Jani Sinokki

This chapter investigates Descartes’ theory of ideas by focusing on the distinctions he draws between different functions. It argues that Descartes is committed to a dual function of ideas: unifying the mind with its object and providing psychological and epistemic access to that object. Drawing on an analysis of Descartes’ terminology—especially his use of the terms “material,” “objective,” and “formal”—this chapter reconstructs a trichotomy underlying his conception of ideas. It aims to show how each term corresponds to a distinct perspective: ideas as mental operations, as unifications with objects, and as representations subject to truth and falsity. This framework is used to reinterpret Descartes’ responses to critics such as Arnauld and Desgabets and to reassess Margaret Wilson’s influential claim that Descartes’ view collapses into incoherence. This chapter ultimately defends the coherence of Descartes’ position by distinguishing misrepresentation from misattribution and by showing how the special status of the cogito reveals a case in which representation and objective reality converge, eliminating the possibility of error.

The paper argues that humour can be very effective in disseminating extremist ideologies, in part because of humour's inherent capacity to hinder critical reflection and in part because humour requires bringing together two conflicting frames of interpretation. With extremist humour, the other frame needed to make sense of what is funny is the extremist ideology itself. Thus, merely grasping what is funny in an extremist joke entails the ability to see and interpret other things through the lenses of that extremist ideology. Although this ability does not amount to accepting the ideology, the ability is the crucial first step in the process of converting audiences to the ideology. I argue that ideology should be understood as an interpretational framework, following the political theorist Michael Freeden, so that it is something that can be parsed from the joke by the audience making sense of the joke. This view of ideology opens a way for understanding how indoctrination to an ideology with humour occurs, explaining how ideology is transmitted, how it bypasses critical reflection and how it might cause dogmatism. The paper argues that this power stems not only from the cognitive mechanisms of humour processing but also from the deeper human needs that humour serves, the desire for communality and belonging and the creation of in-group/out-group distinctions (schismogenesis). The neo-Nazi website, the Daily Stormer, which is notorious for using humour to garner new adherents for the white supremacist ideology and antisemitism, is used as a case study.

This is an introduction to the volume "Cartesianism and Philosophy of Mind", edited by Vili Lähteenmäki, Oberto Marrama, and Jani Sinokki. This collective work focuses, from the viewpoint of the philosophy of mind, on interesting but insufficiently studied views and arguments among seventeenth-century Cartesians. It seeks to offer careful philosophical engagement with the topics and the sources – clarifying what Cartesian philosophy of mind amounts to, and, in doing so, helping us also better discern what is Cartesian in our contemporary philosophy of mind. What emerges from the various contributions in this book is not a single narrative about Cartesianism. In fact, the tradition commonly known as “Cartesianism” developed through distinct reactions to the ideas and arguments found in Descartes’ works. As the chapters in this volume illustrate, despite their shared intellectual heritage, Cartesian thinkers diverge in their views on the core principles of Cartesian philosophy. They disagree in their assessment of the significance, acceptability, and proper defense of specific doctrines about the mind. Hence, by looking at how Descartes’ conception of the mind was received through these reactions – including both constructive engagements and critical responses – we can gain a nuanced picture of the foundations of modern philosophy of mind. The first part of the volume focuses on the general features of the Cartesian mind, with particular emphasis on intentionality, representationality, and self-reflectivity. The chapters of the second part focus on the mind–world relationship, examining how minds are linked to and interact with external objects. The third and final part of the volume shifts focus from individual minds to trans-individual aspects of mentality.

Descartes holds that ideas have or contain _objective reality_ of their objects, so that the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect. In this paper, I examine this obscure thesis which grounds the disagreement about Descartes’ commitment to direct or indirect realism. I suggest that, importantly, both readings are correct to a certain extent. I argue that the view of objective reality Descartes develops bears the earmarks of both direct and indirect realist views but must be classified as a third alternative combining some central features of both. I elaborate first on the direct realist interpretations of Descartes’ objective reality and explain their most significant shortcomings. My interpretation of objective identity comes in the form of attributing to Descartes a view about identity and persistence of objects known as _sortalism_. I argue that Descartes’ objective identity turns out to be much like the Aristotelian view of _formal identity_, yet without the forms. By way of discussing the case of Theseus’ ship, I point out how Cartesian sortalism, contrary to other versions of sortalism, allows us to analyze the puzzle as a tension between two distinct yet independently legitimate criteria of identity. It is this sortalist insight that helps to render Descartes’ account of objective identity consistent. This point also grounds my argument that we need not consider direct and indirect realism as logical complements, contrary to the received wisdom.

