-
351The aim of inquiry?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2): 506-523. 2024.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
-
176Committed Neutrality in the Rational MindAnalysis 82 (4): 754-765. 2022.Critical Notice of Scott Sturgeon's The Rational Mind
-
1Zetetic EpistemologyIn Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere, Routledge. forthcoming.In this paper I explore the contours of a picture of normative epistemology that speaks centrally to the question of how to inquire rather than just the question of what to believe. What if normative epistemology were expanded to encompass inquiry in full? I argue that while a 'zetetic epistemology' builds on traditional normative epistemology in many appealing ways, it also faces some challenges.
-
734The Epistemic and the ZeteticPhilosophical Review 129 (4): 501-536. 2020.Call the norms of inquiry zetetic norms. How are zetetic norms related to epistemic norms? At first glance, they seem quite closely connected. Aren't epistemic norms norms that bind inquirers qua inquirers? And isn't epistemology the place to look for a normative theory of inquiry? While much of this thought seems right, this paper argues that the relationship between the epistemic and the zetetic is not as harmonious as one might have thought and liked. In particular, this paper argues that som…Read more
-
41Correction to: Teleological epistemologyPhilosophical Studies 177 (1): 287-287. 2020.In Section 3 of the original version, the Weak Evidentialist Norm is given as follows: ‘For every S, p and t, S’s coming to know p at t is permissible’.
-
258Teleological epistemologyPhilosophical Studies 176 (3): 673-691. 2019.It is typically thought that some epistemic states are valuable—knowing, truly or accurately believing, understanding. These are states it’s thought good to be in and it’s also said that we aim or want to be in them. It is then sometimes claimed that these sorts of thoughts about epistemic goods or values ground or explain our epistemic norms. For instance, we think subjects should follow their evidence when they form their beliefs. But why should they? Why not believe against the evidence or ig…Read more
-
592Inquiry and BeliefNoûs 53 (2): 296-315. 2017.In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an inquiry or question settled.
-
800Suspended judgmentPhilosophical Studies 162 (2): 165-181. 2013.Abstract In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third o…Read more
-
272Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven EpistemologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3): 568-583. 2017.In this paper I revisit Gilbert Harman's arguments for a "clutter avoidance" norm. The norm -- which says that we ought to avoid cluttering our minds with trivialities -- is widely endorsed. I argue that it has some fairly dramatic consequences for normative epistemology.
-
654Why Suspend Judging?Noûs 51 (2): 302-326. 2017.In this paper I argue that suspension of judgment is intimately tied to inquiry and in particular that one is suspending judgment about some question if and only if one is inquiring into that question.
-
451Question‐directed attitudesPhilosophical Perspectives 27 (1): 145-174. 2013.In this paper I argue that there is a class of attitudes that have questions (rather than propositions or something else) as contents.
-
594Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of BeliefOxford Studies in Epistemology 4 57. 2013.There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, not-p to precise degrees of belief for p and not-p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather than belief,…Read more
-
2187A discussion of L.A. Paul's 'Transformative Experience' from an Author Meets Critics session at the 2015 Pacific APA.
University of Oxford
DPhil, 2011
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Normativity |
Value Theory |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Language |