Hegel’s confrontation with scepticism forms one of the most peculiar and elaborate attempts in the whole history of philosophy. For Hegel the only way for philosophy to gain immunity against sceptical attacks is not to reject but, on the contrary, to integrate scepticism into the philosophical discourse as its internal, negative or critical, moment. Scepticism should be thus transformed into a sceptical method, i.e. a mechanism of liberation of any giveness and finiteness. Hegel shows persuasive…
Read moreHegel’s confrontation with scepticism forms one of the most peculiar and elaborate attempts in the whole history of philosophy. For Hegel the only way for philosophy to gain immunity against sceptical attacks is not to reject but, on the contrary, to integrate scepticism into the philosophical discourse as its internal, negative or critical, moment. Scepticism should be thus transformed into a sceptical method, i.e. a mechanism of liberation of any giveness and finiteness. Hegel shows persuasively that scepticism does not result in any absolute nil; its negation is not absolute or abstract but a determinate one. It delivers content which remains beyond inspection and scrutinising although it needs itself to be tested and sublated. This very content of scepticism consists in the reality or in the being of the appearances, in the non-reducible somethingness of the phenomena, which remain, even for Sextus Empiricus, out of the scope of sceptical test. In the present text we will try to follow Hegel’s argument in the Sense-certainty chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, focusing especially on its third moment, wherein a pure sceptical attitude regarding the non reducible character of the sensible - its alleged immediacy, singularity and positivity - is decisively disproved and refuted.