Although the historical‐causal picture of reference Kripke sketches in Naming and Necessity is highly influential, Kripke in fact says very little about what reference is and how it comes about. In this paper I point out that the possibility of asking WH‐questions (i.e. ‘what?’, ‘who?’, ‘which?’) about a sound or inscription pattern (e.g., what does that refer to?) shows that in case of names especially, their reference, if there is one, will be preserved by a causal‐historical chain constituted by transmissions of the (physical) patterns themselves, even in absence of language users or any linguistic intentions. I sketch out a causal‐informational theory of reference, that holds that the causal aspect of refence transmission is due to two‐factors. On the other hand there are informational chains constituted by data transmissions, on the other, also communicational rules by which speakers can interpret the data as information of something are needed. In most part the causal‐informational theory sketched in the paper can be viewed as complementing Kripke’s original causal picture. However, I will argue that Kripke's account of fixing the reference of proper names in ‘initial baptisms’ is inadequate. I will argue that most cases of seemingly fixing the reference via use of a definite description (e.g., the naming of Neptune) in fact presuppose a prior causal‐informational connection to the named object, thus essentially fixing the reference in the same way as in cases of baptism by ostension. I will further argue that in the cases that do not fall into the previous category, the baptism by definite description simply fail to fix any reference. I thus conclude that there is no such thing as fixing the reference of a proper name by definite description.

Mikä tarkalleen ottaen on aistimusten rooli ulkoisten objektien havaitsemisessa Descartesin mukaan? Descartes esittää, ettei ulkoisia olioita havaita aistien avulla, vaan pelkästään mielen tarkastelulla. Yksi tapa ymmärtää Descartesin väite on ajatella, että suhde havaitsijan ja objektin välillä edellyttää päättelyä aistimuksista itse olion läsnäoloon. Toinen mahdollisuus on ajatella, että itse asiassa aistimukset ovat suhteellisen yhdentekeviä havainto-relaatiolle, ja että tämä relaatio muodostuu tietyllä tapaa syvemmän maailman rakenteen ymmärtämisestä. Tässäkin näkemyksessä aistimuksilla on tietty rooli, mutta kyse ei ole päättelystä aistimuksista objektin läsnäoloon, kuten edellisessä näkemyksessä, vaan päättelykyvyn käyttäminen kohdistuu pikemmin ajattelijan ja objektin välisten suhteiden ymmärtämiseen laajemman metafyysisen viitekehyksen avulla. Tämä kirjoitus tarkastelee tätä jälkimmäistä vaihtoehtoa mahdollisena tulkintana Descartesin havaintokäsityksessä ja pohtii samalla erityisesti aistimusten toimintoa havainnossa.

