• University of Helsinki
    Department of Philosophy (Theoretical Philosophy, Practical Philosophy, Philosophy in Swedish)
    Post-doctoral fellow
Helsinki, Finland
  •  9
    Simulated Data in Empirical Science
    Foundations of Science 1-22. forthcoming.
    This paper provides the first systematic epistemological account of simulated data in empirical science. We focus on the epistemic issues modelers face when they generate simulated data to solve problems with empirical datasets, research tools, or experiments. We argue that for simulated data to count as epistemically reliable, a simulation model does not have to mimic its target. Instead, some models take empirical data as a target, and simulated data may successfully mimic such a target even i…Read more
  •  33
    Multiple Realizability and Biological Laws
    History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 34 (4): 521-537. 2012.
    We critically analyze Alexander Rosenberg’s argument based on the multiple realizability of biological properties that there are no biological laws. The argument is intuitive and suggestive. Nevertheless, a closer analysis reveals that the argument rests on dubious assumptions about the nature of natural selection, laws of nature, and multiple realizability. We also argue that the argument is limited in scope, since it applies to an outmoded account of laws and the applicability of the argument …Read more
  •  20
    Abstraction in ecology: reductionism and holism as complementary heuristics
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3): 395-416. 2018.
    In addition to their core explanatory and predictive assumptions, scientific models include simplifying assumptions, which function as idealizations, approximations, and abstractions. There are methods to investigate whether simplifying assumptions bias the results of models, such as robustness analyses. However, the equally important issue – the focus of this paper – has received less attention, namely, what are the methodological and epistemic strengths and limitations associated with differen…Read more
  •  126
    Causal and Mechanistic Explanations in Ecology
    Acta Biotheoretica 59 (3): 251-271. 2010.
    How are scientific explanations possible in ecology, given that there do not appear to be many—if any—ecological laws? To answer this question, I present and defend an account of scientific causal explanation in which ecological generalizations are explanatory if they are invariant rather than lawlike. An invariant generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change—called an intervention—that changes the value of its variables. According to this account, causes are difference-ma…Read more
  •  83
    Robustness and sensitivity of biological models
    Philosophical Studies 166 (2): 285-303. 2013.
    The aim of this paper is to develop ideas about robustness analyses. I introduce a form of robustness analysis that I call sufficient parameter robustness, which has been neglected in the literature. I claim that sufficient parameter robustness is different from derivational robustness, the focus of previous research. My purpose is not only to suggest a new taxonomy of robustness, but also to argue that previous authors have concentrated on a narrow sense of robustness analysis, which they have …Read more
  •  65
    Evolutionary Contingency, Stability, and Biological Laws
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1): 45-62. 2015.
    The contingency of biological regularities—and its implications for the existence of biological laws—has long puzzled biologists and philosophers. The best argument for the contingency of biological regularities is John Beatty’s evolutionary contingency thesis, which will be re-analyzed here. First, I argue that in Beatty’s thesis there are two versions of strong contingency used as arguments against biological laws that have gone unnoticed by his commentators. Second, Beatty’s two different ver…Read more
  •  68
    Stability and lawlikeness
    Biology and Philosophy 28 (5): 833-851. 2013.
    There appear to be no biological regularities that have the properties traditionally associated with laws, such as an unlimited scope or holding in all or many possible background conditions. Mitchell, Lange, and others have therefore suggested redefining laws to redeem the lawlike status of biological regularities. These authors suggest that biological regularities are lawlike because they are pragmatically or paradigmatically similar to laws or stable regularities. I will review these re-defin…Read more
  •  61
    The basic idea behind the Competitive Exclusion Principle is that species that have similar or identical niches cannot stably coexist in the same place for long periods of time when their common resources are limiting. A more exact definition of the CEP states that, in equilibrium, n number of sympatric species competing for a common set of limiting resources cannot stably coexist indefinitely on fewer than n number of resources. The magnitude or intensity of competition between species is propo…Read more
  •  67
    Allometries and scaling laws interpreted as laws: a reply to Elgin
    Biology and Philosophy 26 (1): 99-111. 2011.
    I analyze here biological regression equations known in the literature as allometries and scaling laws. My focus is on the alleged lawlike status of these equations. In particular I argue against recent views that regard allometries and scaling laws as representing universal, non-continent, and/or strict biological laws. Although allometries and scaling laws appear to be generalizations applying to many taxa, they are neither universal nor exceptionless. In fact there appear to be exceptions to …Read more
  •  47
    It is often argued that biological generalizations have a distinctive and special status by comparison with the generalizations of other natural sciences, such as that biological generalizations are riddled with exceptions defying systematic and simple treatment. This special status of biology is used as a premise in arguments that posit a deprived explanatory, nomological, or methodological status in the biological sciences. I will discuss the traditional and still almost universally held idea …Read more