Jane Kisbey

This thesis is presented as a collection of independent papers. In these papers, I investigate the nature of psychopathy. There are a number of issues that arise from this endeavour. I separate out these issues into single papers which allows us to gain a clearer picture of psychopaths. I begin, in paper 1, by introducing psychopathy in a clinical context. It is first important to understand how psychopathy is diagnosed and different subtypes of psychopathy before entering philosophical debates. After this background is given, in paper 2 I outline and defend my hypothesis of (Cleckleyan) psychopaths. I characterise them as extreme future-and-other discounters. I take this to be the central feature of psychopaths which accounts for and explains their other behavioural symptoms. In paper 3, I assess the personhood of psychopaths. Here, I argue that psychopaths are unable to recognise timeless and impersonal reasons for action. This is taken to be a necessary condition for personhood according to psychological theories of personal identity, and so I argue that psychopaths are not persons in the traditional philosophical sense. In paper 4, I examine the claim that psychopaths are incapable of empathy. I argue that we ought to remain agnostic about whether psychopaths lack empathy. The reason for this is because the evidence is also consistent with an alternative hypothesis, that is that they lack sympathy. In paper 5, I ask whether psychopaths are capable of mental time travel. I distinguish mental time travel from a different notion, one which I call “self-sympathy”. I argue that psychopaths are capable of the former but not the latter. Finally, in paper 6, I consider whether psychopaths are responsible for the harm they cause. My ultimate answer to this question is that they have diminished responsibility simpliciter which also entails diminished moral responsibility.