any proponent or adversary of new, speculative, perspectival or pragmatic realism, ontic or epistemic structural realism, scientific pluralism, feminist or structural empiricism, selective scepticism, non-reductive or reductive naturalism with an interest in general philosophy of science should take the careful reconstruction of the debates and the novel arguments presented in this book into account. Readers interested in philosophy and the sciences with an interest in these areas of theoretical philosophy will find in this book an informative and comprehensive outline of the state of the art in the epistemology and ontology of the natural sciences.

This article gives an interpretation of the concepts of nature and the universe as used by Markus Gabriel in his new realist fields of sense ontology and epistemology. I argue that the ontological domain, the field of sense, of the universe is an epistemological fusion, not capable of providing the substantive philosophy of nature Gabriel needs for his philosophical endeavours, while the notion of nature is not developed fully in Gabriel’s published work yet. I give the outlines of an extended concept of nature which Gabriel only hints at. I go on to argue that any route Gabriel might want to take in elaborating his concept of nature involves taking a stance towards the natural sciences and their capabilities. I take Hasok Chang’s and Michela Massimi’s recent proposals for new versions of scientific realism and conclude that Gabriel should side with an optimism concerning the natural sciences’ ability to know about nature. I emphasise that much philosophical work remains to be done by Gabriel in order to develop a sophisticated notion of nature that meets his own demands and requirements.

This is the first volume focused on Markus Gabriel’s version of New Realism, which spans the fields of metaphysics/ontology, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of science, and meta-philosophy. Most of the selected contributions are directly or indirectly concerned with Gabriel’s fields of sense-ontology, his version of a thoroughly realistic pluralism. While some take up criticisms from previous debates surrounding Gabriel’s philosophy and New Realism in general, others advance completely new and innovative challenges for this highly systematic thinker. Overall, the contributions provide both a substantive commentary on Gabriel’s work and a multifaceted, critical assessment of its underlying ideas. The book is not only an essential addition to the debate surrounding New Realism, but also furthers the discussions about naturalism, deflationist ontologies, contextualism and mereological arguments to which Gabriel’s work has contributed in recent years.

This thesis presents an argument for a new type of scientific realism beyond naturalism, correlationism and what the author terms 'objective realism'. To achieve this positive philosophical proposal, Jan Voosholz develops a thorough critique of current debates surrounding realism and antirealism in philosophy of science as well as those concerning new and speculative realism. Moreover, in order to provide a new outlook for the philosophy of the natural sciences, this book advances and introduces decisive arguments to that debate from speculative and new realist discussions in ontology and epistemology. Consequently, it develops a unique starting point for a pluralistic philosophy of nature. Any proponent or adversary of new, speculative, perspectival or pragmatic realism, ontic or epistemic structural realism, scientific pluralism, feminist or structural empiricism, selective scepticism, non-reductive or reductive naturalism with an interest in general philosophy of science should take the careful reconstruction of the debates and the novel arguments presented in this book into account. Readers interested in philosophy and the sciences with an interest in these areas of theoretical philosophy will find in this book an informative and comprehensive outline of the state of the art in the epistemology and ontology of the natural sciences.

Quentin Meillassoux descarta la cuestión de la correlación correcta en su Después de la finitud y en las publicaciones siguientes porque su trabajo tiene como objetivo refutar el correlacionismo. La pregunta central que planteo en el artículo es:¿ necesita la posición de Meillassoux algo más que un juego ontológico formal (y los realismos especulativos y los nuevos realismos en general)? Mi respuesta a esta pregunta será un no, pero creo que él y todos los realistas especulativos y nuevos realistas necesitan una concepción de la conexión entre nosotros y las cosas que nos rodean. El artículo comienza examinando dos nociones centrales de la filosofía negativa de Meillassoux: correlación y ancestralidad. Este análisis elude dar una respuesta a la cuestión de por qué Meillassoux trata de evitar comprometerse con cuestiones tradicionales de epistemología, filosofía de la mente y ciencia. Después introduzco la noción de juego ontológico formal y presento un argumento (del experimento mental de la tabla periódica de las cosas) de por qué cualquier realista especulativo y nuevo realista debe abstenerse de declarar su ontología realista respectiva en la forma de este juego. El artículo concluye con cuatro preguntas que deben ser respondidas por Meillassoux y, por extensión, por cualquier filosofía que se esfuerce por ser un realismo especulativo o un nuevo realismo.

