Janusz Salamon

Peter Millican and Branden Thornhill-Miller have recently argued that contradictions between different religious belief systems, in conjunction with the host of defeaters based on empirical research concerning alleged sources of evidence for ‘perceived supernatural agency’, render all ‘first-order’, that is actual, religious traditions positively irrational, and a source of discord on a global scale. However, since the authors recognise that the ‘secularisation thesis’ appears to be incorrect, and that empirical research provides evidence that religious belief also has beneficial individual and social effects, they put forward a hypothesis of a ‘second-order religious belief ’, with Universalist overtones and thus free of intergroup conflict, and free of irrationality, since supported (solely) by the Fine-Tuning Argument. While granting most of their arguments based on empirical research and embracing the new paradigm of the atheism/religion debate implicit in their paper, I contend that Millican’s and Thornhill-Miller’s proposal is unlikely to appeal to religious believers, because it misconstrues the nature and grounds of religious belief. I suggest that their hypothesis may be refined by taking into account a view of axiologically grounded religious belief that I refer to as ‘agatheism’, since it identifies God or the Ultimate Reality with the ultimate good (to agathon).

In this paper I argue that from the point of view of a theist, inclusivism with respect to the issue whether adherents of different religious traditions can have veridical experience of God (or Ultimate Reality) now, is more plausible than the Alstonian exclusivism. I suggest that mystical inclusivism of the kind I imply in this paper may contribute to the development of cross-cultural philosophy of religion, as well as to the theoretical framework for inter-religious dialogue, because (1) it allows for the possibility of veridical experience of God in a variety of religious traditions, but (2) it avoids the radical revisionist postulates of Hickian pluralism and (3) it leaves open the question whether the creed of any specific tradition is a better approximation to the truth about God than the creeds of other traditions. (edited)

This article argues that the existence of horrendous evil calls into question not just the plausibility of the most popular theodicies on offer, notably sceptical theism, but the coherence of any agatheology–that is, any theology which identifies God or the ultimate reality with the ultimate good or with a maximally good being. The article contends that the only way an agatheologian can ‘save the face of God’ after Auschwitz and Kolyma is by endorsing a non-interventionist interpretation of the Divine providence which will amount to naturalisation of the discourse on evil by localising entirely in nature the causes of evil and the possible ways of its prevention. ‘Theodicy of justice as fairness’ is then presented as consistent with such naturalistic account of evils and yet compatible with a religious worldview. It justifies the Divine non-intervention by suggesting that it would not be just or fair for God to intervene on only some occasions to avert evil, if God is apparently prevented from intervening in all such cases. Since for Agatheos it is metaphysically impossible to do what is unjust or unfair, God never intervenes to avert evil.

The paper is a response to recent criticisms of agatheism, a new pluralistic interpretation of religious belief put forward by Janusz Salamon with the aim of accommodating the epistemological challenge of religious diversity. Agatheism is an axiologically grounded religious belief which identifies God, the Absolute or the ultimate reality religiously conceived with the ultimate good as the ultimate end of all human agency and thus an explanation of its irreducibly teleological character and a source of its meaning. Janusz Salamon argues that this grounding of religious belief in the human axiological consciousness makes it immune to falsification by any future science. Replying to the concerns of the critics about about irrationality of doxastic commitment to a particular religious tradition, Janusz Salamon argues that to the extent the fundamental agatheistic religious belief is presupposed in such tradition as its doxastic core, its belief system - if internally coherent and aligned with a worldview that is consistent with undisputed scientific findings - may be considered rational, despite there being a plurality of such belief systems.

Rezultaty badan filozofów religii związanych z nurtem analitycznym są w naszym kraju mało znane, w każdym razie znacznie mniej, niż na to zasługują. Tłumaczenia prac zaliczanych już do klasyki w tej dziedzinie badan filozoficznych można policzyć na palcach jednej ręki. Są to następujące pozycje: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Uwagi o religii i etyce; John L. Mackie, Cud teizmu; John Hick, Argumenty za istnieniem Boga; Alvin C. Plantinga, Bóg, wolność, zło; Richard Swinburne, Spójność teizmu, oraz cenna antologia ważniejszych esejów wydana w serii: Fragmenty filozofii analitycznej pod zbiorczym tytułem: Filozofia religii. Niedawno nakładem PWN, w cyklu publikacji z szeroko pojętego religioznawstwa, ukazał się przekład pierwszej pracy, którą można traktować jako elementarne wprowadzenie do zagadnień podejmowanych przez analityczną filozofię religii.

