Jared Michelson

I evaluate three of the most widespread analytic objections to the doctrine of divine simplicity: that it fails to cohere with the application of accidental predicates like ‘creator’ or ‘lord’ to God, problematically entails that God is identical to an abstract object, and is inconsistent with the freedom and contingency of God’s acts in creation resulting in modal uniformity/collapse. In dialogue with Thomas’s account of the doctrine, I suggest that each objection is either the product of a misinterpretation or is addressed by Thomas himself. This defence of Thomas’s view of divine simplicity further unearths the way his account of divine simplicity is, according to Thomas, necessary to secure divine aseity and ultimacy. This places a burden upon analytic objectors to divine simplicity, questioning whether their neo-classical conception of God offers an adequate account of divine ultimacy, aseity, and even goodness.

I evaluate three of the most widespread analytic objections to the doctrine of divine simplicity: that it fails to cohere with the application of accidental predicates like ‘creator’ or ‘lord’ to God, problematically entails that God is identical to an abstract object, and is inconsistent with the freedom and contingency of God’s acts in creation resulting in modal uniformity/collapse. In dialogue with Thomas’s account of the doctrine, I suggest that each objection is either the product of a misinterpretation or is addressed by Thomas himself. This defence of Thomas’s view of divine simplicity further unearths the way his account of divine simplicity is, according to Thomas, necessary to secure divine aseity and ultimacy. This places a burden upon analytic objectors to divine simplicity, questioning whether their neo-classical conception of God offers an adequate account of divine ultimacy, aseity, and even goodness.

I evaluate three of the most widespread analytic objections to the doctrine of divine simplicity: that it fails to cohere with the application of accidental predicates like ‘creator’ or ‘lord’ to God, problematically entails that God is identical to an abstract object, and is inconsistent with the freedom and contingency of God’s acts in creation resulting in modal uniformity/collapse. In dialogue with Thomas’s account of the doctrine, I suggest that each objection is either the product of a misinterpretation or is addressed by Thomas himself. This defence of Thomas’s view of divine simplicity further unearths the way his account of divine simplicity is, according to Thomas, necessary to secure divine aseity and ultimacy. This places a burden upon analytic objectors to divine simplicity, questioning whether their neo-classical conception of God offers an adequate account of divine ultimacy, aseity, and even goodness.