Jaroslaw Olesiak

The aim of the present article is to consider the shortcomings of the physicalist rainfall example set forth by Aristotle in Physics II.8. I first outline the ancient physicalist account of the coming-to-be of natural organisms and the accompanying rejection of the teleological character of such processes. Then I examine the rainfall example itself. The fundamental difficulty is that rainfall does not appear to have a proper nature. Hence it is not natural in the strict sense and cannot be used in arguments either for or against natural teleology. Rainfall can at most have an end in a weak sense, which makes it inadequate as a paradigm. Furthermore, the physicalist conception of action for an end is itself flawed. I argue that they construe it anthropomorphically and falsely presuppose a symmetry between coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. I would like to thank Hasse Hamalainen and Marcin Karas for looking at earlier drafts of this paper. I am also especially grateful for the numerous remarks and suggestions of three anonymous referees

In the article I examine Aristotle’s distinction between knowledge and opinion. I first consider Aristotle’s notion of rational intuition in the light of the commentaries of Ross and Apostle. Next, I turn to the distinction between opinion and knowledge in Aristotle’s texts and in the commentaries of Aquinas and Barnes. I conclude that the distinction is complex, including a number of factors, some objective, others subjective. Aristotle believes that the object of knowledge must be objectively true and necessary; it must subjectively be seen as necessary; the true cause has to be known; and the necessity of the causal connection must be perceived. The most important criterion for knowledge is objective necessity. If any of the aforementioned criteria is not satisfied, there can according to him be at most true opinion

The present paper, taking as a point of departure Aristotle’s dispute with the ancient physicalists in Physics II.8-9 about the role of the final cause in nature, examines the context of the problem, his theory of the causes. Aristotle assumes an analogy between nature and craft and takes the production of artifacts to be paradigmatic. With these assumptions as guiding principles, the paper attempts to motivate his causal theory and propose what may be called a “logic” of the causes. It examines artefactual coming-to-be more closely, focusing on the aspects of Aristotle’s account that are highlighted in his explanation of natural coming-to-be: the basic character of the causes, the peculiar distinction between the causes and the accompanying the deeper coincidence among three of them, the complementarity between the final and moving causes, the nature and role of desire in coming-to-be, and the primacy of form. It introduces the notion of a trans-temporal objective whole and shows the need to consider the full whole — which includes the entire process of coming-to-be together with its source — as the proper context for a full understanding of coming-to-be. It also points out the importance of the distinction between the objective and subjective perspectives, especially useful in understanding final causality.