Quentin Meillassoux dismisses the question of the right correlation both in his 'After finitude' and in subsequent publications because his work aims to refute correlationism. The central question I want to address in this article is: Does Meillassoux’s position (and the New Realisms more generally) need a correlation to be more than just a formal ontological game? My answer to this question will be a no, but I think that both his and other versions of speculative and new realism need an interconnection between us and the things around us.

This publication forms a basis for the interdisciplinary development of a certification system for artificial intelligence. In view of the rapid development of artificial intelligence with disruptive and lasting consequences for the economy, society, and everyday life, it highlights the resulting challenges that can be tackled only through interdisciplinary dialogue between IT, law, philosophy, and ethics. As a result of this interdisciplinary exchange, it also defines six AI-specific audit areas for trustworthy use of artificial intelligence. They comprise fairness, transparency, autonomy and control, data protection as well as security and reliability while addressing ethical and legal requirements. The latter are further substantiated with the aim of operationalizability.

Die vorliegende Publikation dient als Grundlage für die interdisziplinäre Entwicklung einer Zertifizierung von Künstlicher Intelligenz. Angesichts der rasanten Entwicklung von Künstlicher Intelligenz mit disruptiven und nachhaltigen Folgen für Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Alltagsleben verdeutlicht sie, dass sich die hieraus ergebenden Herausforderungen nur im interdisziplinären Dialog von Informatik, Rechtswissenschaften, Philosophie und Ethik bewältigen lassen. Als Ergebnis dieses interdisziplinären Austauschs definiert sie zudem sechs KI-spezifische Handlungsfelder für den vertrauensvollen Einsatz von Künstlicher Intelligenz: Sie umfassen Fairness, Transparenz, Autonomie und Kontrolle, Datenschutz sowie Sicherheit und Verlässlichkeit und adressieren dabei ethische und rechtliche Anforderungen. Letztere werden mit dem Ziel der Operationalisierbarkeit weiter konkretisiert.

The paper addresses a question concerning George Ellis’s theory of top-down causation by considering a challenge to the “level-picture of nature” which he employs as a foundational element in his theory. According to the level-picture, nature is ordered by distinct and finitely many levels, each characterised by its own types of entities, relations, laws and principles of behavior, and causal relations to their respective neighbouring top- and bottom-level. The branching hierarchy that results from this picture enables Ellis to build his model of modular hierarchical structure for complexity, his account of same-level, bottom-up and top-down causation, of emergence, equivalence-classes and multiple realisability. The three main arguments for the level-picture in Ellis’s works are reconstructed and shown to face serious problems. Finally, the paper presents a possible solution to this challenge by introducing a reformulation of certain fundamental points of Ellis’s theory that does without the level-picture of nature. This allows us to preserve all of his central claims about the model of complexity, the three types of causation, emergence, equivalence-classes and multiple realisability. Any problems pertaining to the level-picture can be remedied in the context of Ellis’s theory of top-down causation.

This book presents the latest research, conducted by leading philosophers and scientists from various fields, on the topic of top-down causation. The chapters combine to form a unique, interdisciplinary perspective, drawing upon George Ellis's extensive research and novel perspectives on topics including downwards causation, weak and strong emergence, mental causation, biological relativity, effective field theory and levels in nature. The collection also serves as a Festschrift in honour of George Ellis' 80th birthday. The extensive and interdisciplinary scope of this book makes it vital reading for anyone interested in the work of George Ellis and current research on the topics of causation and emergence.