W maju 1998 roku odbyła się w Monachium międzynarodowa konferencja poświęcona zagadnieniu racjonalności teizmu. Temat to szeroko dyskutowany w ostatnich czasach, stąd wydawać by się mogło, że zorganizowanie jeszcze jednej sesji, która przyciągnęłaby uwagę środowiska filozofów religii, będzie przedsięwzięciem wyjątkowo trudnym. Tymczasem monachijska debata zasłużyła sobie na miano wydarzenia. O jej atrakcyjności zadecydował fakt, że została pomyślana jako próba ożywienia dialogu pomiędzy filozofami nawiązującymi do tradycji kontynentalnej z przedstawicielami filozofii analitycznej. Tego rodzaju ekumeniczne inicjatywy nalezą w tej dziedzinie do rzadkości. Ten swoisty izolacjonizm ma wiele przyczyn, a kością niezgody jest między innymi stosunek do Kanta. Postkantowska kontynentalna filozofia religii, kładąca nacisk na epistemologię i fenomenologię doświadczenia religijnego, postrzega anglosaski renesans badań nad klasycznymi problemami teodycealnymi jako nawrót do przedkrytycznego dogmatyzmu. Z kolei niektórzy analityczni filozofowie religii zdają się uprawiać swą dyscyplinę w taki sposób, jak gdyby kopernikański przewrót Kanta uważali za niebyły, a czasem nazywają expressis verbis epoką nowożytną okresem błędów i wypaczeń. Epistemologiczne zagadnienie racjonalności religii należy do kręgu zainteresowań obydwu wymienionych tradycji, stad możliwe jest tu połączenie wysiłków w celu uporządkowania tematyki i oceny aktualnego stanu refleksji.

The philosophical challenge that religious diversity poses for religious belief has become in recent years the focal point of a very engaging theological and philosophical debate. The debate began in the Christian context and it would be fair to say that its main issue remains the relationship of Christianity to other major religions. Traditionally Christian thinkers faced with the fact of religious plurality have assumed that Christianity is the only way to salvation, and the truth-claims of other religions can be refuted by way of argument. This position is described today as 'exclusivist'. John Hick's name has become synonymous with a radically different approach to the whole issue. Hick argues that all religious traditions make contact with the same Ultimate Reality, each encountering it through a variety of culturally shaped forms of thought and experience, but all offering equally effective paths to 'salvation/liberation'. Hick's pluralistic hypothesis, although very popular in some quarters, appears to many Christian and non-Christian thinkers as highly controversial.

Does the alleged religious experience of a mystic constitute a reliable source of knowledge about the object of his or her experience? Or does it rationally justify a move from such experience to meaningful beliefs about God or the Absolute which is supposed to be the object of that experience? And are religious beliefs in need of being grounded in religious experience in order to be rationally justified? Although it seems pretty obvious that a great many adherents of all religions find reasons for their beliefs in their religious traditions rather than in their personal religious experiences, one could note that usually these traditions present religious experiences of their founder figures as constituting evidence for their authenticity and truthfulness ; the supposed mystical experiences of some adherents of a given religious tradition are often treated by their co-believers as an important evidence which increases credibility of their own religious convictions.

Although it became customary to warn against confusing postmodernism with deconstructionism, it seems plausible to suggest that their central agendas are not dissimilar. Moreover, from the philosophical point of view, it is the idea of the 'deconstruction of meaning' that can be said to constitute the foundation of postmodernism understood here as an intellectual movement. It is true that grounded in the poststructuralist language analysis, deconstructionism seeks primarily to challenge the attempts inherent in the Western philosophical tradition to establish ultimate meaning in a text. However, as one might have anticipated, the deconstruction of meaning of texts provided a basis for a large scale project leading to deconstruction of all 'truths', as conceived in the mainstream philosophical tradition. And it did it by questioning the coherence of the very concept of 'truth'. Eclectic as postmodernism is, it can be recognized by the fundamental assumption that there is no common denominator that guarantees the one-ness of the world, or the possibility of objective or neutral thought. This assumption would suffice to make one expect that postmodernism will challenge the very foundations of any metaphysical or religious system of beliefs. And so it does. In this paper I would like to ellucidate just one way this challange may be construed, poiting to the example of Don Cupitt, the leading exponent of the 'antirealist' critique of the discourse of theism.

