Janis Talivaldis Ozolins

The artefacts of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, common with other ethnic peoples, have to be understood not simply as objects that can be described in terms of their physical characteristics and the use made of them, but also as objects that have cultural, historical and religious significance. It is crucial that we see artefacts not just starkly as having utilitarian purposes, but immersed in an Aboriginal world in which they will have different meanings, if not uses, for different Aboriginal communities. It is also important to realise that every Aboriginal community will have prohibitions on outsiders knowing certain things which are sacred to that community and which only designated members of the community can know. Unless individuals are members of that community, they will not be privy to their secret matters. This is to preserve the value of not only certain ceremonies and rituals, but also specific designs, totems and objects. This means that the significance of the artefacts considered below can only be partially understood since our ability to enter the world of a specific Aboriginal community is limited.

Despite the great technical progress of the modern world, we live, in some parts of Western society at least, in a joyless and despairing world. Many Western countries are in demographic decline and their citizens, thanks to the Covid pandemic, increasingly distrustful of governments and science alike. At the same time, social media has replaced traditional media, such as newspapers, radio, and television, as the new sources of information and opinion about a multitude of issues. Unfortunately, because we are exhorted to be sensitive to everyone’s subjective feelings and because we are bombarded on all sides by masses of information, misinformation, and untested opinions, one of the first casualties of this zeitgeist is truth. The genesis of the contemporary estrangement from truth is the post-modern rejection of Modernity and the Enlightenment project in which the hope of humanity was taken to lie in reason and science alone. Religion was to henceforth be a private matter. A rising anti-religious fervour in the nineteenth century prompted Nietzsche to warn that the death of God would have dire consequences for human beings. Despite Nietzsche’s warnings, universal religious, moral and social principles grounded in a transcendent reality that demand priority over subjective desires, are now a major stumbling block for a world in which, in God’s absence, individual autonomy is the most important value and personal opinion overrides truth. Although post-modernity has provided a propaedeutic to the overconfident reliance of the Enlightenment on the power of an objective reason, it has, in its turn, swung the pendulum too far towards a dogmatic insistence that reality is subjective. This paper, drawing on Plato’s dialogues against the sophist, shows that the contemporary estrangement from truth is not new and that the postmodern world is full of sophists too. It is suggested that the chaos of the modern world can only be corrected through a return to a metaphysics in which God, and hence truth, has a central role.

Undoubtedly the past two years of the Covid-19 pandemic have been challenging for every nation. The response, however, has been varied. In this paper, beginning with a brief overview of how the virus has progressed in Australia, we consider some worrying developments. Although the speed with which state governments assumed emergency powers to deal with the virus showed a commendable degree of leadership, the continuing reliance on these powers to close state borders and to lockdown their citizens demonstrates a shift towards authoritarianism. Worse still, is the willing compliance of the majority of citizens in their own incarceration. The state of Victoria has the dubious honor of being the most locked down state in the world. The effect on mental health, particularly school children who have missed a significant portion of the school year, small businesses that have been forced to close, and workers unable to work from home, has been severe. State governments, by and large, have ignored this and continued to use lockdowns as the means of trying to control the spread of the virus. More recently, has come the realisation that eliminating the virus is not possible, and the end of lockdowns can only be achieved through mass vaccination. Rather concerningly, this has resulted in a further lurch towards an authoritarian state with growing support for mandating vaccination. We argue that the turn to totalitarianism should be resisted.

In this brief paper we undertake a reflection on the apparent failure of modern moral philosophical theories to provide any adequate guidance in moral decision-making. Anscombe, for example, contends that moral philosophy will never advance until there is an adequate moral psychology. MacIntyre laments that moral philosophers have not been clear about what their central questions are. This leads us to consider whether we need normative moral theories at all, leading to a discussion of the viability of intuitionism as a guide to moral actions, and if one of the central moral questions is about the nature of the good, whether it is as unanalysable as G.E. Moore proposed. We conclude that its unanalysability opens the door for a theological answer to the nature of the good. Finally, concluding that the nature of the good is not the expression of human passions, but is external to human beings, we provide a short classification of moral theories according to whether they are realist or anti-realist, cognitivist or non-cognitivist.

This volume addresses the issue of the human encounter with the Mystery of God and the purpose of human life. It explores major themes from diverse cultural and philosophical traditions, starting with questions about the possibility of belief in God, His transcendence as seen in both East and West, and ending with questions about ethics and about personhood, human dignity and human rights. Taking an eclectic approach, the chapters in this book each uniquely address aspects of the human encounter with the Mystery of God, drawing from specific cultures and traditions, and using a particular philosophical and theological style. Together, the chapters provide a fresh approach and a synergy that ensures that each topic contributes something new to the dialogue between religion and culture.