Kirjoitus tarkastelee kahta jännitteessä olevaa näkemystä mielestä, komputationalismia ja eksternalismia. Komputationalismin mukaan mielen toiminta on mahdollista kuvata yksikäsitteisistä askeleista muodostuvana laskentana. Eksternalismin mukaan mielen toimintaa ei ole kuitenkaan mahdollista ymmärtää ottamatta huomioon niitä merkitysrelaatioita, joita mielellä on maailmaan. Näiden kahden näkemyksen välillä on selvä jännite: eksternalismin korostamat merkitysrelaatiot eivät voi luonteensa vuoksi olla komputationaalisen kuvaukseen sisältyviä ominaisuuksia. Vertailemalla Jerry Fodorin ja René Descartesin näkemyksiä esitän, että mahdollisuudet komputationalismin ja eksternalismin yhteensovittamiseen riippuvat suuresti siitä, minkälaisen laajemman teoreettisen hierarkian osiksi komputationalismi ja eksternalismi käsitetään. Kiinnitän huomiota myös siihen, että eksternalismin tueksi tavallisesti esitetty ajatuskoe, Hilary Putnamin nk. kaksoismaa-ajatuskoe, näyttää riippuvan huomattavasti arkisemmasta ajattelun ilmiöstä kuin on esitetty. Esitän Descartesin käsittävän teoreettisesti keskeisimmäksi tasoksi kognitiivisten relaatioiden tason, ja täten alistavan muut teoreettisen kuvauksen tasot mielestä näiden ensisijaisten suhteiden toteumiksi. Fodorilaisessa näkemyksessä komputationaalinen kuvaus nähdään ensisijaisena, jolloin ongelmallisesti muut kuvaukset joudutaan selittämään pikemmin tuon komputationaalisen kuvauksen laajennuksina. Tämän näkökulmaeron ymmärtäminen auttaa myös näkemään, miten Descartesin näkemys kykenee sovittamaan komputationalismin että eksternalismin osaksi yhtä näkemystä. Kiinnitän huomiota erityisesti siihen, että mielen toiminnan ymmärtäminen yksityiskohtaisen mekaniikan tai laajojen relaatioiden tasolla on välttämättä riippuvaista siitä laajemmasta teoreettista viitekehyksestä, joka meillä ajattelun luonteesta on. Tässä hankkeessa perinteisen metafysiikan tärkeyttä ei tulisi aliarvioida.

This commentary examines gender asymmetries in online dating, particularly on Tinder, and highlights overlooked factors in Joona Räsänen's article. First, the growing number of men struggling to find romantic partners is a broader societal issue that extends beyond Tinder. Second, given that men outnumber women on the platform by a ratio of three to one, finding a match is inherently more difficult for men. Third, Räsänen's claim that Tinder constitutes an injustice for men and his suggestion to revert to traditional methods of assortative mating lack sufficient justification. Finally, based on recent studies of women's behaviour on Tinder, I propose an alternative hypothesis: many men may simply struggle to use the app effectively—that is, they may be bad at using Tinder.

This book explores themes in the philosophy of mind as they emerge within the early modern Cartesian tradition. It brings together thirteen contributions from international scholars, to provide a fine-grained account of how seventeenth-century thinkers scrutinized and re-interpreted Descartes’ doctrines about the nature and functions of the mind. Although it is well known that many of the challenges that philosophers confront today were discussed by the Cartesians, historical Cartesianism remains underexplored and warrants deeper, careful study. There is much to be learned about how the Cartesian tradition understood phenomena such as consciousness, intentionality, embodiment, and moral agency—and the puzzles they raise. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part 1 focuses on fundamental features of cognition, such as the nature of ideas and intentionality, as they were debated by early interlocutors of Descartes. Part 2 analyzes how Cartesian philosophers conceived the relation between sensation and material objects, including the human body. Part 3 investigates the moral and social dimensions of the Cartesian mind, such as love and virtues. Cartesianism and Philosophy of Mind will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on early modern philosophy and philosophy of mind.

Rasismia koskevaa yhteiskunnallista keskustelua näyttää leimaavan eräänlainen käsitenihilismi: rasismin käsitteen ajatellaan olevan epäselvyydessään niin altis erilaisille tulkinnoille, ettei yksiselitteistä määritelmää ole lainkaan löydettävissä. Myös tutkijat ja rasismin vastaista työtä tekevät tahot näyttävät alistuneen tähän oletukseen. Aiheen taustoittamisen ja sen potentiaalisesti haitallisten yhteiskunnallisten seurausten toteamisen jälkeen esitän filosofisesti perustellun lähestymistavan rasismin käsitteeseen. Ehdotan, että Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien Kaikkinaisen rotusyrjinnän poistamista koskeva kansainvälinen yleissopimus sisältää normatiivisen rasismin määritelmän, johon meidän tulee mukauttaa rasismin käsitteen käyttömme sekä yhteiskunnallisessa keskustelussa että tutkimuksessa. Totean, että tuon yleissopimuksen määritelmän voidaan – sen näennäisestä polveilevuudesta huolimatta – ymmärtää tuottavan tarkan ja käyttökelpoisen määritelmän rasismin käsitteelle. Esitän, että meidän on tällöin kuitenkin hylättävä klassinen näkemys käsitteistä ja niiden määritelmistä, ja pidettävä rasismin käsitettä niin kutsuttuna ryväskäsitteenä.