Does the alleged religious experience of a mystic constitute a reliable source of knowledge about the object of his or her experience? Or does it rationally justify a move from such experience to meaningful beliefs about God or the Absolute which is supposed to be the object of that experience? And are religious beliefs in need of being grounded in religious experience in order to be rationally justified? Although it seems pretty obvious that a great many adherents of all religions find reasons for their beliefs in their religious traditions rather than in their personal religious experiences, one could note that usually these traditions present religious experiences of their founder figures as constituting evidence for their authenticity and truthfulness ; the supposed mystical experiences of some adherents of a given religious tradition are often treated by their co-believers as an important evidence which increases credibility of their own religious convictions.

In this paper I want to look at the Holocaust story as an example of a value-laden story which might become one of the foundation stones of the emergent global ethics, indispensable for bridging ideological divides that so often prevent a global society from living in peace and solidarity. My key suggestion will be that the stories that have the potential of becoming truly “global stories,” will in reality become carriers of global values only after undergoing interpretative transformation which will enable all citizens of the global village to identify with ethically positive aspects of the story, so that they will perceive this story as their own.

Ogłoszenie papieskiej encykliki „Fides et ratio" ożywiło dawny spór o stosunek wiary i rozumu. Pewnym przyczynkiem do dyskusji precyzującym stanowisko, które zmierza de godzenia pozornej sprzeczności wymogów wiary i rozumu może być analiza dziewiętnastowiecznej polemiki Newmana z Lockiem. Filozofia religii obydwu myślicieli jest osadzona w szerszym teoriopoznawczym horyzoncie, co pozwala pokazać, iż rozwiązania dylematów wiary i rozumu należy szukać u samych podstaw ludzkiego bycia i poznania, w warstwie metafizycznej i epistemologicznej.

The philosophical challenge that religious diversity poses for religious belief has become in recent years the focal point of a very engaging theological and philosophical debate. The debate began in the Christian context and it would be fair to say that its main issue remains the relationship of Christianity to other major religions. Traditionally Christian thinkers faced with the fact of religious plurality have assumed that Christianity is the only way to salvation, and the truth-claims of other religions can be refuted by way of argument. This position is described today as 'exclusivist'. John Hick's name has become synonymous with a radically different approach to the whole issue. Hick argues that all religious traditions make contact with the same Ultimate Reality, each encountering it through a variety of culturally shaped forms of thought and experience, but all offering equally effective paths to 'salvation/liberation'. Hick's pluralistic hypothesis, although very popular in some quarters, appears to many Christian and non-Christian thinkers as highly controversial.

Does the alleged religious experience of a mystic constitute a reliable source of knowledge about the object of his or her experience? Or does it rationally justify a move from such experience to meaningful beliefs about God or the Absolute which is supposed to be the object of that experience? And are religious beliefs in need of being grounded in religious experience in order to be rationally justified? Although it seems pretty obvious that a great many adherents of all religions find reasons for their beliefs in their religious traditions rather than in their personal religious experiences, one could note that usually these traditions present religious experiences of their founder figures as constituting evidence for their authenticity and truthfulness ; the supposed mystical experiences of some adherents of a given religious tradition are often treated by their co-believers as an important evidence which increases credibility of their own religious convictions.