There is no doubt that medical nutrition and hydration to persons in a state of post-coma unresponsiveness [PCU], also called a “persistent vegetative state” should be provided. In agreement with Pope John Paul II, human persons with PCU remain persons and full members of the human community. Although the extent of their unresponsiveness needs to be taken into account in determining appropriate medical treatment, this does not alter their nature as human persons. Hence, they are always to be regarded as subjects of our care and solicitude. The view that they are incapable of acting towards spiritual ends and so it is not morally obligatory to continue nutrition and hydration is rejected, since this implies a loss of personhood. In addition, it is accepted that the burdens of caring for them should not be left solely to their families, but quite properly is also a responsibility of the community and the State. Irrespective of whether provision of medical nutrition and hydration is regarded as medical treatment or normal care, no person with PCU should be left uncared for. This could mean, however, that in some instances, appropriate care could include withdrawal of medical nutrition and hydration.

The use of narrative – in this case a fictional dialogue – has been a time-honoured way of exploring ideas and most importantly indispensable for learning, at least since the time of the Sophists. Indeed, the dialogues of Plato exemplify this thesis because the qualities and characteristics of philosophy and philosophising are revealed through their lives. Extending on this premise, we would argue that we learn to understand both the unity and complexity of philosophy – particularly in education and educational research – not by formal philosophical arguments, necessary as they are in some contexts, but by narratives that are relevant, narratives that make the actions of one or more characters intelligible and justifiable. As a result, this article uses a narrative approach for the dual purpose of exhibiting the relevance of philosophy intelligibly exhibited through the examples of the characters put forward, but at the same time characters we our...

R. S. Peters never explicitly talks about wisdom as being an aim of education. He does, however, in numerous places, emphasize that education is of the whole person and that, whatever else it might be about, it involves the development of knowledge and understanding. Being educated, he claims, is incompatible with being narrowly specialized. Moreover, he argues, education enables a person to have a different perspective on things, ‘to travel with a different view’ [Peters, R. S. (1967). What is an educational process? In R. S. Peters (Ed.), The concept of education (pp. 1–23). Routledge and Kegan Paul]. In asserting this about education, Peters has more in common with another great English educator, John Henry, Cardinal Newman, than one might expect, given they are separated by about a century and start from different philosophical perspectives, namely Kant to a significant degree in the former and Aristotle in the latter. Both nevertheless acknowledge the importance of reason and its development in any education worthy of the name. I will argue that in describing the ‘educated person’ Peters is not far from the view of Newman, who saw education as being about the ‘enlargement of mind’. Although Newman hesitates to call ‘enlargement of mind’ wisdom, and Peters does not use either term, there are good grounds for proposing that in distinguishing between education and training, and in asserting education is moral education because it is concerned to improve persons, Peters acknowledges the higher purposes of education and hence, we can add, its connection with wisdom. Significantly, what such a reading of Peters emphasizes is his insistence on the intrinsic value of education, a view seemingly lost in modern market-driven conceptions of education.

The place of physical education has been contested in recent times and it has been argued that its justification as part of school curricula seems to be marginal at best. Such justifications as have been offered, propose that physical education is justified because of its contribution to moral development or because it is capable of being studied as a theoretical subject. Other justifications have centred on the embodied nature of the human being. In this article we draw on some classical thinkers, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Augustine and Benedict, to argue for a strong, integrated view of the human person. From this it is concluded that physical education is a necessary component of education and that a complete education therefore involves physical education. Physical education is understood in a broad sense as a family resemblance concept which incorporates a wide variety of physical activities. Disciplined physical activity which enables individuals to gain those physical skills required for learning, it is proposed, is essential for intellectual development. Benedictine education, which involves hard physical work, reading, prayer and reflection, illustrates how the physical and mental aspects of a person are to be integrated in order to attain the ends of the committed Benedictine monk.

Education needs to prepare students to have understanding of themselves, of their relationships to others, to have an ability to make good moral and other judgements and to act on these. If education has a role to play in the alleviation of the crises facing the world, then there is some urgency in reflecting on what kind of education is needed in order to prepare young people to tackle these many crises. It is our contention that the major problem with modern education is that it has forgotten that its main task is helping students to learn to be wise. That is, in considering the aims of education, it is proposed that it is wisdom which is the main aim of education. This will be so whatever level of education we are discussing, though much of our discussion refers to higher education.

This paper provides a critical reflection on the International Theological Commission’s (ITC) document on Natural Law. The aim of the document is to argue that Natural Law Theory has the potential to provide the basis for a global ethics. It is argued here that though the aim of the ITC is laudable, there are considerable challenges and it is questionable whether the project itself is not somewhat quixotic, given the very divergent ways in which moral values are justified in different religions and cultures. Despite this, it is a very valuable contribution to the debate about universal moral values and the importance of reaching common understandings about rights and about fundamental human values. The challenge that is posed is whether it is possible for there to be a justification of natural law which is Buddhist, Hindu, or secular and whether this will also mean that the content of the law will also be the same.

The 'post-truth' world in which we live has been beset by fake news, lies and a cavalier disregard for truth. If truth is neglected then an alternative is an appeal to the emotions in order to validate a particular position, which can quickly turn to the use of power to impose a particular view. The loss of truth results in the loss of freedom. This book contends that if we want to preserve our freedom then we have a serious obligation to pursue truth. One way to do this is through an adequate moral education. Education in an Age of Lies and Fake News: Regaining a Love of Truth makes an argument for the importance of truth. It explores how we can retrieve the concept of truth and how moral education can be deployed in order to re-establish a commitment to truth. It introduces Eastern perspectives on the question of truth and how we view reality, and presents a realist position on the nature of truth as a counter to scepticism, drawing on Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, amongst others. Further, the chapters are mindful of the significance of developing a pedagogy which not only enables students to be critical thinkers, but to foster a genuine concern for truth and for its pursuit. This book will be essential reading for students, educators, philosophers and researchers pursuing the question of truth in the modern age.

If we accept Popper's idea that the human habitat is described in terms of three worlds, and that there are overlaps between these three worlds, our moral actions and values will also be subject to the same kinds of consideration as a repertoire of behaviours exhibited in a physical environment. We will develop moral habits in a moral habitat and our moral behaviours will also be dependent on the kind of moral habitat in which we find ourselves.There are three main problems to which this analysis leads and on which we will focus in this paper. Firstly, there is the problem of the kind of moral environment—habitat—that we need to provide for human beings if they are to develop the kinds of moral values that we hold to be important. Secondly, there is the question of how we are to develop the kinds of moral habits themselves and thirdly, there is the question of how these moral habits and habitat are to be maintained. If we take Popper seriously then human beings have a crucial responsibility in the creation of a moral third world—that is, a habitat in which human beings can flourish. Schools have an important role as a moral habitat for the inculcation of good moral habits

There are several versions of the anthropic principle and in its strong form, provides support for the theist through maintaining that the universe has to have a Designer. Unfortunately, its assumptions are simply untenable and so the best option is some version of the weak anthropic principle. In this paper, we consider some arguments in support of the Weal Anthropic Principle (WAP), namely, the "improbability of the Universe" argument and the "fine-tuning" argument. Neither of these arguments provide any decisive support for the WAP and so it does not sustain any sufficiently plausible argument for intelligent design nor, hence, the existence of God

A recurring theme in many places concerns the nurturing and maintenance of a civil society that is committed to justice, to human fulfilment and a community that actively pursues the good of all its members. The creation of a civil society where there is respect for persons and a concern for the good of others is an important social aim and though it is not the sole responsibility of educational institutions, they have a crucial role to play in its development. It also evident that the creation of a civil society includes the family and the wider community and so in order to understand how a civil society is to be fostered, we need to understand relationality, a central concept in both the Western and Eastern understandings of human nature. If we reflect on contemporary education in both the East and the West, an important question to consider is the extent to which education measures up to developing in young people a sense of their responsibilities to one another, their families and to the wider community. In short the question of how well we are developing humane persons who are able to relate to one another and build a civil society. This article argues that there needs to be a rebalancing of the aims of education to include the development of those values and dispositions that will foster a civil society.

In the mind of many governments the aim of education is not just to develop the potential of each young person and adult, but to also develop their creativity. Part of the logic of the rhetoric of constant improvement is that the improvement of literacy and numeracy is not enough, but that education must also unlock thepotential of every human being. Though few, if any, would dispute this as a laudable aim of education, the equating of creativity with the development of a person’s full potential is misguided. Though creativity does admit of degrees, at its highest level, it breaks new theoretical ground, solves formerly intractable problems and inspires new approaches to practical problems; at this level it cannot be taught and doubtful whether anyone can be taught to be creativeat any level. Moreover, the products of creative work will not always have economic value. It is argued that though it is important to encourage creativity, it should not be expected that creative outcomes will follow from such encouragement. The nature of creativity is such that governments should be careful what they wishfor.