Rezultaty badan filozofów religii związanych z nurtem analitycznym są w naszym kraju mało znane, w każdym razie znacznie mniej, niż na to zasługują. Tłumaczenia prac zaliczanych już do klasyki w tej dziedzinie badan filozoficznych można policzyć na palcach jednej ręki. Są to następujące pozycje: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Uwagi o religii i etyce; John L. Mackie, Cud teizmu; John Hick, Argumenty za istnieniem Boga; Alvin C. Plantinga, Bóg, wolność, zło; Richard Swinburne, Spójność teizmu, oraz cenna antologia ważniejszych esejów wydana w serii: Fragmenty filozofii analitycznej pod zbiorczym tytułem: Filozofia religii. Niedawno nakładem PWN, w cyklu publikacji z szeroko pojętego religioznawstwa, ukazał się przekład pierwszej pracy, którą można traktować jako elementarne wprowadzenie do zagadnień podejmowanych przez analityczną filozofię religii.

Although it became customary to warn against confusing postmodernism with deconstructionism, it seems plausible to suggest that their central agendas are not dissimilar. Moreover, from the philosophical point of view, it is the idea of the 'deconstruction of meaning' that can be said to constitute the foundation of postmodernism understood here as an intellectual movement. It is true that grounded in the poststructuralist language analysis, deconstructionism seeks primarily to challenge the attempts inherent in the Western philosophical tradition to establish ultimate meaning in a text. However, as one might have anticipated, the deconstruction of meaning of texts provided a basis for a large scale project leading to deconstruction of all 'truths', as conceived in the mainstream philosophical tradition. And it did it by questioning the coherence of the very concept of 'truth'. Eclectic as postmodernism is, it can be recognized by the fundamental assumption that there is no common denominator that guarantees the one-ness of the world, or the possibility of objective or neutral thought. This assumption would suffice to make one expect that postmodernism will challenge the very foundations of any metaphysical or religious system of beliefs. And so it does. In this paper I would like to ellucidate just one way this challange may be construed, poiting to the example of Don Cupitt, the leading exponent of the 'antirealist' critique of the discourse of theism.

Ogłoszenie papieskiej encykliki „Fides et ratio" ożywiło dawny spór o stosunek wiary i rozumu. Pewnym przyczynkiem do dyskusji precyzującym stanowisko, które zmierza de godzenia pozornej sprzeczności wymogów wiary i rozumu może być analiza dziewiętnastowiecznej polemiki Newmana z Lockiem. Filozofia religii obydwu myślicieli jest osadzona w szerszym teoriopoznawczym horyzoncie, co pozwala pokazać, iż rozwiązania dylematów wiary i rozumu należy szukać u samych podstaw ludzkiego bycia i poznania, w warstwie metafizycznej i epistemologicznej.

W maju 1998 roku odbyła się w Monachium międzynarodowa konferencja poświęcona zagadnieniu racjonalności teizmu. Temat to szeroko dyskutowany w ostatnich czasach, stąd wydawać by się mogło, że zorganizowanie jeszcze jednej sesji, która przyciągnęłaby uwagę środowiska filozofów religii, będzie przedsięwzięciem wyjątkowo trudnym. Tymczasem monachijska debata zasłużyła sobie na miano wydarzenia. O jej atrakcyjności zadecydował fakt, że została pomyślana jako próba ożywienia dialogu pomiędzy filozofami nawiązującymi do tradycji kontynentalnej z przedstawicielami filozofii analitycznej. Tego rodzaju ekumeniczne inicjatywy nalezą w tej dziedzinie do rzadkości. Ten swoisty izolacjonizm ma wiele przyczyn, a kością niezgody jest między innymi stosunek do Kanta. Postkantowska kontynentalna filozofia religii, kładąca nacisk na epistemologię i fenomenologię doświadczenia religijnego, postrzega anglosaski renesans badań nad klasycznymi problemami teodycealnymi jako nawrót do przedkrytycznego dogmatyzmu. Z kolei niektórzy analityczni filozofowie religii zdają się uprawiać swą dyscyplinę w taki sposób, jak gdyby kopernikański przewrót Kanta uważali za niebyły, a czasem nazywają expressis verbis epoką nowożytną okresem błędów i wypaczeń. Epistemologiczne zagadnienie racjonalności religii należy do kręgu zainteresowań obydwu wymienionych tradycji, stad możliwe jest tu połączenie wysiłków w celu uporządkowania tematyki i oceny aktualnego stanu refleksji.